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The Psychology of Repression and Dissent in Autocracy
Lauren E. Young
How do autocrats maintain power? In many cases, autocrats lack the support of a majority of the
population. This problem is particularly stark in electoral autocracies, where autocrats must generate
millions of favorable votes in order to stay in power. Coercion, or the forcible exclusion of some
segments of the population from power, is one tool that many autocrats use to solve this problem.
However, creating coercive institutions is also dangerous for autocrats, as the same forces that can be
used to coerce citizens can also be used to depose or demand resources from the autocrat himself.
In the first paper, I contend that autocracies can use the psychological effects of fear to coerce
citizens at a lower cost and at lower personal risk. This psychological theory of autocratic coercion
has two core implications that I test. First, I use a lab-in-the-field experiment to show that the emotion
of fear reduces participation in pro-democracy action, and that this may work through its effects on
perceptions of risk and risk attitudes. Second, I show using correlational evidence that propensity to
feel fear predicts variation in participation in dissent.
In the second paper, I examine how poverty conditions the way that citizens respond to the threat
of coercion. I argue that poverty may make coercion more effective in reducing citizen dissent both
by making citizens more prone to fear, and by increasing their physical vulnerability to violence. I
test this prediction at the individual and constituency level using data on public opinion and voting in
Zimbabwe, drawing on random variation in recent exposure to violence and poverty.
The third paper tests whether emotions can also be used by activists to increase dissent among
citizens with anti-regime preferences. I partnered with an opposition party that ran an experimental
test of angry against enthusiastic campaign messages using video and images sent out via mobile
phone chat groups. Analysis of the transcripts of these groups shows that the anger appeals generated
significantly more pro-opposition participation in the groups. There is some evidence that anger was
most effective in constituencies that had experienced violence in the past.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, electoral autocracy has become the most common form of non-
democratic regime in the world (Schedler, 2013). In electoral autocracies, incumbents must mobilize
large numbers of citizens to cast a vote, often against their preferences, in order to maintain power.
How do unpopular incumbents maintain power, particularly given the growing external pressure to
hold elections? On the other hand, how do pro-democracy activists mobilize large enough swathes of
the population to bring about regime change?
This dissertation grew out of a desire to understand how people living under autocracy form
beliefs and make decisions about speaking out against the regime. As an outsider beginning to do
research on Zimbabwe, I was initially told that “everyone knows” what they can and can’t do or say
in such a setting. This view, however, seemed both to assume that the limits are stable and simple, and
that people’s thresholds for risk are relatively similar. Indeed, much of the literature on participation
in risky acts of dissent like protest seemed to take this view as a point of departure, assuming that
citizens receive information about the risks and benefits of dissent in a uniform, unbiased way.
This dissertation begins from the basic insight that estimating the risk of repression in autocracy is
cognitively difficult. As a result, individual variation in the interpretation of signals about repression
can help explain variation in dissent. I focus on one source of variation that both psychologists and
qualitative scholars of contentious politics have long identified as a critical factor in how individuals
react to risk, both in and out of the political arena: emotions.
I argue that emotions, particularly anger and fear, have an important causal effect on how citizens
perceive and process information about the risks of dissent. This assertion is grounded in the
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
literature on emotions and risk in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, where several decades of
experiments and observational research have shown that emotions affect parameters like pessimism
and risk aversion. It also has significant implications for understanding who participates in risky acts
of dissent, and how autocrats can remain in power despite the lack of popular support.
In this dissertation, I have tested the micro-foundations of this theory using a series of lab
experiments carried out with a total of 1,145 opposition supporters in Zimbabwe, a field experiment
with 941 opposition supporters, and historical analysis of data on voting and public opinion in
Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013. I use the experiments to isolate the causal effects of emotions
on decisions to dissent and test the micro-mechanisms of the theory that I propose. I also draw
on original and existing data to show at the individual and community level that variation in the
propensity to feel fear is related to large changes in the propensity to express dissent. Taken together,
these findings suggest that emotions are a powerful tool that can be used by pro-democracy and
ruling party elites to mobilize or demobilize citizens.
1.1 Relationship to existing literature
Understanding autocratic persistence and participation in democratization movements has long
been a focus of comparative politics. My research primarily speaks to a growing literature on
autocratic durability, and to a debate over whether autocracies persist by using institutions to facilitate
power-sharing arrangements or through coercive state power. One school of thought argues that
autocratic states survive on the basis of their coercive capacity, and that democratization movements
or revolutions succeed when this coercive capacity begins to crumble (Huntington, 2006; Skocpol,
1979; Bellin, 2004, 2012; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). By contrast, a new strand of the literature
on autocracy focuses on how institutions like elections, legislatures and ruling parties can be used
to facilitate power sharing and cooptation of potential challengers from within the elite or mass
movements (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2009, 2012). This new view
of autocracy as a collaborative set of power-sharing institutions is compelling, but it largely fails to
explain the high levels of repression that continue to exist in autocracies around the world (Taylor et
al., 2013; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; van Ham and Lindberg, 2015; Mares and Young, 2016).
My argument about emotions helps explain why coercion is so widely used by autocrats, and
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builds on a recent qualitative literature that explains the persistence of extractive or non-responsive
institutions by showing how violence creates terror that keeps unhappy populations in line (Fujii,
2013; Pearlman, 2013). Ultimately, this view builds on a long history of scholarship on fear under
autocracy, beginning with Montesquieu’s depiction of fear as an all-consuming tool of despotic rulers
(Robin, 2004).
My research is also related to two other literatures on the psychology of political participation.
First, it relates to the study of emotions in contentious politics including protest and rebellion. Some
of these theories contend that emotions make citizens act against their rational interest: Scott, for
example, argues that dissent is experienced as “...a rush of anger that overwhelms one’s deliberative
self” (1990, 218, see also Gurr, 1968; 1970). Others contend that emotions influence citizens’
preferences over strategies such as staying home or participating during protest (Petersen, 2002a;
Kuran, 1995; Goodwin, 1997). In line with these theories, I contend that emotions are central to
understanding participation in pro-democracy mobilization. However, I argue that emotions do not
make decision-makers irrational or change the order of preferences, but rather change how they
perceive risks and the level of risk that they are willing to take on.
On the other hand, this dissertation is also related to a number of studies on emotions in
American politics. Since ground-breaking work on emotional appeals in American elections in the
1990s (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Ansolabehere, 1995), there has
been a steady stream of research identifying how anger, fear, enthusiasm and other emotions affect
information-seeking (Brader, 2005; Valentino et al., 2008; Ryan, 2012), political preferences (Lerner
et al., 2003; Lerner and Small, 2008), and participation in electoral politics (Brader, 2006; Valentino
et al., 2011). From its earliest antecedents (Hartmann, 1936), this work has pioneered rigorous
experimental methods, and I transfer many of the methodological innovations of this literature to the
Zimbabwean context.
Finally, my research is part of a growing literature on how psychological factors affect electoral
manipulation. Dominant models of clientelistic transactions have struggled to explain why citizens
vote against their preferences despite the low probability of sanctions when ballot secrecy is protected.
Others have shown that preferences for reciprocity can sustain clientelistic transactions in lieu of
punishment (Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter, 2013; Lawson and Greene, 2014), and that norms
against vote buying and voter intimidation can shape their effectiveness (Gonzalez Ocantos et al.,
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2014; Collier and Vicente, 2014). My work suggests that politicians can manipulate the perceived
probability of punishment using fear, which may help them enforce quid-pro-quo transactions even
when the objective probability of sanctioning is low.
1.2 Overarching theoretical framework
Each of the three papers in this dissertation shed light on a different piece of the political processes
that determine whether citizens express their dissent against a repressive autocrat. This broader
theory is not explicitly elaborated or tested in this dissertation, but it lays a common foundation for
the three articles.
First, there is an underlying view that the threat of coercion is an important determinant of
whether citizens living under non-democratic governments decide to express or hide their dissent,
particularly around elections. This view in grounded in data showing that many elections around
the world are affected by violence (Taylor et al., 2013; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014), and that large
proportions of citizens in many countries are afraid of personally becoming victims of violence
during elections (van Ham and Lindberg, 2015; Mares and Young, 2016). All three of the papers in
this dissertation take place in a context where the threat of violence is highly salient for opposition
supporters in their decisions to speak or vote against the regime.
Second, although violence around elections may be used for many purposes, I focus on the role of
violence in signaling the risk of repression to opposition supporters. Others have argued that election
violence is used to enhance group identities (Wilkinson, 2004) or actually destroy the capacity of
challengers. While these strategic logics may also be at play, I argue that one key target of violent
events is not the primary victim but observers who see or hear about the violent event and update
their beliefs about how dangerous it is to act out against the regime. In Paper 2, I test whether groups
of people in areas recently affected by violence much larger than the actual number of victims are
less likely to speak or act against the regime in the days or months afterwards.
Third, it is cognitively difficult to form accurate beliefs about the risk of repression because
non-democracies are often low-information, high-stress environments. In such a context, emotions
play a large role in how information related to the risks of dissent is perceived and processed. Several
emotions are likely to influence the decision to participate in politics, both in high-risk contexts
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and established democracies: anger, fear, and enthusiasm. Theory from psychology suggests that
the emotions of anger and fear should have opposite effects on the propensity of people to take
political action (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Fear should demobilize political action, while anger
should increase it, perhaps even to a greater extent than a positive emotion like enthusiasm. In Paper
1, I test this micro-mechanisms of this view with respect to fear, while Paper 3 analyzes real political
messages to compare the effects of anger and enthusiasm.
Fourth, because anger and fear have opposite effects on participation decisions, I argue that
variation in individuals’ propensities to react to violence with anger versus fear can help explain why
repression is sometimes effective in quashing dissent, and other times fails to work or even backfires
from the autocrat’s perspective. To predict whether an individual will react to the threat of repression
with anger or fear, I focus on general self-efficacy, or beliefs about one’s general capacity to cope in
negative situations. Again, theory from psychology suggests that people low in self-efficacy should
be more likely to deem themselves incapable of coping and therefore react to a negative situation with
fear, while those high in self-efficacy will react with anger (Bandura, 1988). Self-efficacy is thought
to be formed over the long run through experiences of mastery, although there is some evidence
that it can be influenced through counseling interventions (Bandura, 1986). As a result, factors like
socioeconomic status, particularly in childhood, should influence perceptions of self-efficacy. In
Paper 1, I test whether self-efficacy is correlated with the emotional, perceptual, and behavioral
response to violent events. In Papers 2 and 3, I argue that variation in self-efficacy may drive some of
the relationship between measures of economic deprivation and the effectiveness of violent events
and different types of emotional appeals.
1.3 Summary of the Three Papers
1.3.1 Paper 1: The psychology of political risk - Repression, fear and mobilization
The first paper in my dissertation tests whether the emotion of fear can suppress dissent. I test this
proposition using an original lab-in-the-field experiment in which I randomly assigned 671 urban and
rural opposition supporters in Zimbabwe to experience fear in a political or apolitical context and
compared their outcomes to a neutral control. The experiment shows that fear reduces participation
in dissent by between 14 and 77% on a range of measures, and that these effects are mediated by
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increases in risk perceptions and risk aversion. Second, I test whether the propensity to feel fear in
the face of a threat due to low self-efficacy can explain variation in emotions, beliefs, and dissent. I
find that self-efficacy is a better predictor of political participation than other prominent explanations
including ideological preferences and access to information. These effects suggest that a model of
decision-making that takes emotions into account can help us understand how repression is used to
influence citizens and how its negative effects can be mitigated.
1.3.2 Paper 2: Preying on the poor - The impact of repressive violence on citizen
behavior
In the second paper, I explore whether demographic variation across individuals and constituencies
can explain why some citizens reduce dissent after repression events while others persist. In this
paper, I focus on the role of poverty, which may mediate the effect of repression on dissent through
two channels. First, poverty may make citizens more physically vulnerable to the threat of coercion
by making it harder for citizens to invest in security, travel or healthcare to prevent or mitigate
violence. Second, poverty might make citizens more psychologically vulnerable to coercion by
making them more vulnerable to fear. I test the prediction that repression should have the largest
effect on the behavior of the poor using observational data from Zimbabwe and two empirical
strategies at the constituency and individual level that draw on exogenous variation in economic
scarcity and exposure to repressive violence. The results suggest that repression is more effective
in shaping the behavior of poor citizens, and are robust across three analyses using independent
variation in repression and poverty. I also rule out alternative explanations by showing that repression
and scarcity are not accompanied by changes in preferences, differences in the type of repression, or
differences in the effectiveness of clientelism.
1.3.3 Paper 3: Mobilization under threat - An experimental test of opposition party
strategies in an electoral autocracy
The final paper has two primary goals. First, it tests whether emotions can be used to mobilize
opposition supporters. Second, it seeks to extend the finding that emotions can have a causal effect
on dissent into a real-world context. To do this, I analyze the results of an experiment that was run
by an opposition party in Zimbabwe to test whether party messages that appeal to anger are more
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effective in mobilizing their supporters to engage in pro-opposition speech than purely enthusiastic
appeals. The results show that randomly assigned anger appeals with the same informational content
increase action on average by 0.38 standard deviations. In real terms, this represents levels of
activity in the anger groups that were higher than the control by between 32% and 174% across
four different measures of participation. There is also evidence that these results are strongest in
areas with past repression. These results suggest that anger can be an important factor in mobilizing
political participation in repressive environments.
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Chapter 2
The psychology of political risk:
Repression, fear and mobilization
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Abstract
Many authoritarian regimes wield the threat of repression to suppress dissent. Cogni-
tive psychology predicts that the emotion of fear should affect how citizens perceive and
process information about repression risk, and ultimately how they behave. I test the im-
plications of this model of decision-making by studying how opposition supporters make
participation decisions and how different types of citizens vary in their decision-making
and outcomes. I test these predictions using a mix of quantitative and qualitative data,
including an original lab-in-the-field experiment with 671 urban and rural opposition
supporters in Zimbabwe. The experiment shows that fear reduces participation in dissent
by between 14 and 77% on a range of measures, and that these effects are mediated by
increases in risk perceptions and risk aversion. Second, a psychological propensity to
feel fear in the face of a threat is a better predictor of political participation than other
prominent explanations including ideological preferences and access to information.
These effects suggest that a model of decision-making that takes emotions into account
can help us understand how repression is used to influence citizens and how its negative
effects can be mitigated.
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2.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, electoral autocracy has become the most common form of non-
democratic regime in the world (Schedler, 2013). Sixty-nine countries in the world are currently
considered to be non-democratic, despite the fact that all but twelve have held national elections in
the past fifteen years (Hyde and Marinov, 2012; Freedom House, 2015). In many of these electoral
autocracies, repression is a key tool wielded by incumbent regimes to maintain power despite a lack
of popular support. In sub-Saharan Africa, one in five elections since 1990 have been afflicted by
significant electoral violence, mostly perpetrated by ruling parties (Straus and Taylor, 2012), and
48% of voters continent-wide reported fear of violence during elections in the fifth round of the
Afrobarometer survey. Large numbers of citizens must decide how to vote by considering not only
the cost of voting and promises of the respective parties, but also the potential physical and material
sanctions that they might face because of the party they choose.
Opposition supporters in repressive regimes must make difficult decisions about whether or not
to express their dissent – difficult not only because the stakes are high, but also because information
about potential costs and benefits is ambiguous. Citizens know that the regime has an interest in
exaggerating the cost of opposition, so they must judge this probability on the basis of credible
signals such as past acts of repression. However, violent events are generally rare, even in highly
repressive regimes. What does it mean for a citizen in one Harare slum trying to decide whether or
not to attend a protest that someone in another neighborhood was beaten for wearing an opposition
t-shirt last week? Would every potential attendee of that protest interpret the signal in the same way?
Most importantly, these risks must be assessed in emotional environments characterized by ardent
calls to protest and frightening threats. Coercive violence is often perpetrated in a way that seems
designed to maximize fear through graphic torture, public spectacle, or violation of norms. Does the
terror that violence incites play any role in how citizens perceive and process information about the
risks and opportunities of taking action against an autocratic regime? More plainly, does the emotion
of fear itself affect whether or not citizens choose to participate in pro-democracy action?
This study proposes and tests a theory of how emotions influence participation in pro-democracy
action by shaping how citizens perceive and process information about the risks and benefits of
dissent. My starting point is the calculation that citizens use to weigh the potential costs and benefits
of participation. I present a simple decision framework for citizens that is a function of the strength of
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their preferences for an alternative regime, the repressiveness of the regime, and the number of other
people who are expressing dissent. Citizens form beliefs about these parameters on the basis of past
repression events, which they interpret as signals about the regime’s repressive capacity and intent.
However, repression events also have an emotional impact, which I follow neuroscientists in defining
as patterns of chemical and neural responses to environmental stimuli that affect cognitive and bodily
processes. Specifically, repressive violence is intended to incite fear, which makes citizens more
pessimistic in their own perceptions of the risk of repression and less tolerant of risk. Through these
parameters – namely, pessimism and risk aversion – fear has a causal impact on citizens’ propensities
to dissent.
Modeling decision-making in this way has important implications. First, it can help explain
who participates in risky acts of dissent in autocracy. Because citizens differ in their propensities to
feel fear in response to a negative situation, the same repression event may terrify one citizen while
leaving another unmoved. This implies that variation in the subjective interpretation of signals of
repression risk can explain variation in protest participation across individuals. Second, it implies
that fear can be used strategically in the struggle between elites and citizens for control of the state.
Autocrats must allocate resources between coopting and coercing potential challengers. Some have
argued that coercion is an undesirable tool for autocrats because building up repressive institutions
creates a greater threat than it neutralizes. However, if autocrats can effectively use fear to coerce
citizens without needing to create the full capacity to carry out the threat, it may make coercion a
viable option, particularly for regimes that lack the financial resources to buy off the support of large
numbers of citizens.
This paper uses a mix of experimental, observational, and qualitative methods to test the impli-
cations of this theory using data from Zimbabwe, an electoral autocracy in which the regime that
is currently in power has previously used violence to win elections. First, in order to test the effect
of fear on how citizens make decisions about participating in dissent, I carried out a series of lab-
in-the-field experiments with a total of 1,145 opposition supporters in Zimbabwe. I experimentally
induce fear using standard techniques from psychology experiments, and measure pessimism about
the cost of dissent and risk attitudes. I measure both self-reported propensity to participate in various
acts of dissent, and an actual behavior that is indicative of the desire to express dissent. Second,
I use my original survey data test whether variation in the psychological predilection for fear can
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explain participation in dissent. I test whether low self-efficacy, a psychological characteristic that
predisposes people to have fear reactions in negative situations, is related to pessimism, risk aversion,
and ultimately a lower propensity to engage in pro-democracy action.
The evidence presented here shows that fear has a strong effect on dissent that may work through
pessimism and risk aversion. Experimentally induced fear reduces a hypothetical and behavioral
measure of participation in dissent. Mediation analysis using the methodology of Imai and Yamamoto
(2013) suggests that these changes in dissent are driven by increases in pessimism about the cost of
dissent and risk aversion. Second, there is strong and consistent evidence that self-efficacy perceptions
can explain which citizens react fearfully in the face of repression, and therefore who continues to
dissent in the face of threats and who abstains. Self-efficacy beliefs are in fact a stronger predictor of
dissent than measures of access to information or strength of preferences for the opposition.
A number of models explaining participation in citizen challenges against entrenched regimes
have emphasized how beliefs about the risk of repression, signaled by informational signals of the
regime’s strength and expectations about how other opposition supporters will behave, influences
participation in dissent (Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1994; Angeletos et al., 2007; Shadmehr and
Bernhardt, 2011; Tyson and Smith, 2015). However, these models have largely ignored how citizens
interpret information about potential risks and benefits of participation. The origins of preferences
and formation of beliefs about the state of the world are assumed to be exogenous or constant across
citizens. None of this literature considers that heterogeneity in interpretation of this information
might be important in explaining who dissents and who abstains. These theories have at their base a
model of citizen decision-making based on expected utility that assumes that emotions felt at the
time of the decision are epiphenomenal, and again, the way in which beliefs about the expected
utility of strategies are formed is not explained.
On the other hand, there are arguments that emotions are central to participation in anti-regime
speech, protest, or rebellion. Gurr (1970), for instance, argues that the anger caused by relative
deprivation enables citizens to overcome the collective action dilemma, and that this anger is even
redoubled by the threat of repression. Scott (1990) similarly argues that dissent is experienced as “a
loss of temper, a rush of anger that overwhelms one’s deliberative self rather than an act of calculated
anger” (218). Much of this literature, however, has ignored the strategic dimensions of dissent,
often assuming that emotions cause decisions to be completely dominated by expressive benefits,
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even in the face of large potential costs. In addition, both formal models of coordination for regime
change and theories that focus on the role of emotions in dissent have been subjected to few rigorous
empirical tests.
This study integrates insights on emotions and decision-making about risk from cognitive
psychology into a model of decisions about participation in high-risk, pro-democracy action. It
fills a gap in the literature between theories explaining collective action using an expected utility
framework, and studies that document the importance of emotions in social movements. While
others have done this by modeling emotions as part of “expressive benefits” (Downs, 1956; Varshney,
2003) that are weighed against the costs of political participation, I contend that the emotions felt
at the moment of making a decision influence assessments of multiple parameters as well as basic
preferences like risk attitudes that shape how these parameters are processed. Similar frameworks
have been proposed to explain attitudes towards counter-terrorism (Lerner et al., 2003), welfare
(Lerner and Small, 2008), and voting (Valentino et al., 2011) in the United States, but this study
extends this research to a new domain of political behavior.
Second, I add to studies of emotions and participation in contentious politics by testing the theory
that emotions matter in such contexts using rigorous experimental methods. Most past research
on this topic relies on case studies or interviews with protesters to bring evidence to bear on how
emotions influence behavior. However, these methods cannot definitively prove that emotions have a
causal effect. By isolating the effect of emotions, independent of new information, selection effects,
or even thoughts about existing information on parameters in the decision to participate in dissent,
my empirical strategy isolates the effect of fear itself on perceptions and behavior. This empirical
strategy draws from a long literature in psychology, as well as a number of recent experiments in
American politics and economics studying the causal effects of emotions (Valentino et al., 2008;
Banks and Valentino, 2012; Callen et al., 2014).
Finally, this study paints a rich picture of the experiences of opposition supporters in a repressive
regime. By leveraging the expertise and networks of an NGO that conducts research and provides
support to the victims of violence in Zimbabwe, I was able to survey more than 1,000 opposition
supporters living under the current threat of violence from a repressive regime. The methodology
that we developed to do this safely and precisely builds on practices deployed in contexts of civil war
or counter-insurgencies to protect participants and research staff. The data that we produced gives a
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rare glimpse into the lives of people living under an autocratic state that is willing to use violence to
maintain power.
2.2 A psychological theory of dissent in autocracy
Psychologists view emotions as processes that help individuals take advantageous actions in response
to a stimulus. Emotions are activity in specific parts of the brain that send signals to other parts of
the brain and body through the bloodstream and neural pathways. These signals set off a series of
reactions in the brain and body that prepare the individual to take appropriate action such as fight or
flight. Just as fear causes an individual’s heart rate to increase, it also causes changes in cognitive
processes and preferences such as attention, cognitive capacity, perceptions of risks, and tolerance
for risk. Fear specifically has been shown to make people risk averse, uncertain, attentive to threats
over incentives, and pessimistic, with the overall effect of facilitating retreat or vigilance in response
to a negative stimulus.
Citizens with pro-democracy preferences living under a repressive regime must make decisions
on a daily basis about whether to express or hide their dissent. Before they can make such a decision,
however, citizens must assess a number of parameters that shape the costs and benefits of dissent,
including how many other citizens will join them and the likelihood that they will face repression if
they engage in a specific act of dissent. These assessments are non-trivial, and must be made in a
context where information is scarce and multiple parties have incentives to misrepresent. The central
prediction of the theory that I elaborate in Section 2.2.1 is that these assessments and how they are
weighed together are affected by the emotional state of the decision-maker.
If this insight is correct, it has widespread implications for understanding pro-democracy collec-
tive action and the strategic interactions between autocrats and activists. First, if certain emotions
have a large effect on dissent decisions, then people who are more likely to experience those emotions
should be less likely to dissent. I argue in Section 2.2.2 that self-efficacy, or an individual’s subjective
assessment of her general ability to cope in negative situations, predicts whether individuals will
react to repressive threats with fear, and as a result how the threat will affect their behavior. Second, if
fear makes opponents of the regime less likely to take action, then the regime should try to maximize
fear in order to reduce dissent at minimal cost, while pro-democracy activists should try to fortify
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opposition supporters against fear. Ultimately, these effects have implications for the strategies that
agents of the regime and pro-democracy activists should use to mobilize or demobilize citizens,
including how much coercive threats should be used relative to other strategies such as patronage.
2.2.1 Emotions and decisions to dissent
Citizens considering whether or not to participate in an act of dissent must weigh the expected costs
and benefits of their action. At a very simple level, the expected utility of expressing dissent involves
weighing the expressive and instrumental benefits of dissent against the costs, including the potential
of being repressed.2 The focus of this paper is on the potential costs of dissent, which may involve
some opportunity cost in terms of time or money, plus the expected disutility of repression. The
disutility of repression is a function of the severity and probability of the violence that an individual
might face. I follow a number of other models of protest in arguing that because the regime has a
limited capacity to repress, an individual’s personal risk of repression also depends on the number of
other people who are expressing dissent.
These terms – the expressive benefits, perceived potential for change, opportunity cost, and
potential repression – must be weighed against each other. At this point citizens’ risk attitudes can
also influence their decision. Citizens who are risk neutral will simply sum the expected utility of
different outcomes. However, those who are risk averse will need the potential benefits of dissent to
outweigh the potential costs to compensate for the risk that they are taking on.
Estimating the risk of repression in an autocracy is not a trivial task: signals of repression risk
in autocracy are rare, noisy, and potentially biased (Stern and Hassid, 2012; Stern and O’Brien,
2012). Citizens must judge the risk of repression based on credible signals because regimes have an
2While most of the terms in this decision framework are probabilistic, most theories assume that the expressive benefits
of dissent are certain. For example, Kuran (1995) assumes that people derive some fundamental utility from expressing
their preferences. The instrumental benefits of dissent, based on the probability that your individual act of dissent will bring
about a change of regime and the extent to which you value that change, are typically thought to be negligible because
each individual action has an extremely small probability of being necessary to bring about change. However, there is
evidence that people actually tend to give such small probabilities outsize weight when making decisions (Kahneman,
2013). Furthermore, there is ample qualitative evidence that protesters do not just protest for to experience it but also
because they hope that their protest will have some influence. Nevertheless, these benefit parameters are not the focus of
this theory.
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incentive to exaggerate the risk of repressive violence in order to keep citizens in line at minimal
cost. The regime’s past use of violence is the best signal of its capacity and intention to repress.
For example, if someone who went to an opposition rally was recently killed by the regime in your
neighborhood, it sends a strong and credible signal that your personal risk of being killed if you take
a similar action is high. Repression events are relatively rare and interpreting what they mean for you
personally is not trivial. This implies that more often than not people must assess risks based on little
information, much of which is not credible. Of course, repression events are not purely informational
signals: repressive violence often induces fear. As a result, citizens must update their beliefs about
the costs and benefits of dissent in highly stressful, emotional environments based on rare, noisy, and
potentially biased signals. In other words, “...estimating the intentions and power of the dominant
is a social process of interpretation highly infused with desires and fears... the evidence is never
entirely unambiguous and that the subjectivity of subordinate groups is not irrelevant to its reading”
(Scott, 1990, 220).
This type of low-information, emotional environment is exactly where we would expect cognition
to be influenced by affect. Emotions play an integral role in decision-making of all kinds, includ-
ing decisions about political participation. Emotions are chemical and electrochemical processes
triggered by the brain in response to a stimulus (Damasio, 1994). Emotions have objects or stimuli
that cause them, such as a specific threat or opportunity (Russell, 2003), which distinguishes them
from moods or “background emotions” such as malaise, calm or tension (Damasio, 2000). While
the pathways through which emotions affect behavior and cognition are thought to be hard-wired
through evolutionary processes, the emotional reactions to specific objects can be either innate or
learned.
The focus in this study is on “incidental” or “anticipatory” emotions that an individual is actually
experiencing at the time of making a decision. These emotions have been shown to influence decision
parameters, including risk appraisals and attitudes.3 Importantly, while incidental affect is initially
caused by a specific object, it influences all judgments, decisions, and behaviors that the individual
3This is in contrast to what Lerner and Keltner (2001) call “integral affect” or Lowenstein et al. (2001) calls “anticipated
emotions”, which are defined as emotions that the decision-maker expects to feel in the future as a result of their choices.
Anticipated emotions are integrated into how people calculate the utility of specific strategies, while incidental emotions
have a broader impact on decisions.
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makes while under its influence (Lerner and Keltner, 2000).4
Emotions are associated with changes in how the body and brain functions that are intended
to prepare an individual for action. These include physiological changes that affect the autonomic
nervous system including breathing patterns, heart rate, and the central nervous system. They also
include significant changes in cognitive functioning including memory, attention (Eysenck, 1982),
the distribution of cognitive capacity (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992), the use of heuristics (Park and
Banaji, 2000), evaluative judgments (Schwartz and Clore, 1983), appraisals of uncertainty and lack
of control (Lerner and Keltner, 2001), and evaluations of risks (Johnson and Tversky, 1983).
Fear, the focus of this paper, is associated with a bundle of cognitive and physical changes that
evolved to help an organism survive an imminent threat. Fear causes people to pay more attention to
threatening stimuli, at the expense of other activities (Gray, 1987). A number of studies in political
psychology have found that information-seeking and vigilance are increased by anxiety (Brader,
2005; Valentino et al., 2008). It also redirects cognitive capacity to threats, reducing performance
on non-threat related cognitive tasks (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992). Most importantly for this study,
however, fear leads to heightened perceptions of risks (or in other words, more pessimistic) (Johnson
and Tversky, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003) and risk aversion (Guiso et
al., 2013; Cohn et al., 2015).
Applying these findings from psychology to the study of dissent decisions is relatively straight-
forward. Fear should affect perceptions of the risks associated with dissent as well as how those
potential risks and benefits are weighed against each other. First, fear should make people more
pessimistic in their beliefs about the number of other citizens who will express dissent. If I expect
that the regime is going to arrest ten people at a rally, the fewer other people that I expect to stand
with me in expressing anti-regime preferences, the higher the probability that the repression will
affect me personally. In addition, the number of other people whom you expect to turn out could
affect the chance that the action will successfully bring about regime change, which I argue that
citizens perceive as non-negligible. Second, fear should make people more pessimistic in their
expectations that they personally will face repressive violence. This term may be a function of
4For example, Lerner et al. (2003) show that experimentally inducing fear around the September 11th terrorist attacks
in the United States affected not only beliefs about political phenomena, but also perceptions of the probabilities of basic
risks such as catching the flu.
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changes in expectations about whether other people will also dissent, or in expectations about how
much repression the regime is willing or capable of doing. Third, fear should make people more risk
averse. In the case of political participation, this would imply that the expected benefits will have to
outweigh the expected costs by a larger amount to compensate for the risk involved in dissenting. As
a result of these effects, fear should reduce participation in dissent.
2.2.2 Self-efficacy and selection into fear
One important determinant of vulnerability to fear or anxiety is self-efficacy, or the perception
of one’s ability to cope with threats or challenges (Bandura, 1977, 1988). People who perceive
themselves as less efficacious are more likely to react fearfully to a threatening stimuli (Bandura
et al., 1982; Gamson, 1968). Those with high internal efficacy, on the other hand, are more likely
to assess that they have the capacity to face a challenge and therefore react with anger and action
(Bandura, 1977).
There is existing evidence that self-efficacy is linked to participation in the political sphere.
Valentino et al. (2009) show using data from the ANES that American voters who have higher
perceptions of their personal efficacy are more likely to feel angry rather than fearful in response to
policy threats, and that this anger in turn boosts participation in politics. The idea of self-efficacy is
also related to a large literature on “political efficacy” first identified by Campbell et al. (1954) to be
correlated with political participation. The concept of political efficacy, however, often combines
both an individual’s notion of personal effectiveness and her view of the responsiveness of the system
– a dimension that subsequent authors labelled external political efficacy (Iyengar, 1980).5 General
self-efficacy has been linked to higher participation in several political actions in a non-contentious
context, including participation in political campaigns (Rudolph et al., 2000) and calling in on radio
5Despite the recent theoretical clarity around internal and external political efficacy, these two elements have remained
difficult to disentangle in survey measures. For instance, internal political efficacy is often measured with survey questions
like “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does” on a four-point agree-disagree scale. However,
this measure actually conflates internal and external efficacy, as agreement requires that respondents both believe that
the political system is responsive to citizens and that they are personally efficacious (Morrell, 2003). To avoid these
measurement problems and separate the concept of personal or “internal” self-efficacy from views of the political system, I
measure self-efficacy using a battery of general questions about personal power and ability to cope in difficult situations
(Jerusalem and Schwarzer, 1995).
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shows (Newhagen, 1994).
In non-democratic settings, however, the effects of self-efficacy are more nuanced. Chen and
Zhong (2002) show that people with lower self-efficacy are more likely to turn out to vote in semi-
competitive elections during a relatively repressive period in Beijing in the 1990s. In this context,
turnout is additionally related to support for the authoritarian regime, affective attachments to the
political authority, and lower support for democracy, suggesting overall that voting is less about
influencing policy than showing support for the regime. Similar theories have been suggested in other
authoritarian environments, including the Soviet Union (Bahry and Silver, 1990), and in Zimbabwe,
there is evidence that education causes reductions in turnout that might work through a psychological
characteristic like self-efficacy (Croke et al., 2016). In addition, self-efficacy has been linked to
participation in protest in a number of contexts (Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Tausch et al., 2011).
I follow Valentino et al. (2009) by hewing closely to the original view of self-efficacy from
psychology as a general tendency to view a negative stimulus as a challenge rather than a threat
(Bandura, 1977). As a result, I predict that people with low self-efficacy are more likely to react
more fearfully to repressive threats. In turn, if fear has the effects on decision-making that I predicted
in Section 2.2.1, people low in self-efficacy should experience fear reactions more strongly and
frequently in a repressive political system than those high in self-efficacy. Thus, the model of
emotions and cognition that I posit implies that people low in self-efficacy should participate less in
dissent, be more pessimistic in their assessments of the risk of repression, and be more risk averse.
In effect, people who see themselves as inefficacious – even conditional on their actual coping ability
– should be more likely to select into fear, which subsequently affects how they make decisions about
dissent.
To summarize, I propose that a series of causal relationships are at play when a citizen in a
non-democratic regime is exposed to a repressive threat. Figure 2.1 presents these relationships as a
diagram of causal pathways.6
6This graph is a variant of the directed acyclical graphs discussed in Morgan and Winship (2007). However, I follow
Weinberg (2007) in using an arrow pointing at a causal relationship to capture a moderating variable, or a “variable that
affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or
criterion variable” (Baron and Kenny, 1986, 1174). This is in contrast to the methods of creating separate DAGs for
different subgroups discussed in Morgan and Winship (2012), or creating nodes for interaction terms as in VanderWeele
and Robins (2007).
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In Figure 2.1, repression represents a repressive threat that is received by a citizen with pro-
opposition or pro-democracy preferences. Repressive threats induce fear in a relationship that
is moderated by self-efficacy such that citizens low in self-efficacy have stronger fear reactions
after repression. Subsequently, fear changes the way that information is perceived and processed,
specifically by making decision-makers pessimistic and risk averse. By increasing how decision-
makers view and weigh the potential cost of dissent, these psychological parameters reduce dissent.
This diagram focuses on the causal processes of interest in this project rather than all possible
channels by which repression might influence dissent. In some ways, this figure presents the ideal use
of repressive threats by an autocrat. By working through fear, repression can effectively demobilize
citizens without bearing the full cost in terms of spending resources, creating an internal threat to
its own security, and losing international standing. The most important omitted set of processes
are effects that repression could have on alternative emotions (most importantly, anger), as well as
preferences and beliefs through an informational channel. These are not tested in this paper, but
certainly help explain why repression in some cases leads not to decreases but increases in dissent.
2.3 The Zimbabwean context
Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been an electoral autocracy (Kriger, 2005). It
holds regular elections but these have not resulted in any peaceful transitions of power between
parties, in part because of the ruling party’s use of violent force. ZANU-PF grew out the independence
struggle and enjoyed widespread popular support in the 1980s and 1990s that diminished in the
1990s in part due to a severe structural adjustment program (LeBas, 2011).
Zimbabwe’s ruling party began seriously employing the threat of repression against dissenters
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in the year 2000. Beginning around 1999, an opposition party that grew out of the country’s major
trade union began to credibly challenge ZANU-PF. The opposition party MDC had just orchestrated
the unexpected defeat of ZANU-PF’s proposed constitution in a referendum. Shortly thereafter,
opposition supporters and organizers began to be killed, and the government stopped protecting white
commercial farmers and their farm workers from threats by land invaders, often led by self-claimed
veterans of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle (LeBas, 2006). Zimbabwe’s white minority had been
an important source of funding and mobilization during the referendum.
From 2000 to 2008, repressive violence by the ruling party, targeting opposition supporters and
organizers, took a number of forms. In 2001 the government initiated a national youth training
program that created a nationwide militia for the party. These militia set up bases around the country
and began using more sophisticated forms of torture (Reeler, 2003; LeBas, 2011; Sachikonye, 2011).
Party agents, youth wing members, members of the association of independence war veterans,
soldiers, and traditional leaders have all played a role in organizing intimidation campaigns around
recent elections (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). By some accounts, by 2008 the youth militia had
as many as 50,000 members (Sachikonye, 2011, 48).
Violent repression reached a peak during the 2008 elections, which took place in a context
of hyperinflation, deindustrialization and the collapse of public services that led to widespread
dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Before the first round, violence began to escalate. In particular,
many identify the violent disruption of a prayer meeting organized by Save Zimbabwe Campaign in
March 2007 as a clear point of escalation. That meeting was disrupted by state agents who brutally
beat the campaigners. Sachikonye (2011) quotes interviewees who described that violent event
as “...aimed at sending ‘a message to all ... and there was both fear and revulsion’, ‘a warning to
others’ and ‘a lesson that authorities can humiliate anybody’ (Field Interviews with DA, CR and NW,
February 2010)” (89). One civil society leader explained how that this type of violence was designed
to affect election outcomes by intimidating opposition supporters. In his words, “Violence will have
a lot of effect on the outcome of the election. Firstly it is a tool of intimidation. By beating up people
like Tsvangirai they are sending the message that no one is safe. And when word gets out into the
rural areas that you are not safe, this will have enormous impact” (Reginald Matchaba-Hove, former
head of ZESN, quoted in OSISA, 8, 2007).
As the results of the March 2008 election were counted, it became clear that ZANU-PF had lost
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its parliamentary majority and the office of the presidency. At this point, “the party-state launched a
terror campaign of a scope and intensity never before seen in Zimbabwe” (Bratton and Masunungure,
2008, 51). This campaign was centrally controlled by the Joint Operations Command under the
leadership of the Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa (HRW, 2008; Sachikonye, 2011). A
passage from a report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe describes how
the 2008 violence was orchestrated:
“Perpetrators moved in groups of up to 30 and established ‘distinguishable bases’
supplied from confiscated foodstuffs and other necessities. The overwhelming numbers
of perpetrators made it difficult for individual victims to defend themselves. The tools
used varied from logs, sjamboks, machetes, steel rods, knobkerries to knives and chains.
However, there were cases where tools and equipment associated with security agencies
like the police (batons and guns) were used in the perpetration of the violence, suggesting
the direct involvement of state security agents or deliberate issuance of such tools to
party militia...”
(CCJPZ, 2009, 43)
This coordinated campaign brought the threat of violence from high-level national events into
the villages and homes of opposition supporters. Violence during this period was marked by public
assault and killings, and the increasing use of graphic forms of torture. (Sachikonye, 2011, 88) noted
an increase in “the widespread but calculated use of torture as an instrument to punish the opposition
and cause fear amongst its ranks” including “the use of falanga [beating on the soles of the feet], not
only by state agents including the police but also by the militia” (p88).
As a result, the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai pulled out of the run-off election scheduled
for July. Negotiations brokered by the international community between the government and the
opposition MDC led to the formation of a coalition government with the long-serving president and
ruling party leader Robert Mugabe remaining as president and Tsvangirai serving as Prime Minister.
Entry into government in February 2009 was the beginning of the MDC’s loss of popular support, as
shown by a number of polls conducted by the Afrobarometer and the Mass Public Opinion Institute,
a well-respected Zimbabwean survey firm (Bratton and Masunungure, 2012; Booysen, 2012). The
MDC, focused on skirmishes over parliamentary procedures and largely dismissive of internal and
external research showing that they had lost support, ran an anemic campaign in 2013 (Zamchiya,
2013). By contrast, the ZANU-PF 2013 campaign was “slick, well-funded, united and peaceful”
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(Tendi, 2013).
Post-2013, both ZANU-PF and the MDC fell into internecine conflicts. In 2014 President
Mugabe rapidly fired Vice President Joice Mujuru and purged her supporters from national and
regional posts, and promoted his unpopular wife Grace Mugabe to a powerful position as head of the
ZANU-PF women’s league (Freedom House, 2015). At the same time, the MDC’s defeat “catalysed
and consolidated sentiment against Tsvangirai who had now lost three presidential elections” (ICG,
2014, 10). A faction led by core members of the MDC leadership split off, creating a third MDC in
addition to an earlier regional faction that had split in 2005 (ICG, 2014).
As a result of both ruling party and opposition members getting expelled from their parties, a
series of by-elections for parliamentary seats were held in 2015 around the time of this study. The
main opposition party boycotted these elections, leaving ZANU-PF to compete against some of its
former members who ran as independents and several smaller opposition parties. In cases where the
ruling party candidate faced a credible challenge, such as from one of its former members running
as independents, the elections were preceded with widespread threats and attacks on candidates as
well as efforts to monitor, buy off and intimidate voters. Low-level violence also continued around
the country, though during this time it primarily consisted of violations perpetrated by and against
members of the same party as part of factional struggles (Zimbabwe Peace Project, June 2015). It
is in this context of a long history of repressive violence and growing dissatisfaction with both the
ruling party and the major opposition party that this study took place.
2.4 Empirical analysis: Fear and decisions to dissent
In this section I describe the research design and results of the first level of tests of the implications of
this theory. The core goal of this research design was to test whether emotions have a causal effect on
whether opposition supporters participate in dissent that works through pessimism and risk aversion.
To go back to the diagram presented in Section 2.2, this section tests the second half of the
proposed causal chain. Figure 2.2 uses the original DAG to show which processes are tested in this
section.
In this section, I use an emotion induction experiment to identify the effect of fear on decisions
about dissent. This experiment aims to shut down selection into fear by inducing fear in a random
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subset of participants – regardless of whether they are a type that is susceptible to feeling fear after
a repressive threat. The design enables me to test for the causal effect of the treatment on both the
psychological outcomes of itnerest and on dissent. However, the design does not allow me to test
whether pessimism and risk aversion mediate the relationship between fear and dissent. Instead, I use
mediation analysis based on the methodology of Imai and Yamamoto (2013) that rests on identifying
assumptions to test whether the psychological changes mediate the changes in dissent.
2.4.1 Research design: Identifying the effect of fear
The specific hypotheses that I set out to test in this section are based on the theory described in
Section 2.2.1. They were pre-registered with the EGAP experimental registry on September 29,
2015:7
1. Participants who receive the fear treatments will be more pessimistic in their expectations
about their fellow opposition supporters propensity to take pro-opposition action.
2. Participants who receive the fear treatments will be more pessimistic in their assessments of
their own probability of facing repression.
3. Participants who receive the fear treatments will be more risk averse.
4. Participants who receive the fear treatments will be less willing to take pro-opposition political
actions.
7I also pre-registered a fifth hypothesis that the effects of fear would spill over into economic domains. I do not focus
on here in the interest of parsimony, but discuss it and present the results in 2.A.5. A sixth, non-substantive hypothesis that
the effects of two different versions of the treatment would be the same was also pre-registered.
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There are several important design decisions that structure this section of the analysis. First,
testing the causal proposition that emotions affect dissent requires that we isolate the impact of
emotions independent of information or selection into feeling particular emotions. For example,
citizens with a higher objective risk of facing repression are likely to be both more fearful and have a
higher perceived risk of repression. Similarly, certain types of citizens may be more likely to be both
more fearful and have higher subjective perceptions of risk.
My research design addresses this issue by randomly assigning participants to an emotion
induction treatment that is commonly used in psychology experiments. Specifically, I use a reflection
task in which respondents are instructed by the enumerator to describe a situation that makes them
feel a specific emotion. The techniques that I use to stimulate emotions have been used in numerous
studies in psychology (Strack et al., 1985; Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Exercises based on recall are
one of the most effective ways to stimulate specific emotions, particularly compared to alternative
treatments like viewing videos (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007). It has also been shown to be a strong
enough treatment to cause physiological effects of emotions such as heart rate and skin conductance.
This method is increasingly used in political psychology to study the effect of emotions on political
attitudes towards welfare (Lerner and Small, 2008) or racial minorities (Banks and Valentino, 2012).
The second inferential challenge that my research design must solve is around selection into risk.
Because the probability of facing repression is conditional on their decision to participate in dissent,
general perceptions of the risk of repression are confounded by choices about actions. For example,
an individual may believe that if they attend a pro-opposition protest it is very likely that they will be
killed, but because they have no intention of going to a protest they may believe that their chance of
being killed is very low. Therefore, accurately measuring perceptions of risk requires that I measure
perceived risk conditional on a level of participation in dissent. To this end, I measure perceptions of
the risk of repression conditional on participation in a common act of dissent in the Zimbabwean
context – attending a rally for an opposition party.
Third, measuring propensity to take risky action in a way that does not expose participants in a
repressive environment to risk and minimizes desirability bias is a serious challenge. Self-reported
measures of propensity to take actions such as attending a rally, wearing a t-shirt, or sending an
SMS for the opposition are all closely related to the ultimate behavior of interest. However, whether
someone thinks that it is likely that they would take any of these actions is potentially only loosely
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related to what they would actually do, and it is unclear how the desire to please or look brave before
the surveyor might differ based on the emotional state of the participant. For these reasons, a real
behavioral measure of action is the gold standard for measuring propensity to take action. Other
experiments have measured willingness to take non-risky political action by giving participants
the chance to sign real petitions or send messages to their representatives (Grossman et al., 2014).
However, in this context, actions that link a participant by name to pro-opposition political actions
put participants at an unjustifiable level of risk.
To measure propensity to take meaningful pro-democracy action while minimizing bias and
risk to participants, I devised a new behavioral measure based on the type of thank-you gift that a
participant decided to take towards the end of the experiment. Specifically, I offer participants the
choice of one of two wristbands as a token of appreciation – first, a political wristband that they
are told would “show their political beliefs” when they wear it and is printed with the text “Voice
for Democracy” and “Speak out against Violence!” Alternatively, they are offered a similar plain
wristband with no text.
This measure identifies propensity to take pro-opposition political action if the only reason that
fear might induce a respondent to choose the plain wristband over the political is because they
become unwilling to show their political beliefs. The wristbands are the same size and color, and
from a distance appear exactly the same, so there is no reason to believe that one would be more
attractive from a stylistic perspective or have a higher re-sale value (or that the fear treatment would
affect concerns about personal style or the desire to sell the wristband). Wearing pro-democracy
or pro-opposition paraphernalia is an act of dissent in Zimbabwe that can put people at risk of
facing low-level repressive violence such as threats or assault, particularly during election periods.
However, giving the participants a wristband that they may or may not choose to wear after the
induced emotions have worn off does not meaningfully increase the level of risk that they face.
The following sections describe the experimental design in more detail.
2.4.1.1 Treatment: Inducing emotions
The treatment in this study is a reflection task commonly used in psychology to induce specific
emotions. In the task, participants are asked to describe a time that they felt a targeted emotion in
detail and in a way that would also make a reader or listener feel the emotion. Compared to other
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methods of inducing emotion, including videos or situations like public speaking or interactions with
confederates of the experimenter, reflection tasks (also called directed recall) are one of the best ways
to isolate a specific emotion in a range of people (Myers and Tingley, Forthcoming). This method is
strong enough to cause changes in physical measures of emotional arousal based on cardiovascular,
respiratory or electrodermal response (Kriebing, 2010).
In the task, the participant is asked by the enumerator to describe a situation that makes them
relaxed (control), or afraid (treatment).8 Half of the treated participants were assigned to a version of
the prime that directed them to talk fears around politics and elections. The entire interview, including
the emotion induction, was done in private. The enumerator read a list of examples of things that
a similar sample pool had reported made them afraid or relaxed before asking the participant to
describe the situation in a way that might make the enumerator herself relaxed or afraid as well.
Enumerators were given a list of probes to use to follow up on the response and were instructed to
keep the participant focused on what makes him or her afraid until they were satisfied that they had
reflected on a real, relevant fear, and to redirect the participant if they went off-topic. The text of the
instructions for the reflection task are shown in Appendix Table 2.23.
The first question is designed to help the participant brainstorm several things that make him or
her afraid or relaxed, and thus make it easier to focus later on the items in the list that make them
most afraid or relaxed. After coming up with a list of at least two things that make them afraid or
relaxed, participants were asked to describe in detail the one that makes them most afraid before
completing the first battery of outcome measures. Then, before the second set of outcome measures,
they were asked to describe in more detail another situation that makes them afraid or relaxed in
order to re-induce the emotion to carry through to the end of the outcome modules.
Describing the situation to an enumerator is advantageous in this situation for several reasons.
First, it enables us to include low-literacy participants in our sample. Second, the enumerator can
use a series of several permitted probes to direct the participant in an interactive way to reflect on
precisely the ideas or feelings that trigger the specific emotion, enabling a more potent treatment.
This type of emotion-induction technique has been used in a wide range of contexts, including in
8A recent validation exercise of this emotion induction technique found that it had little effect on positive emotions
(Myers and Tingley, Forthcoming). I chose a control focusing on relaxation to ensure that the control participants, many of
whom live in high-stress environments, had a low likelihood of reflecting on things that actually induced stress or fear.
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low- or middle-income countries such as Kenya, Afghanistan (Callen et al., 2014), and Colombia
(Bogliacino et al., 2015), although I have adapted it to the Zimbabwean context. The method was
developed and has most typically been used in internet- or lab-based surveys in the U.S. where
respondents are asked to describe the situations in which they felt the specified emotion in writing
(Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003; Banks and Valentino, 2012).
Although this method is thought of as the best existing way to induce a specific targeted emotion,
in practice the evidence suggests it meets a slightly lower standard. While there is consistent evidence
that negative emotion inductions are able to induce the targeted emotion, they also tend to induce
other negative emotions and reduce positive emotions. Some past studies using this type of emotion
induction conduct a manipulation check with only a handful of subjects (often less than 20) (Lerner
and Keltner, 2001), or run a manipulation check that only compares two negative emotions rather
than comparing both to a control (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003), or simply do not run
a manipulation check (Callen et al., 2014). A number of studies that have carried out manipulation
checks on multiple emotions in large samples have found that the directed reflection task targeting
one negative emotion like fear in many cases also increase other negative emotions such as anger
(Valentino et al., 2011; Banks and Valentino, 2012; Myers and Tingley, Forthcoming).
Other researchers have suggested three ways of dealing with this exclusion restriction violation
in the design and analysis of emotion induction experiments. First, some psychologists and social
scientists have begun using alternative treatments such as the anticipation of electric shocks (Cohn et
al., 2015) or injections of the stress hormone cortisol (Kandasamy et al., 2014). These methods are
promising but are much less tested, less realistic, and difficult to implement outside of well-equipped
labs. Others have argued that emotion inductions should be analyzed using mediation analysis to
test whether the targeted emotion mediates the relationship between the treatment and outcomes of
interest (Myers and Tingley, Forthcoming; Albertson and Gadarian, Forthcoming 2016). I contend
that this method (particularly the method developed by Imai and Yamamoto (2013) that doesn’t rely
on the assumption of no post-treatment confounding) can provide an important secondary check, but
shouldn’t be used as the primary form of analysis. Even the Imai and Yamamoto (2013) relies on the
sequential ignorability assumption, essentially requiring that the analysts control for all potential pre-
and post-treatment confounders. In this way, most of the benefits of experimental design are lost.
Finally, some have shown only that the targeted emotions were induced in greater amounts than the
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non-targeted emotions, and have relied on theory to make arguments about the direction of potential
bias (Valentino et al., 2011; Banks and Valentino, 2012). Most commonly, researchers studying anger
or fear have argued that these emotions, though they are often both induced by the same treatment,
are believed to have the opposite effects on many outcomes, including risk assessments, risk attitudes,
and propensity to take political action. In my discussion of the results, I will implement a mediation
analysis as a secondary test, and also make logical arguments based on the size of the effects and
directions of likely bias. Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with concerns about this
exclusion restriction violation in mind.
Randomization into the treatment categories was blocked on community, enumerator, and gender.
Each enumerator used a survey dictionary to select the appropriate treatment based on the gender of
the participant and the number of the interview.
2.4.1.2 Measurement
After the emotion induction treatment, participants went through a series of modules to measure
outcomes. Assessment of political risks were measured with a series of twelve questions on six
political risks that are relevant in the Zimbabwean context. As discussed in depth in section 2.4.1,
to hold constant the riskiness of the behavior that the respondent typically engages in, I asked
participants to report their perception of the probability that they would face punishments if they
engage in a specific action, namely going to an opposition rally. Participants were asked about the
probability that they will face threats, assault, destruction of property, sexual abuse, abduction and
torture, and murder. They were asked to report the risk of each if they go to a rally now (during
a non-election period) and around the time of the next election. They assessed the likelihood of
each risk on a five-point scale that was easy to understand in the local language including not at all
likely, a little bit likely, somewhat likely, very likely, and sure. The responses to these questions were
averaged together to make an index of perceived risk of repression.
Beliefs about other opposition supporters’ willingness to engage in politics were measured in a
similar way. Respondents reported the proportion of other opposition supporters in their community
that they believe would wear an opposition party t-shirt, share a funny joke about the president, go to
an opposition rally, refuse to go to a pungwe [a mandatory rally for the ruling party] when asked by a
community leader, tell a war veteran [a type of individual who is known for perpetrating political
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violence] that she supports the opposition, or testify in court against a perpetrator of violence. They
were asked to assess the proportion of other opposition supporters that would take each action now
(during a non-election period) and around the next election on a five-point scale including none, a
few, some, many, and all. The answers to these questions were averaged together to create an index
of beliefs about others’ propensity to participate in dissent.
The next two outcomes both measure propensity to participate in dissent. The first measure is
hypothetical and follows the same structure as the questions about beliefs about other opposition
supporters to reduce complexity for respondents. The response scale was the same five-point
probability scale that respondents used to report the risk of repression. Respondents were asked
to report the likelihood that they themselves would wear an opposition party t-shirt, share a funny
joke about the president, go to an opposition rally, refuse to go to a pungwe [a mandatory rally for
the ruling party] when asked by a community leader, tell a war veteran [a type of individual who is
known for perpetrating political violence] that she supports the opposition, or testify in court against
a perpetrator of violence. They reported the likelihood that they would take each action now (during
a non-election period) and around the next election. The answers to these questions were used to
make an index of propensity to dissent.
As a behavioral measure of propensity to take political action, I record whether participants chose
to take as a thank-you gift a wristband with a pro-democracy and anti-violence slogans on it over
an otherwise similar plain wristband. The enumerator explained to participants when offering the
wristband that one has a slogan that will “show your political beliefs” and read the written text, while
the other has no political message. As discussed in section 2.4.1, the only reason that fear would
cause an increase in the propensity to take the plain over political wristband is through a decrease in
the willingness to express dissent.
Finally, I measured financial risk attitudes and pessimism about economic outcomes. Financial
risk attitudes were measured with a module developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002) that uses a
series of four 50-50 lotteries in which participants chose from five different bets with varying levels
of risk. Across the four lotteries, there will be two standard conditions, one condition with ambiguity,
and one with losses. From these I constructed several measures: risk aversion, ambiguity aversion,
and loss aversion. Due to its reliance on 50-50 coin flips, which are easy to understand intuitively, this
measure is designed to be effective with a participant pool that includes low-numeracy individuals.
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Financial pessimism was measured using twelve scenarios similar to the political risk perceptions
and the same five-point probability scale. These questions elicited the perceived likelihood that
investment in a small business will pay off, that someone in the family would lose a job if they got
one, that a family breadwinner would have to stop working, that a major asset would be broken
or lost, or that savings would be lost or stolen. Each probability was assessed over the next six
months and the next two years. All twelve questions were averaged into an index of economic risk
perceptions.
Within each outcome module except for the lotteries and wristband, the order of the questions
was randomly assigned.
As a manipulation check after the measurement of the five outcomes of interest, respondents
were asked to report the extent to which they felt six primary emotions in the present moment to
assess whether the treatment had in fact induced the targeted emotion. The emotions measured were
fear, anger, surprise, happiness, sadness, and disgust, all on a four-point scale (not at all, a little bit,
somewhat, and very). In practice, inducing fear is likely to also induce other negative emotions and
reduce positive emotions. A principal concern was that the participants in the fear condition were not
also induced to feel anger to the same degree as they felt fear, given the evidence that anger causes
optimistic risk assessments (Lerner et al., 2003) and increases in participation in collective action
(Young, 2015).
The participants’ emotional states were measured after the last outcome measure to reduce the
evidence that asking participants to report on their emotional states can reduce the extent to which
they actually feel the targeted emotion (Keltner et al., 1993b; Kassam and Mendes, 2013). Carrying
out the manipulation check at the end of the study also tests whether the emotions were induced
throughout the course of all of the outcome modules.
In addition, 10% of the emotion inductions were randomly selected to be recorded and were
transcribed and translated as a second manipulation check and to provide a qualitative sense of the
political and apolitical fears that participants focused on.
Participants subsequently took part in a second short experiment using a conjoint analysis design,
and then answered two batteries of questions on past exposure to repression and past participation in
opposition politics. These modules were put after the treatments to avoid priming the participants in
all three treatment arms to think about repressive violence.
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Some specifications also include a set of controls measured before the emotion induction treat-
ments. Socioeconomic status was measured using an updated version of the index of asset ownership
from the last Zimbabwean Demographic and Health Survey. It covers quality of housing, land
ownership, major assets like generators and cars, small assets like mobile phones and radios, and
livestock. I use the standardized first principal component of these questions as my measure of
socioeconomic status.
Self-efficacy, a psychological concept that is related to perceptions of your personal ability to deal
with challenging situations, was measured with a ten-point questionnaire developed by Jerusalem
and Schwarzer (1992); Schwarzer et al. (1997). This module has previously been used in 28 different
languages in North and South America, Europe, and Asia.
Past exposure to political violence is measured with a module based on the Harvard Trauma
Questionnaire. The types of traumas asked about are taken from past applications of the Harvard
Trauma Questionnaire in Zimbabwe. For each item, respondents were asked whether they experienced
the trauma and whether they heard about it happening in their community since 2000. Last, I measured
past participation in opposition politics with a series of eight questions about whether the respondent
has taken pro-opposition actions many times, sometimes, once or twice, or never since the year 2000.
In order to avoid priming participants on opposition politics and political violence, these last two
batteries of questions came after the treatment.
2.4.1.3 Data and implementation
This experiment was carried out by researchers connected with the Zimbabwean NGO Voice for
Democracy (VfD), which conducts research on human rights abuses and organizes communities to
prevent and respond to political violence. Relying on VfD’s existing networks and local knowledge
was crucial for this study to be carried out safely as the research team could leverage existing social
ties with respondents to establish trust.
The researchers who interacted with participants and the research team leader were blind to the
hypotheses of the study, although it was necessary that they understood that the emotion induction
was a “treatment” designed to have some effect on participants’ behavior. Even when asked what
patterns they thought I expected to see after the survey concluded, they reported that they did not have
any expectations about the hypotheses. Keeping participants and surveyors blind to the hypotheses
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was important to ensure that their behavior was not shaped by these expectations through subtle cues,
desirability bias, or actual manipulation of the results.
Interviews were carried out by surveyors in pairs within isolated areas of private homes provided
by the mobilizer to ensure privacy. Interviewers obtained informed consent verbally in the local
language of Shona. Data was collected on tablets using Open Data Kit software. No identifying
information on participants was collected in order to reduce the probability that participants could
be connected to their responses in case of a breach of information. To further reduce the likelihood
that data could be leaked, surveyors sent completed surveys to the ODK database over the cellular
network and deleted the responses from their tablet after each survey was completed.
Another concern given the topic of the study and the fact that we were asking participants to
describe in detail a situation, often traumatic, that made them afraid was that participants could
become traumatized. We dealt with this risk in three primary ways. First, the surveyors that
implemented the study have significant experience working with the victims of violence through
VfD’s previous work with survivors to document the election violence that took place in 2008. Second,
surveyors were trained to recognize signs of trauma, at what point to pause or stop the interview, and
how to provide a limited amount of support during a post-interview debrief to participants. Third,
surveyors tracked whether or not participants became traumatized to the point that they needed
professional counseling. This was monitored in the field and by the investigator and plans for
bringing participants to a well-respected trauma center in Harare were made.
Although this study was carried out during a period in which repressive violence against opposi-
tion supporters was extremely uncommon, safety for the surveyors was also a significant concern. To
further reduce the small probability that the surveyors themselves would be targeted by perpetrators
of violence during the course of the study we took several steps. First, surveyors traveled in small
teams but never alone. Second, they spent no more than a few days in each community, and did
not go to the same community two days in a row. Third, they assessed the security situation in
each community through the local mobilizers before entering the community. Fourth, although we
recruited only opposition supporters to participate in the study, we asked participants about their party
identification early on in the survey to identify supporters of the regime who had mistakenly gotten
into the participant pool. If they happened to survey a supporter of the regime, surveyors were trained
to continue the study but skip all sensitive questions about politics and violence. Out of the target
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Figure 2.3: Map of constituencies included in study
of 700 participants, three recruited participants ended up being supporters of the regime, and in all
cases the surveyors followed the protocol appropriately. Finally, because Westerners are considered
to be suspicious in many parts of Zimbabwe, particularly in the rural areas, I could not travel with
the team. The use of the tablets and ODK software to send the data over the cellular network was
an important implementation feature to overcome this limitation, as was relying on a highly skilled
team leader who had a sophisticated understanding of the sampling and measurement strategies and
could raise and even solve potential design problems proactively. There were no security incidents or
adverse events during the study.
2.4.1.4 Summary statistics and measure validation
671 participants were recruited from six communities in Zimbabwe where VfD has a network of
mobilizers and informants, and which have also been affected by state-sponsored violence since
2000. Half of the participants were recruited in the southern suburbs of the capital city Harare, and
half from rural areas in Masvingo and Manicaland provinces in southern and eastern Zimbabwe.
Figure 2.3 displays a map of the areas from which we drew our participants.
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In each community, the research team used known local mobilizers to recruit opposition sup-
porters, relying on local knowledge of residents’ political beliefs in order to recruit and interview
them discreetly. Though my sample is by no means representative, the recruitment strategy aimed to
correct for some first-order biases. In particular, I wanted to avoid recruiting only the most active
opposition supporters in each community because they were much more likely to be recruited and
I suspected that activists might react to repressive threats in a way that was different from most
of the population. In most communities, the surveyors started by interviewing the pro-democracy
and pro-peace activists who were working as our mobilizers so that they understood the sensitive
content of the study, and then asking them to recruit opposition supporters that they had been trying
to mobilize, including those who were afraid to openly participate in opposition politics.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics and tests of whether treatment assignment was balanced
across important covariates. Just more than half of study participants are female. The median
respondent has a high school degree and is 35 years old. There is significant variation in asset
ownership. To highlight just a few of the assets that we measured, around one in four owns a
generator, more than one in three owns a smartphone, 34% have electricity in their home, more than
one-third own cattle, and almost 60% own chickens. The median monthly income per capita within
the participants’ households is $14.29, and the mean is $27.40, with 22% of respondents’ households
earning no income at all.
The average respondent in the sample has experienced a large amount of past repression. Since
the year 2000, 83% of the control group reported that, in the context of political violence, they had
experienced verbal abuse or threats, 67% withholding of benefits such as food or goods, 43% torture,
41% destruction of property, 40% assault, 21% abduction, 19% arbitrary arrest or detention, 2%
sexual violence, and 0% murder. Surveyors defined “experience” for the respondent as something
that happened to you or someone in your household.9 These numbers suggest an extremely high
level of victimization, but there is evidence to suggest that this is not far from the average experience
in Zimbabwe. A nationally representative study carried out by the most respected Zimbabwean
survey firm in 2009 found similar levels of victimization, including that 51% of Zimbabweans had
experienced threats or intimidation, 17% have experienced personal injury and 31% have a family
member who has, and 13% have a family member who has died in a politically-motivated event
9Because these variables were measured post-treatment, I only report these statistics for the control group.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics and balance on baseline covariates
Control Fear Fear Fear - Control
General Political
Mean Difference p-value
Female 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.03 0.60
Education 1.72 1.67 1.69 0.04 0.62
Age 38.99 39.77 40.26 -1.02 0.50
Generator 0.23 0.21 0.30 -0.03 0.55
Smartphone 0.38 0.33 0.40 0.02 0.76
Electricity 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.02 0.68
Bicycle 0.21 0.26 0.23 -0.04 0.41
Chickens 0.57 0.60 0.57 -0.01 0.87
Cattle 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.93
Income (USD) 22.61 25.40 26.97 -3.57 0.37
(Bratton, 2011). These responses are not directly comparable due to differences in the question
wordings and the different time frame. A full comparison of my sample on demographic measures and
in terms of past exposure to repression is presented in Appendix 2.D. Nevertheless, the similarly high
incidence of political violence in the nationally representative data suggests that my experimental
sample is not completely different than the average Zimbabwean on this dimension, and again
reiterates the importance of coercion in this context.
Before presenting the results it is also important to validate the choice of the political wristband
as a measure of propensity to take political action.10 To do so, I look at the distributions of the
hypothetical and behavioral measures of propensity to take risky political action. The primary goal
of this exercise is to test whether taking a political wristband does in fact seem to be an indicator of
willingness to take pro-democracy action. In fact, the hypothetical index is strongly predictive of the
binary wristband measure. Figure 2.4 shows that responses on the hypothetical measure of political
action are strongly predictive of taking the wristband.
10Because we increased the sample size of the study after piloting (but before pre-registration), we did not have enough
wristbands for the full sample. The analyses with the wristband outcome presented throughout this paper are from a
restricted sample of only people surveyed on days where we offered real wristbands. On days after the wristbands had run
out, we still collected a hypothetical measure of whether they would prefer a wristband with a political message or a plain
wristband.
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The predicted probability of taking the wristband for a respondent who is at the bottom extreme
of the distribution on the hypothetical measures, which means that they responded that it is “not
at all likely” that they would take the twelve political actions, is 0.46. For someone at the high
extreme of the distribution, meaning that they are “sure” that they would take all twelve actions, the
predicted probability of taking the wristband is 0.96. 95% confidence intervals are displayed around
the predicted probabilities.
Qualitatively, participants who did not take the political wristband reported that they were afraid
to wear it, and there is no reason to expect that there are any financial or aesthetic reasons that
participants would choose the plain wristband, or that if there are that these would be affected by
fear.
2.4.1.5 Manipulation check
First I present the results of the manipulation check that the emotion inductions are actually increasing
the level of fear reported by participants. While I expected that the fear induction would also cause
increases in other negative emotions and decreases in positive emotions, my goal was to increase fear
more than other emotions, and particularly more than anger, which other research has shown to have
opposite effects to fear on risk perceptions. Figure 2.5 presents the coefficients on regressions of the
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six primary emotions on the treatment indicators.




































































The coefficients presented in Figure 2.5 confirm that the emotion induction increased self-reported
fear by a significant and substantively large amount. The political fear treatment increased fear by
1.7 points on a four-point scale, or 1.25 standard deviations. The general fear treatment increased
reported fear by 1.18 points on the same scale, or 0.88 standard deviations. At the same time,
happiness decreased by between 1.06 and 1.51 points, and other negative emotions increased by
between 0.12 and 0.93 points.
Because the manipulation checks show that the fear treatments increased not only fear but also
other negative emotions, and decreased happiness, one could be concerned about violations to the
exclusion restriction. In other words, one could worry that the observed effects are driven not only by
increases in fear, but are also biased by changes in other emotions. In order to assuage worries about
this form of bias, I implement a mediation analysis using the methodology of Imai and Yamamoto
(2013), which accommodates testing for the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) of a single
mediator (in this case, fear) that may be confounded by other post-treatment factors (other emotions).
Several political psychologists who use similar emotions inductions to study American political
behavior have identified this method as a best practice in the analysis of this type of study (Myers
and Tingley, Forthcoming; Albertson and Gadarian, Forthcoming 2016). That analysis is presented
in Appendix 2.A.1 and the results are discussed later in this section.
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2.4.2 Results: The effect of fear on dissent
In this section I test whether fear reduces the propensity to participate in dissent. I test this prediction
by comparing propensity to take pro-democracy political action using both the index based on how
likely participants say it is that they would take action, and the behavioral wristband measure. I
measure participation in high-risk acts of dissent using an index of responses to the six separate ways
that they could express dissent in two periods on a five-point likelihood scale.
As a behavioral measure of propensity to take pro-opposition action, I measure whether the
participant chose to take as a thank-you gift a wristband inscribed with a pro-democracy, anti-
violence message, or a plain wristband with no political message that is otherwise indistinguishable.
As discussed in Section 2.4.1.4, taking the political wristband is strongly correlated with higher
propensity to take pro-opposition actions on the hypothetical measure. The analysis presented here is
restricted to the 441 participants who actually had to choose whether they would take a real political
wristband. Figure 2.6a plots the differences between the control group and each of the treatment
groups with 95% confidence intervals from a t-test. The p-values calculated from non-parametric
statistical tests, including randomization inference, are presented in Appendix 2.A.2.
Figure 2.6a shows that participants experiencing fear both report significantly lower likelihood
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of expressing dissent, and are less likely to actually take a wristband indicating that they support
democracy. These effects are substantively large and statistically significant, even on the binary
measure of taking a wristband in a reduced sample. The general and political fear treatments reduced
how likely participants said they were to take action on the hypothetical measure by 0.53 and 0.76
standard deviations, respectively. The fear treatments reduced the proportion of respondents who took
the political over plain wristband by 11 percentage points in the case of the general fear treatment
and 19 percentage points in the case of the political fear treatment.
In Appendix 2.A.3, I present the treatment effects broken down by act of dissent and by period
(now vs. during the next election). While the treatment effects are larger for self-reported propensity
to act during the election period, there is no clear pattern in the size of the treatment effect across
individual acts. The coefficients on all of the individual acts are significant.
These reductions in dissent are substantively large and important. Table 2.2 shows the proportion
of participants who either took the political wristband or say that they are “very likely” or “sure” to
take each of the six hypothetical political actions during an election period.
Table 2.2: Proportion of respondents who are very likely or sure to take express dissent by treatment
assignment




Wristband 82% 71% 63%
Rally 50% 36% 33%
Shirt 49% 25% 24%
Reveal 39% 15% 21%
Refuse 39% 16% 16%
Testify 31% 13% 11%
Joke 28% 8% 7%
On the wristband, while 82% are willing to take the wristband in the control group, only 71%
of participants experiencing general fear and 63% of participants experiencing fear in a political
context chose the political wristband that they were told would “show their political beliefs” over the
plain option. These effects represent reductions of 14% in the case of general fear and 23% in the
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case of political fear. To give another example, while 28% of people in the control group said they
were very likely or sure to share a joke about the president during an election period, just 7-8% of
respondents in the fear treatment group reported the same high propensity to dissent by sharing a
joke. This represents a 70-77% reduction in the proportion of respondents who say they are likely to
take that action.
A mediation analysis confirms that increases in fear mediate all of the observed effects, rather
than changes in other emotions. This analysis uses the methodology of Imai and Yamamoto (2013) to
identify the ACME of a single mediator (fear) conditional on potentially confounded post-treatment
mediators (other emotions) is presented in Appendix 2.A.1.
2.4.3 Results: Fear, pessimism and risk aversion
The first results provided strong support for the prediction that the emotion of fear has a causal effect
on participation in pro-democracy political action. In this section, I test whether fear affects the
variables that I posited as mechanisms – namely, that fear increases pessimism around the cost of
expressing dissent and risk aversion. In this section I present difference-in-means tests to test these
predictions.
I test the effect of the fear inductions on three outcomes: the index of expectations about how
many other opposition supporters will take pro-democracy action, the index of the perceived risk of
repression associated with attending a protest, and the amount of risk that the participant chose to
take on the monetary lottery. In this section I present the results of difference-in-means tests between
pairs of each of the three randomly assigned groups, and results broken down by period (now and
during the next election) and by individual act of dissent or repression are presented in Appendix
2.A.4. Additional statistical tests that do not rely on the assumption of normality are presented in
Appendix 2.A.2.
Figure 2.7 plots the estimated treatment effects with 95% confidence intervals. Figure 2.7a
displays the effect of the treatments on expectations of other opposition supporters’ actions. Increases
in expectations of others’ actions indicates that respondents believe that more of the other opposition
supporters in their community would take pro-opposition action. Figure 2.7b displays the effect of
the treatments on expectations of the respondent’s personal risk of facing repression if she attended
an opposition rally. Increases in this perceived risk index indicate that respondents believe that it is
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more likely that they would face repression. Finally, Figure 2.7c displays the effect of the treatments
on the riskiness of the lottery that respondents chose to play during the survey. Higher values on this
scale indicate that the respondent chose a lottery with a larger spread and a higher expected value in
the 50-50 draw that we offered them.
Figure 2.7: Beliefs about costs of dissent and risk aversion





























































































































Figure 2.7 shows that both political and general fear cause participants to become more pessimistic
in their estimation of parameters in the expected cost of expressing dissent, and more risk averse.
Figure 2.7a shows that the general fear treatment reduced the index of beliefs about how many other
oppositions supporters would take political action by 0.31 standard deviations, while the political
fear index reduced expectations of others by 0.46 standard deviations. To put this into real terms,
while the average response for the control group is 2.90, or almost precisely that on average “some”
opposition supporters would take each pro-opposition action (in fact, the average response in the
control group during a non-election period is 3.30, between “some” and “many”, and the average
during an election period is 2.51, between “a few” and “some”), the average for people induced to
feel fear in a political or non-political context is 2.59 and 2.69, respectively.
These treatment effects are slightly larger for assessments of others’ actions during election
periods and for more contentious actions, although the differences between the treatment effects
are not statistically significant. The political and general fear treatments have the largest effects on
perceptions of the probability that other opposition supporters would share a joke about the president
(a highly sensitive act in Zimbabwe) and testify in the trial of someone who has killed for ZANU-PF.
Tables with these results are presented in Appendix 2.A.4.
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Figure 2.7b shows that both political and general fear also increase expectations that participants
will personally be the victims of repressive violence if they attend an opposition rally. The general
fear treatment increased the perceived risk of repression by 0.19 standard deviations, and the political
fear increased perceived risk by 0.51 standard deviations. In real terms, the average control group
respondent thinks that it is slightly less than “somewhat” likely that they would experience the
average act of violent repression (µC = 2.87). In the general fear treatment, this perception increases
to slightly more than somewhat likely (µT G = 3.05), and in the political fear treatment, it is between
somewhat and very likely (µT P = 3.38). In this case, the difference between each of the fear treatment
arms and the control is statistically significant (in the case of general fear, only at the 5% level) and
the difference between the two fear treatments is also significant.
These treatment effects are again larger during election periods, and generally slightly larger
for acts of repression that people judged to be more probable at an opposition rally, such as threats,
assault, and destruction of property. They were lowest for sexual violence, which respondents
generally judged to be improbable.
Figure 2.7c shows that participants in the control group chose on average a lottery with a higher
level of risk, compensated by a higher expected utility, than participants in the two treatment arms.
The general and political fear treatments caused reductions of 0.20 and 0.35 standard deviations
compared to control in the spread of the lottery that respondents chose to play in the 50-50 draw.
Almost one in five (17%) of respondents in the control group seem to be risk-neutral, indicated by
the fact that they chose the riskiest lottery with a spread of $1.10 despite the fact that its expected
utility ($0.55) was equal to that of the second riskiest lottery with a spread of $0.90. In the general
and political fear treatment arms, however, 10% and 12% of respondents chose a lottery indicating
that they are risk-neutral, and much larger proportions of respondents chose lotteries with lower
expected utilities in exchange for higher sure payouts.
Results for other aspect of risk attitudes including uncertainty aversion and loss aversion, are
shown in Appendix 2.A.4. These additional analyses are exploratory: because the psychology
literature does not have clear implications for how fear should affect attitudes towards losses or
uncertainty, I did not pre-register predictions around how fear should affect these parameters. I do
not find that fear has any effect on attitudes towards losses or uncertainty.
If we accept that individuals’ attitudes towards risk are stable across domains, these results
CHAPTER 2. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL RISK: REPRESSION, FEAR AND
MOBILIZATION 44
indicate that fearful citizens making decisions about whether or not to participate in dissent would
need to perceive that the potential gains of participation actually outweigh the potential losses by a
larger amount than citizens not experiencing fear.
Again, a mediation analysis confirms that increases in fear mediate all of the observed effects,
rather than changes in other emotions. This analysis uses the methodology of Imai and Yamamoto
(2013) to identify the ACME of a single mediator (fear) conditional on potentially confounded
post-treatment mediators (other emotions) is presented in Appendix 2.A.1.
I also use the Imai and Yamamoto (2013) method to conduct a substantive mediation analysis.
Specifically, I test whether pessimism about the risk of repression, others’ actions, and risk aversion
mediate the observed decreases in dissent. The main results of this analysis confirm that the reductions
in the hypothetical measure of dissent are mediated by all three potential mechanisms: pessimism
about the risk of repression, pessimism about others’ actions, and risk aversion. The effect on the
behavioral wristband measure, however, is only found to be mediated by increases in risk aversion.
This may be because the wristband is a much lower-risk action than the hypothetical measures where
there is relatively little ambiguity about the risk of punishment. These results are presented in full in
Appendix 2.A.1.
2.5 Empirical analysis: Heterogeneity in reactions to repression
The results so far have shown that fear has a causal effect on participation in risky political behavior
that is mediated by increases in pessimism and risk aversion. Can this theory, however, help us
understand which citizens will participate in pro-democracy action in a repressive environment? In
this section I test whether a psychological characteristic that increases individuals’ propensities to
feel fear in response to a negative stimuli is related to lower participation in dissent.
2.5.1 Research design
The goal of the research design in this section is to test whether self-efficacy can explain why some
opposition supporters in a repressive environment express dissent while others remain silent.
To go back to the diagram presented in Section 2.2, this section tests which type of opposition
supporter are more likely to react fearfully after in a repressive context. Figure 2.8 uses the original
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DAG to show which processes are tested in this section.









I test these hypotheses by testing for the relationship between self-efficacy and all of the subse-
quent outcomes of interest, including fear, pessimism, risk aversion, and dissent. The standard way
to test for a moderating relationship would be to test for the interaction of the cause (in this case,
repression) and the moderator on the outcomes. However, in this design I am essentially conditioning
on repression, as all of the people in my sample are opposition supporters living under a repressive
regime who have experienced at least some repression and perceive that there is a future threat of
repression. This research design therefore tests whether, in a repressive context, self-efficacy is
related to the subsequent outcomes of interest. Finally, it is important to note that although my
theory proposes a chain of mediated causal relationships (for example, that the effect of repression
on pessimism is mediated by fear), in this design I do not have the analytical leverage to test for
all of these proposed relationships. Instead, I will provide suggestive evidence that self-efficacy is
correlated with each step of the proposed causal chain in a repressive context.
It is also important to note that this section is on a different temporal scale than the previous
analysis in Section 2.4. The cognitive and physical reactions that make up a fear response to a
particular stimulus last a relatively short time, on the order of minutes rather than hours or days. In
this section, instead of testing for the effects of specific, known repressive threat in a short period, I
assume that the opposition supporters in the study are exposed to repeated, unmeasured threats, or
memories of threats, that shape their behavior over a short period. Primary or secondary exposure to
repressive violence in the past constitute threats that could induce fear, as well as reflecting on those
past experiences to answer my survey questions about the risk of repression and past exposure to
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repression. Past repeated exposure to fear reactions can also cause people to permanently update
their beliefs about parameters like the risk of repression and propensity of others to act.
it is also important to note that while the experimental design in Section 2.4 allowed me to test
for the immediate effects of fear
I outlined the following hypotheses in Section 2.2.2.
1. Opposition supporters low in self-efficacy will experience more fear after repression events.
2. Opposition supporters low in self-efficacy will be more pessimistic about the costs of dissent.
3. Opposition supporters low in self-efficacy will be more risk-averse.
4. Opposition supporters low in self-efficacy will be less likely to dissent in repressive environ-
ments.
I test these hypotheses using regression analysis based on the data from the experiment participant
pool. Specifically, I regress the outcomes of interest (dissent, risk aversion, etc.) on a standardized
measure of self-efficacy, a vector of pre-treatment demographic controls, two and a community fixed
effect.
One concern with this type of correlational analysis is that the observed relationship between
self-efficacy and dissent might be confounded by a third, unobserved variable. The most plausible
confound that could be driving this effect is actual rather than perceived coping ability. While
my argument is focused on the role of the psychological characteristic of self-efficacy, perceived
self-efficacy is thought to develop over time through experiences of mastery and is most likely
strongly related to the actual ability to cope in a negative environment. In order to rule this alternative
explanation out, I control for a number of demographic characteristics including age, education,
assets, and gender that shape whether an individual is actually more capable of protecting him
or herself against the threat of repression. However, self-efficacy is not strongly related to many
demographic characteristics in this sample: only education and age both positively predict self-
efficacy, suggesting that it may not be very strongly related to the actual ability to cope with physical
threats. Appendix 2.B.1 presents a table of the demographic correlates of self-efficacy.
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2.5.1.1 Measurement
Self-efficacy, the main variable is interest, is measured with a standard 10-question scale developed
by Jerusalem and Schwarzer (1995). The individual measures include questions such as “I can
always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough” and “I can remain calm when facing
difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.” This scale has been validated across cultures
in multiple studies spanning 14 (Schwarzer, 1999) or 25 different cultural contexts (Scholz et al.,
2002). I modified the answer categories based on pre-testing in Zimbabwe such that the answers were
recorded on a five-point agreement scale rather than a four-point scale from not at all true to exactly
true. In Western populations, past research has shown that general self-efficacy and self-esteem, locus
of control, and neuroticism are all measures of the same underlying self-evaluative construct (Judge
et al., 2002). I create a standardized measure of general self-efficacy using principal components
analysis.
In addition, I test self-efficacy against two other prominent explanations for individual participant
in dissent. First, I include a measure of exposure to information based on a principal components
analysis of ownership of information, communication, and technology (ICT) assets, including a cell
phone, a smartphone, a computer, a television, and a radio. Conditional on the other assets indices,
which pick up other household (generator, electricity, stove, car, etc.) and farm (livestock) assets,
theories of protest participation that focus on the role of information would predict that people with
higher access to information would be more likely to participate in dissent. Second, I include a
measure of the strength of political preferences measured on a three-point scale of how close the
respondent feels to an opposition party: not very close, close, or very close. In this sample of control
participants, 68% of people reported feeling very close to an opposition party, 24% close, and 8% not
very close. This measure is included in the specification to test whether the strength of preferences
for the opposition predicts dissent.
I use four separate strategies to measure propensity to dissent in this section: self-reported past
behavior, two hypothetical measures, and a behavioral measure. One advantage to having four
separate measures of the same underlying construct is that each has different drawbacks and qualities:
while the hypothetical measures are potentially biased by recall and desirability bias, they allow me
to examine high-risk acts of dissent. The behavioral measure is the least prone to bias but also as a
very low-risk action is the most distant from the real behavior of interest.
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To measure actual past dissent, I create an index using principal components analysis of responses
to seven measures of past participation in different forms of pro-opposition politics, each measured
on a four-point frequency scale.11 The measures include attending an opposition rally, refusing to go
to a ruling party rally, wearing pro-opposition paraphernalia, volunteering for an opposition party,
volunteering for a peace NGO, volunteering for an election-related NGO, or posting a pro-opposition
or anti-government message on Facebook, all since the year 2000. In addition, I use the behavioral
and hypothetical measures of dissent from the experiment as outcomes in this section.
Finally, as a second hypothetical measure of propensity to dissent, I asked participants to report
how likely it is that they would attend a pro-opposition rally after two repression events described to
them by the enumerator with randomly assigned characteristics.12 Each respondent reported how
likely it is that they would attend an opposition rally after two randomly assigned scenarios. The
scenarios described repression events that varied along a number of dimensions:
Imagine that it is one day / week / month before the next election. You have just heard
that an opposition supporter / organizer / candidate in a community in Manicaland
/ Matabeleland / Harare has been threatened / beaten / abducted / killed by a gov-
ernment agent. You received this information from a friend / an opposition activist / a
ruling party activist.
Although the variation in these scenarios was created for the purposes of a separate conjoint
analysis, one benefit of the fact that there are 324 individual scenarios that vary along dimensions
like the severity of the event and the identity of the victim is that it increases confidence that the
results are not driven by one particular scenario.
To measure the cognitive outcomes of interest, I use the measures of fear, risk aversion, and
pessimism from the experiment, as well as hypothetical measures of fear that respondents report they
would feel after the described repression scenarios.
11Possible responses are never, once or twice, sometimes, or many times.
12In fact, these data were collected as part of a conjoint experiment testing how citizens interpret repression events as
informational signals of their personal risk. The results of that experiment will be presented in a separate paper.
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2.5.2 Results: Self-efficacy and dissent
This section presents the results of the analysis of the correlation between self-efficacy and dissent. I
test for this relationship using four different measures of dissent that vary from low-risk, behavioral
measures to high-risk hypotheticals. Propensity to Dissent (Columns 1-2) and Propensity to Dissent -
Scenarios (Columns 3-4) are both self-reported assessments of the respondent’s own likelihood to
participate in dissent. Past activism (Columns 5-6) and the wristband measure (Columns 7-8), on
the other hand, measure the respondent’s actual behavior (although in the case of Past Activism we
could be worried about bias due to the self-reported nature of the measure). Table 2.3 presents the
results of the analysis of the relationship between self-efficacy and dissent.
Table 2.3: Self-efficacy and participation in dissent
Dependent variable:
Propensity to Dissent
Propensity to Dissent -
Scenarios
Past Activism Wristband
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Self-Efficacy Index 0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.12∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
ICT Index −0.01 −0.03 0.11∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02)
Closeness to Party 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.02)
Female −0.17∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.20 −0.21 0.003 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.005 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0005∗−0.0005∗−0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)(0.0003)(0.0001) (0.0001)
Education 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)
Assets - Urban −0.05 −0.06 −0.03 −0.05 0.04 0.05 −0.02 −0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Assets - Rural 0.02 0.04 −0.01 0.01 −0.11 −0.12 −0.001 −0.002
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant −0.07 −0.14 0.39 0.31 −1.10∗ −1.09∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) (0.60) (0.61) (0.21) (0.21)
Treatment Status FE X X X X X X X X
Community FE X X X X X X X X
Observations 644 630 663 649 325 319 434 426
R2 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10
Sample All Control Wristband
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a standardized measure of how likely respondents say it is that they would
participate in six different forms of dissent in two different time periods. The dependent variable in Columns 3-4 is a
standardized measure of the average of how likely the participant says they would be to go to an opposition rally
after the two described repression scenarios occurred. The dependent variable in Columns 5-6 is a standardized index
of how frequently the participant participated in 7 different types of dissent over the past 15 years. In Columns 7-8,
the dependent variable is a binary measure of whether the respondent chose the political wristband as a thank-you
gift. Self-efficacy is a standardized index of responses to the Jerusalem and Schwarzer (1995) self-efficacy scale.
The independent variables include dummies for the two fear treatments, a dummy for being a female, and the age of
the respondent at the time of the experiment. Education is a five-point measure of the highest level of education
completed by the participant. The assets indices are the first principal components of lists of urban and rural assets
based on the Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module from Zimbabwe. Finally, I include fixed effects for
each of the constituencies where the experiment was conducted. In Columns 1-4, the results are estimated using all
respondents, while in Columns 5-6 they are estimated using only respondents from the control group because past
activism was measured post-treatment, and in Columns 7-8 they are measured for the subset of the sample for whom
a real political wristband was available. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Table 2.3 shows that the psychological characteristic of self-efficacy is strongly associated with
all of the measures of participation in dissent, including the two different hypothetical measures,
self-reported past dissent, and the behavioral wristband measure. Columns 2 and 4 shows that
participants who are one standard deviation higher on the self-efficacy index are 0.23 standard
deviations higher on the propensity to dissent scale used as an outcome in the main experiment.
Indeed, the results with these two different measures are strikingly consistent in magnitude. In terms
of past activism, respondents who are one standard deviation higher on the self-efficacy scale are
0.12 standard deviations higher in terms of their self-reported past activism (Column 6).13 On the
behavioral wristband measure, a one standard deviation increase in self-efficacy is associated with a
0.04 percentage point decrease in propensity to take the political wristband.
By contrast, there is little empirical support for the alternative hypotheses based on existing
theory. The coefficient on an index of ICT that would increase access to information is positive and
significant at the 10% level in one regression, but is negative in two others. There is stronger support
for the hypothesis that the strength of ideological preferences would predict participation in dissent,
but this result only appears in the hypothetical measures and not the measure of past behavior or
the behavioral wristband measure. This pattern raises concerns about social desirability bias, as
people who feel closer to an opposition party may feel pressured during the survey to exaggerate
their commitment to participating in dissent.
13For this outcome, I restrict the analysis to the control group only because past activism was measured post-treatment
to avoid inducing fear in the entire sample.
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2.5.3 Results: Self-efficacy, fear, pessimism and risk aversion
Next I turn to the psychological measures to examine whether the observed relationship between
self-efficacy and dissent may be driven by fear, pessimism, and risk aversion. Table 2.4 presents the
results of this analysis.












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Self-Efficacy Index −0.06∗ −0.07∗ −0.16∗∗∗−0.17∗∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
ICT Index 0.05 −0.02 0.13∗∗∗ −0.04 0.004
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Closeness to Party 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Female −0.09 −0.06 0.08 0.09 −0.06 −0.05 −0.10 −0.11 0.13 0.14
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Age 0.003 0.003 −0.01 −0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001)(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Education −0.04 −0.05 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Assets - Urban 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06 −0.01 0.02 0.0002 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Assets - Rural −0.04 −0.06 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.12∗∗ 0.13∗∗ −0.04 −0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.25 −0.26 0.27 0.28 −0.37 −0.30 0.13 0.09 0.48 0.46
(0.32) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39)
Treatment Status FE X X X X X X X X X X
Community FE X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 663 649 662 648 643 630 646 632 663 649
R2 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.06
Sample All
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a standardized measure of how afraid the respondent reported being in
the moment at the end of the survey. The dependent variable in Columns 3-4 is a standardized measure of how
afraid the respondent said that she hypothetically would be after two repression scenarios. The dependent variable in
Columns 5-6 is a standardized index of the perceived risk of repression based on six different actions in two periods.
In Columns 7-8, the dependent variable the perceived proportion of other opposition supporters who would take
six different actions in two time periods. In Columns 9-10, it is a standardized measure of risk averse based on
the inverse of the spread of the lottery choice that the respondent chose. Self-efficacy is a standardized index of
responses to the Jerusalem and Schwarzer (1995) self-efficacy scale. The independent variables include dummies for
the two fear treatments, a dummy for being a female, and the age of the respondent at the time of the experiment.
Education is a five-point measure of the highest level of education completed by the participant. The assets indices
are the first principal components of lists of urban and rural assets based on the Demographic and Health Survey’s
assets module from Zimbabwe. Finally, I include fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the experiment
was conducted. In Columns 1-4, the results are estimated using all respondents, while in Columns 5-6 they are
estimated using only respondents from the control group because past activism was measured post-treatment, and
in Columns 7-8 they are measured for the subset of the sample for whom a real political wristband was available.
Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
Again, the analysis in Table 2.4 shows a very strong and consistent relationship between self-
efficacy and the psychological outcomes of interest in this study: fear, pessimism, and risk aversion.
The coefficient in Column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in self-efficacy is related
to a 0.07 standard deviation decrease in the amount of fear felt by the respondent in the moment
at the end of the survey. Column 4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in self-efficacy is
associated with a slightly larger, 0.17 standard deviation, decrease in the hypothetical measure of fear,
i.e. how afraid the respondent says she would feel in two described repression scenarios. Thus, this
analysis confirms that self-efficacy is related to a lower propensity to feel fear in a negative situation.
There is also evidence that self-efficacy is related to pessimism and risk aversion. People who are
one standard deviation higher in self-efficacy are 0.09 standard deviations lower in their perceptions
of the risk of repression associated with six acts of dissent in two time periods (Column 6). They
are 0.21 standard deviations higher in their expectations about the proportion of other opposition
supporters in their area who would participate in six acts of dissent in two time periods (Column
8). Finally, they are 0.1 standard deviations lower on the scale of risk aversion measured with a
behavioral, incentivized lottery.
Although we do not have strong priors about whether access to information or strength of party
affiliation should be related to these psychological outcomes, I nevertheless include these alternative
explanations in some specifications. While nine out of ten of the coefficients are indistinguishable
from zero, there is a positive and significant relationship between the ICT assets index and the
perceived risk of repression. This may be because people with more exposure to information hear
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more about repression events, although this seems less likely given that the coefficient on perceptions
of others’ actions is negative. Nevertheless, the overall evidence that these alternative explanations
are related to variation in fear, perceptions of the costs of dissent, or risk aversion is quite weak.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that incorporating an understanding of emotions and cognition into a
theory of participation in high-risk acts of dissent can shed light on critical questions in the study of
protest and democratization. Citizens making decisions in a state of fear are more pessimistic about
the costs of dissent and more risk averse. By implication, variation in the propensity to feel fear can
explain why one citizen will participate in dissent while another with equally anti-regime preferences
and the same informational signal will abstain.
The empirical tests presented in this paper provide strong support for the prediction that the
emotion of fear enhances the effectiveness of repressive threats. The results from a lab-in-the-field
experiment, conducted with 671 supporters of the opposition in urban and rural Zimbabwe, show that
fear affects perceptions of key parameters in decisions to participate in collective action, including
perceptions of the actions of other citizens, perceptions of your own risk of repression, and risk
aversion. Ultimately, fear has substantively large effects on the propensity of opposition supporters to
actually express their dissent in public ways. Fear causes reductions in both self-reported propensity
to express pro-democracy and anti-regime preferences, and causes a reduction of between 14 and
23% in an actual behavior that indicates a desire to express support for democracy. These effects
seem to be mediated by the changes in pessimism and risk aversion.
These results help explain why there is such high variation in who participates in risky political
behavior, even for people with the same beliefs and objective risk factors. I find that psychological
characteristics that make people prone to feeling more or less fearful are strongly related to pro-
democracy political participation in a repressive environment. Self-efficacy is a better predictor
of dissent, as well as a better predictor of the perceived risk of repression, expectations about the
behavior of other opposition supporters, and risk aversion, than access to information or strength of
preferences for the opposition. These patterns can help us understand why there is such variation
across individuals in the subjective perception of risk and propensity to act.
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This evidence strongly suggests that fear can be used by autocrats to manipulate perceptions of
the costs of dissent in order to lower the cost of repression. Because the goal of repressive threats is
to coerce citizens into not taking action against a regime that they do not support, the fact that this
violence also instills a terror that leads people to become pessimistic and risk averse increases the
potency of this informational signal. Ultimately, fear enables regimes to exaggerate their coercive
capacity.
These findings may shed light on the strategies that autocrats and activists adopt to demobilize
or mobilize citizens with pro-democracy preferences. For example, this may help explain why
repression events are public, graphic, and memorable. In Zimbabwe, during the peak periods of
violence state agents used public assault and murder, unique forms of torture including beatings
on the soles of the feet, and prolonged beatings that caused severe and permanent scars to not only
inform citizens about the cost of dissent but also induce fear. State agents should try to reinforce fear
by reminding people of the In the words of one pro-opposition Zimbabwean informant, “once they’ve
burned down your house, they only need to shake the matchbox” in order to silence your dissent.
In addition, given that citizens vary in their susceptibility to fear, this theory suggests that while
regimes may use violence to incapacitate activists high in self-efficacy, they may target intimidation
on people with anti-regime preferences but low self-efficacy because these people are most likely to
respond to coercive threats by reducing their dissent.
On the other hand, this theory helps explain some of the central strategies that activists use
to mobilize social movements. Activist toolkits stress the importance, for example, of building
confidence by starting with low-risk successes, or modeling fearlessness in the face of threats. These
strategies can be easily linked to common interventions in psychology such as interventions to
increase self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982; Ghosal et al., 2015) or to enable people to regulate their
emotions through methods like reappraisal (Goldin et al., 2008; Halperin et al., 2013). Writing on
Zimbabwe, Masunungure (2006) argues that any mobilization strategy in Zimbabwe needs to take
into account that “risk-averseness is now an integral part of Zimbabwe’s political culture” (2) due
to a long process of conditioning through “more than a century of uninterrupted authoritarianism”
(3). For Masunungure, this implies that passive resistance such as stayaways and rent boycotts that
involves “not physically confronting the state, but eroding the state” will garner more participation
than active resistance like protest (Ibid, 2).
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Appendix
2.A Additional results: The effect of fear on dissent
2.A.1 Mediation analysis
The theory that I propose in Section 2.2 specifies a chain of causal relationships: first, that fear
increases pessimism and risk aversion, and second, that pessimism and risk aversion reduce dissent.
Although the lab-in-the-field experiment does not allow a design-based test of this causal process,
I conduct a mediation analysis using the methods developed by Imai et al. (2010, 2011); Imai and
Yamamoto (2013). In this section I discuss the identifying assumptions of this method and present the
results of two mediation analyses. First, I test whether fear mediates the changes in all four outcomes
of interest. This is important, and indeed has been recommended as a best practice in the analysis of
emotion inductions (Myers and Tingley, Forthcoming; Albertson and Gadarian, Forthcoming 2016)
because these treatments tend to induce emotions in addition to the one that is targeted. Second, I
test whether increases in pessimism and risk aversion mediate the reductions in propensity to dissent
that I observe.
Imai et al. (2011) provide a framework for estimating causal mediation effects with a single
mediator. They use potential outcomes notation to describe the causal model. Mi and Yi represent the
observed value of the mediator and the outcome, respectively, for unit i. Mi(t) represents the potential
mediator values under treatment status t = 0,1, and Yi(t,m) represents the potential outcome values
under treatment status t and mediator value m. As a result, the causal mediation effect, or the causal
effect of the treatment on the outcome caused by the change in the mediator induced by the treatment,
is δi(t)≡Yi(t,Mi(1))−Yi(t,Mi(0)). The direct effect is ζi(t)≡Yi(1,Mi(t))−Yi(0,Mi(t)). Imai et al.
(2010) show that the mediation and direct effects can be identified under the assumption of sequential
ignorability.
Imai and Yamamoto (2013) expand the mediation framework to accommodate the existence of
a second mediator Wi(t) that is not assumed to be independent from Mi(t). Under this framework,
the sequential ignorability assumption is relaxed to allow Mi to be exogenous conditional on post-
treatment confounders Wi. Formally, the sequential ignorability assumption is:
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{Yi(t,m,w),Mi(t,w),Wi(t)} ⊥ Ti|Xi = x
{Yi(t,m,w),Mi(t,w)} ⊥ Wi|Ti = t,Xi = x
{Yi(t,m,w)} ⊥ Wi(t) = w,Ti = t,Xi = x
This assumption requires that the treatment, mediator of interest, and alternative mediators are
conditionally exogenous. However, the mediator of interest M is only assumed to be exogenous after
conditioning on the alternative mediators, treatment, and pretreatment confounders. In addition, in
order to identify the mediation effect, we must either assume no interaction between the treatment
and mediator, or set two parameters by assumption. The first parameter ρt is the correlation between
the mediator Mi(t) and the interaction effect of the mediator and the treatment. The second is the
standard deviation of the coefficient for the treatment-mediator interaction, σ . Imai and Yamamoto
(2013) suggest presenting the results assuming that σ = 0 and assessing the sensitivity of the analysis
to a range of values of ρt and σ .
In this application, the biggest threat to inference is that the fear induction not only increased
levels of fear, but also increased other negative emotions and decreased happiness. Thus, fear is the
mediator of interest M and anger, disgust, surprise, sadness, and happiness are a vector of alternative
mechanisms W . In this case, rather than assuming that M is unconfounded by any post-treatment
variables, we use the Imai and Yamamoto (2013) method to condition on other emotions that the
treatment may have induced. In this case, it is plausible that other emotions would be related to the
amount of fear induced as well as the outcomes of interest. In order to make W and M conditionally
unconfounded, I also control for a number of pre-treatment variables X that might be related to
emotions and the outcomes of interest, including gender, age, education, household assets, farm
assets, the number of earners in the household, two subjective measures of economic insecurity, the
number of rooms in the household, self-efficacy, and a community fixed effect. Table 2.5 presents
the results of an analysis of whether fear mediates the relationship between the treatment and the
four outcomes of interest, conditional on the other five post-treatment emotions.
The results confirm that increases in fear are mediating the treatment effects. Conditional on the
pre-treatment characteristics X listed above and post-treatment levels of five other emotions W , I find
that the Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) of the pooled fear treatment is substantively large
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Table 2.5: Analysis of whether fear mediates the effect of the treatment conditional on other emotions
Fear (Pooled) Political Fear General Fear
ACME ADE ACME ADE ACME ADE
Propensity to Act -0.41∗∗ -0.1∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.03 -0.31∗∗ -0.12
(-0.54, -0.29) (-0.25, 0.05) (-0.73, -0.37) (-0.29, 0.23) (-0.46, -0.17) (-0.31, 0.07)
Wristband -0.09∗∗ -0.08 -0.12∗∗ -0.04 -0.05 -0.08
(-0.16, -0.02) (-0.18, 0.01) (-0.22, -0.02) (-0.19, 0.11) (-0.11, 0.01) (-0.21, 0.06)
Perceived Repression
Risk
0.18∗∗ 0.1 0.21∗∗ 0.12 0.08 0.01
(0.03, 0.32) (-0.08, 0.29) (0.01, 0.41) (-0.16, 0.39) (-0.05, 0.21) (-0.21, 0.24)
Others’ Participation -0.15∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.3∗∗ 0.01∗∗ -0.1 -0.19
(-0.29, -0.01) (-0.33, 0.11) (-0.51, -0.1) (-0.27, 0.3) (-0.23, 0.03) (-0.43, 0.04)
Risk of Lottery -0.19∗∗ -0.06 -0.13 -0.14 -0.17∗∗ 0.1
(-0.38, 0) (-0.32, 0.19) (-0.36, 0.1) (-0.49, 0.2) (-0.31, -0.03) (-0.13, 0.33)
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
∗∗ 95% confidence intervals do not include zero.
The first two columns present the results from a mediation analysis where the treatment variable is a pooled version
indicating that the participant received either fear treatment. The middle columns present the results of a mediation analysis
on the General Fear treatment compared to control, and the last two columns present the same for the Political Fear
treatment. The ACME (Columns 1, 3, and 5) represents the estimated Average Causal Mediation Effect, while the ADE
(Columns 2, 4, and 6) represents the Average Direct Effect.
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and statistically significant for all of the outcomes of interest. The tests of only the General Fear and
Political Fear treatments are also significant at the 95% level in five out of eight cases.
Next, I test whether increases in pessimism and risk aversion mediate the decreases in the
propensity to dissent. In this analysis, it is somewhat more plausible that some of the potential
mediators are independent of each other given that my measurement strategy for risk aversion shuts
down variation in risk perceptions. Nevertheless, given that risk aversion and pessimism are thought
to be closely related (Weber and Milliman, 1997), and given the clear relationship between the
perceived risk of repression and pessimism about others’ actions, I continue to use the framework for
multiple mediators rather than the framework that relies on unconfoundedness of the mediator on
post-treatment factors. Therefore, in this analysis, in addition to conditioning on the same vector of
pre-treatment characteristics, I condition on the alternative post-treatment psychological outcomes
in order to estimate the mediation effect of each mechanism. For example, to estimate the ACME
of pessimism about the risk of repression, I condition on the post-treatment measures of pessimism
about others’ participation and risk aversion. Table 2.6 presents the results.
Table 2.6 shows that all of the observed effects are mediated by changes in risk aversion or
pessimism about the risk of repression or others’ participation in dissent. The first set of results in
Columns 1-2 show the ACME and ADE based on a pooled version of the treatment. It shows that
the reductions in hypothetical measure of dissent, Propensity to Act, are mediated by changes in
both the perceived risk of repression, the perceived likelihood that others will act, and risk aversion.
These effects are mostly driven by the effects of the Political Fear treatment, but the 90% confidence
intervals on the tests for whether the effects of the General Fear treatment on the hypothetical measure
of dissent is mediated by risk aversion and pessimism both exclude zero. The effects on the wristband,
however, are only mediated by changes in risk aversion. One explanation for this pattern might be
that the wristband is such a low-risk action that there is little ambiguity about the risk of punishment.
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Table 2.6: Analysis of whether pessimism and risk aversion mediate the effect on dissent
M Y Fear (Pooled) Political Fear General Fear
















-0.04∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.04 -0.53∗∗ -0.01 -0.37∗∗
(-0.07, -0.01) (-0.6, -0.32) (-0.09, 0) (-0.69, -0.37) (-0.03, 0.02) (-0.5, -0.25)
Wristband 0.01 -0.13∗∗ 0 -0.14∗∗ 0.01 -0.11∗∗










-0.04∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.02 -0.36∗∗
(-0.06, -0.01) (-0.59, -0.34) (-0.08, -0.01) (-0.7, -0.41) (-0.05, 0.01) (-0.51, -0.22)
Wristband -0.02 -0.14∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.01 -0.12∗∗












Propensity to Act -0.13∗∗ -0.37∗∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.46∗∗ -0.11∗∗ -0.28∗∗
(-0.2, -0.06) (-0.49, -0.24) (-0.27, -0.03) (-0.64, -0.29) (-0.21, -0.01) (-0.41, -0.16)
Wristband -0.03∗∗ -0.1∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.1∗∗ -0.02 -0.08
(-0.05, 0) (-0.17, -0.02) (-0.06, -0.01) (-0.2, 0) (-0.05, 0.01) (-0.17, 0.02)
95% confidence intervals in parentheses.
∗∗ 95% confidence intervals do not include zero.
The first two columns present the results from a mediation analysis where the treatment variable is a pooled version
indicating that the participant received either fear treatment. The middle columns present the results of a mediation analysis
on the General Fear treatment compared to control, and the last two columns present the same for the Political Fear
treatment. The ACME (Columns 1, 3, and 5) represents the estimated Average Causal Mediation Effect, while the ADE
(Columns 2, 4, and 6) represents the Average Direct Effect.
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2.A.2 Nonparametric hypothesis tests
In this section I discuss the estimation strategy chosen to test the hypotheses that there are differences
between the outcomes for participants in the fear treatments and those in the control group. In the
results sections I presented graphs with confidence intervals and p-values from hypothesis tests
based on t-tests, which require an assumption that the data are normally distributed. In this section,
I test that assumption and present the results of two other tests for treatments effects based on a.
non-parametric statistical tests, and b. randomization inference.
I first present the results of tests for the significance of the treatments using non-parametric
statistical tests. In fact, all of my continuous outcomes fail the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality, so
I present results for all outcomes. To calculate p-values for the difference tests on the continuous
variables I use Wilcoxon’s rank sum test with a two-sided alternative hypothesis. To test for the
significance of the effects on the binary outcome of taking a political wristband, I use Fisher’s exact
test. All of the hypothesis tests of the treatment effects remain significant at the 5% level. The
p-values are shown in Table 2.7.




Propensity to dissent (hypothetical) 0.000 0.000
Propensity to dissent (behavioral) 0.025 0.000
Perceived likelihood of repression 0.025 0.000
Perceived proportion of others’ acting 0.000 0.000
Spread of lottery choice 0.016 0.000
Randomization inference provides another non-parametric method to test the sharp null hypoth-
esis of no treatment effect. To test the sharp null for each of my two treatment arms, I split the
data into subsamples that include only the control group and the treatment group of interest. These
p-values are constructed by assuming that the treatment has no effect and using random permutations
of treatment assignment to estimate the likelihood that we would see a treatment effect as far from
zero as the one we observe in the experiment just by random chance. The p-values from a two-tailed
test using randomization inference are shown in Table 2.8.
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Propensity to dissent (hypothetical) 0.000 0.000
Propensity to dissent (behavioral) 0.000 0.000
Perceived likelihood of repression 0.021 0.000
Perceived proportion of others’ acting 0.000 0.000
Spread of lottery choice 0.027 0.000
The distributions of the ATEs and are presented graphically in Figure 2.9 as histograms. The
observed ATE is plotted as a red dashed line.
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2.A.3 Full models: The effect of fear on propensity to dissent
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Table 2.9: The effect of fear on propensity to dissent
Dependent variable:
Hypothetical Behavioral
Shirt Joke Rally Reveal Refuse Testify Wristband
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fear - General −0.44∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.46∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Fear - Political −0.72∗∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗∗ −0.63∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −0.72∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Female −0.02 −0.11 −0.16∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.10 −0.21∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Age 0.002 0.03∗∗ 0.03 0.03∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0003∗∗ −0.0003∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Education 0.08 0.11∗∗ 0.06 0.03 0.10∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
Assets Index 0.01 −0.01 0.0003 −0.05 −0.08 −0.03 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant 0.33 −0.80∗∗ −0.18 −0.22 −0.25 −0.32 0.68∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.32) (0.37) (0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.20)
Community FE X X X X X X X
Observations 647 647 647 647 646 646 436
R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.09
Sample All Real Wristband
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable in Columns 1-6 is a standardized measure of the self-reported propensity of
the respondent to take each type of expression of dissent on a five-point scale, averaged over the two
time periods. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a binary measure that takes a value of 1 if the
respondent chose the wristband with a political slogan on it during the experiment over an otherwise
identical plain wristband. The independent variables include dummies for the two fear treatments, a
dummy for being a female, the age of the respondent at the time of the experiment. Education is a
five-point measure of the highest level of education completed by the participant. The assets index is the
first principal component of a list of assets based on the Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module
from Zimbabwe. Finally, I include fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the experiment
was conducted. In Columns 1-6, the treatment effects are estimated using all of the participants without
missing data, while in Column 7 the sample includes every participant who was offered a choice between
real (rather than hypothetical) wristbands. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
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2.A.4 The effect of fear on the perceived cost of dissent and risk attitudes
Table 2.10: The effect of fear on perceptions of own repression risk by risk
Dependent variable:
Threat Assault Property Abduction Sexual Murder
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear - General 0.23∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.06 0.16∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Fear - Political 0.52∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Female −0.15∗ −0.05 −0.06 −0.002 −0.01 0.004
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Age 0.02 0.03∗ 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02 0.0004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Education 0.003 −0.01 −0.06 0.01 −0.02 −0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Assets Index 0.13∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.65∗∗ −0.67∗ −0.24 −0.32 −0.11 0.21
(0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34)
Community FE X X X X X X
Observations 645 646 646 646 646 646
R2 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable in each column is a standardized measure of the perceived
likelihood of each type of repression on a five-point scale, averaged over the two time
periods. The independent variables include dummies for the two fear treatments, a
dummy for being a female, the age of the respondent at the time of the experiment.
Education is a five-point measure of the highest level of education completed by
the participant. The assets index is the first principal component of a list of assets
based on the Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module from Zimbabwe.
Finally, I include fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the experiment
was conducted. Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
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Table 2.11: The effect of fear on perceptions of others’ actions by act
Dependent variable:
Shirt Joke Rally Reveal Refuse Testify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear - General −0.14∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.16∗ −0.17∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Fear - Political −0.28∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Female 0.02 −0.07 −0.01 −0.15∗∗ −0.07 −0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.0002 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Education 0.04 0.05 0.001 −0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Assets Index 0.002 0.04 0.04 0.08∗ 0.03 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant 3.42∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31)
Community FE X X X X X X
Observations 649 649 648 649 649 649
R2 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09
Robust tandard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable in each column is a standardized measure of the expected
proportion of other opposition supporters in the respondents’ area who would take
six different actions to express dissent, averaged over the two time periods. The
independent variables include dummies for the two fear treatments, a dummy for
being a female, the age of the respondent at the time of the experiment. Education is
a five-point measure of the highest level of education completed by the participant.
The assets index is the first principal component of a list of assets based on the
Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module from Zimbabwe. Finally, I include
fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the experiment was conducted.
Models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
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Table 2.12: The effect of fear on perceptions of repression risk and others’ actions by period
Dependent variable:
Repression Risk Others’ Actions
Now Election Now Election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fear - General 0.17∗ 0.17∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)
Fear - Political 0.43∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08)
Female −0.10 0.02 −0.01 −0.16∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Age 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Education −0.03 −0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Assets Index 0.11∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.02 0.07
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.60∗ 0.03 −0.03 −0.06
(0.36) (0.32) (0.37) (0.35)
Community FE X X X X
Observations 646 646 649 649
R2 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.06
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a standardized measure of
an index measuring perceived likelihood of six type of repression on a
five-point scale. In Columns 3-4 it is a standardized measure of an index
measuring the perceived proportion of other opposition supporters who
would turn take each of six different actions on a five-point scale. In
Columns 1 and 3, the dependent variable index is based on perceptions
of what would happen in this period (a non-election period), while in
Columns 2 and 4 the index is made up of perceptions of what would
happen around the next election. The independent variables include
dummies for the two fear treatments, a dummy for being a female, the age
of the respondent at the time of the experiment. Education is a five-point
measure of the highest level of education completed by the participant.
The assets index is the first principal component of a list of assets based
on the Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module from Zimbabwe.
Finally, I include fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the
experiment was conducted. Models are estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS).
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Table 2.13: The effect of fear on risk attitudes
Dependent variable:
Risk Acceptance Uncertainty Acceptance Loss Acceptance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear Treatment - General −0.34∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.09 −0.09 0.15 0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
Fear Treatment - Political −0.45∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.19 0.18
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16)
Female −0.09 −0.09 0.12 0.10 0.35∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
Age 0.02 −0.02 0.004
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age2 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Education −0.04 −0.03 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Assets Index 0.13∗∗ −0.06 −0.14
(0.06) (0.07) (0.09)
Constant 3.13∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 0.03 0.47 −0.10 −0.12
(0.21) (0.45) (0.23) (0.48) (0.31) (0.66)
Community FE X X X X X X
Observations 669 666 669 666 669 666
R2 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a standardized measure of the spread of the lottery that the
participant chose to play in a draw with 50-50 chances of winning. In Columns 3-4, it is the difference
between the participants’ choice of lottery in the standard draw and her choice in the draw in which
60% of the balls were of an unknown color. In Columns 5-6, the outcome is the difference between the
participants’ choice in the standard draw and on a draw where the choices were framed as losses rather
than gains. The independent variables include dummies for the two fear treatments, a dummy for being a
female, the age of the respondent at the time of the experiment. Education is a five-point measure of the
highest level of education completed by the participant. The assets index is the first principal component
of a list of assets based on the Demographic and Health Survey’s assets module from Zimbabwe. Finally,
I include fixed effects for each of the constituencies where the experiment was conducted. Models are
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).
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2.A.5 The effect of fear on pessimism in economic domains
Next, I test the prediction that fear, including fear of repression, should create pessimism that spills
over into perceptions of economic domains. I have already shown that fear causes increases in risk
aversion on a series of monetary lotteries, which has consequences for economic risk taking. To
test whether fear also affects pessimism in economic domains, I measured a series of six perceived
economic risks over two time periods and created an index of economic pessimism.14 Figure 2.10
presents the average treatment effects calculated by treatment arm with 95% confidence intervals.















































In the case of economic risks, participants in both the general and political fear treatment arms are
more pessimistic than the control participants. Only the difference between participants experiencing
fear in a political context, however, is statistically significant (p = 0.03). These results, coupled
with the results showing that fear increases risk aversion on lotteries presented in Section 2.4.3,
show that fear of repression affects beliefs and preferences in economic domains that could lead to
14The measures included in the economic pessimism index include the risk that a business would not make a profit
(measured as the probability of making profits and then inverted), the risk of job loss, the risk of losing or breaking an
asset, the risk of your economic situation in general getting worse, and the risk that a family breadwinner would have to
stop working. For all six of these economic risks, I measured the perceived likelihood that it would happen in the next six
months and in the next two years.
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under-investment and lower economic outcomes.
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2.A.6 Heterogeneous effects analysis
This section describes an exploratory analysis of the heterogeneous effects in the emotions induction
experiment. I did not expect to see any heterogeneous effects and did not pre-register hypotheses
about heterogeneous effects because (1) the psychology literature does not suggest that the same
amount of fear should have different effects on different types of people, and (2) I instructed my
research team to continue trying to make people afraid until they were satisfied that the treatment was
successful. Thus, I designed the treatment to wash out differences in susceptibility to feeling fear.
In this memo, I explore heterogeneous effects along several characteristics: self-efficacy, past
activism, and past exposure to violence. Self-efficacy is a psychological trait that should predict
someone’s propensity to react fearfully in a given situation. I predicted that self-efficacy should
moderate how people react to repression, but not how the fear treatments affect their decision-making.
Past activism is strongly correlated with self-efficacy and is a potential confound in a treatment-
by-covariate heterogeneous effects analysis. People with high past exposure to violence may also
experience different effects of fear because they have more frightening experiences to draw on during
the reflection task.
2.A.6.1 Data
Some of the characteristics of interest for heterogeneous effects analysis were collected post-treatment
in order to avoid inducing fear in the control participants. To study heterogeneity in the effects of fear
along these characteristics, I first imputed “pre-treatment” versions of the variables using multiple
imputation. Figure 2.11 plots the distribution of the control values of these variables in blue against
the imputed values for the treatment group in red.
2.A.6.2 Heterogeneous effects on emotions
First I look at heterogeneous effects on the emotion manipulation checks. Table 2.14 includes only
the interaction of Self-Efficacy and the pooled version of the treatment, Table 2.15 adds controls
based on interacting the treatment dummy with demographic characteristics measured at baseline,
and Table 2.16 adds the interaction of the treatment and the imputed variables measuring past trauma
and past activism.
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Figure 2.11: Imputed values
(a) Activism









































Table 2.14: Fear and Self-Efficacy
Dependent variable:
fear anger sadness surprise happiness disgust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear Treatment × Self-Efficacy 0.01 0.35∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.03 0.25∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy −0.03 −0.01 −0.04 −0.08 0.13∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Fear Treatment 1.05∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Constant −0.53∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.10∗ 0.48∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 666 665 666 666 666 666
R2 0.29 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.27 0.11
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
While the fear treatment did not induce more fear in participants with high self-efficacy, it did
induce more anger, sadness, surprise and disgust. It had the largest differential effect on anger. The
interaction of self-efficacy and the treatment indicator does not change much after the inclusion
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Table 2.15: Fear and Self-Efficacy with Pre-Treatment Controls
Dependent variable:
fear anger sadness surprise happiness disgust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear Treatment × Self-Efficacy 0.03 0.37∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.02 0.24∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy −0.07 −0.05 −0.06 −0.08 0.13∗∗ −0.02
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Fear Treatment × Age −0.005 0.001 0.01 −0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fear Treatment × Education 0.04 0.25∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.22 −0.05 0.14
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Fear Treatment × Female 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.17 −0.23∗ 0.02
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Fear Treatment × Assets - Urban 0.14∗ 0.05 0.04 −0.07 −0.17∗∗ −0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Fear Treatment × Assets - Rural −0.03 −0.09 −0.04 −0.06 −0.12 −0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Fear Treatment 1.08∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.39 −0.11 −0.82∗∗ 0.29
(0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.37) (0.40)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01∗ 0.01 0.001 −0.002 0.01∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education −0.11 −0.11 −0.13 −0.18∗ 0.14∗ −0.12
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Female −0.15 −0.19∗ −0.30∗∗∗ −0.21∗ 0.31∗∗∗ −0.20∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Assets - Urban −0.14∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.12∗ −0.04 0.11∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Assets - Rural 0.05 0.06 0.04 −0.001 0.04 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.52∗∗ −0.23 −0.07 0.29 0.12 −0.23
(0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.28)
Observations 663 662 663 663 663 663
R2 0.32 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.29 0.17
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.16: Fear and Self-Efficacy with Pre-Treatment and Imputed Controls
Dependent variable:
fear anger sadness surprise happiness disgust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear Treatment × Self-Efficacy −0.01 0.34∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.05 0.21∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy −0.03 −0.02 −0.04 −0.05 0.11∗∗ 0.003
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Fear Treatment × Activism 0.50∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Activism −0.46∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Fear Treatment × Trauma −0.71∗∗ −0.48 −0.59∗ −0.33 0.67∗∗ −0.56
(0.31) (0.35) (0.35) (0.37) (0.32) (0.35)
Trauma 0.61∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗ −0.65∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗
(0.23) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) (0.24) (0.26)
Fear Treatment × Age −0.005 0.0005 0.01 −0.003 0.002 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fear Treatment × Education −0.002 0.21 0.30∗∗ 0.18 −0.02 0.10
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Fear Treatment × Female 0.21 0.17 0.20 0.22 −0.28∗∗ 0.06
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
Fear Treatment × Assets - Urban 0.11 0.03 0.01 −0.09 −0.14∗ −0.05
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Fear Treatment × Assets - Rural −0.003 −0.06 −0.01 −0.03 −0.14∗ −0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Fear Treatment 0.73∗∗ −0.25 −0.65 −0.40 −0.58 0.01
(0.36) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43) (0.37) (0.41)
Age 0.01∗ 0.01 0.004 0.0002 −0.001 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Education −0.08 −0.08 −0.10 −0.15 0.11 −0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Female −0.22∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Assets - Urban −0.12∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.09 −0.02 0.09 −0.16∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Assets - Rural 0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.02 0.07 −0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.19 −0.01 0.12 0.49 −0.07 −0.02
(0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28)
Observations 663 662 663 663 663 663
R2 0.36 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.32 0.19
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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of other interaction terms as controls. None of the demographic measures are particularly strong
or consistent predictors of the size of the treatment effect. However, the treatment effect varies
strongly based on the past activism and past trauma of the participant in Table 2.16. Participants who
have engaged in a lot of past activism feel more of all six emotions in response to the treatments
than non-activists. Activists in the control group express much lower levels of negative emotions
and higher levels of happiness: a one standard deviation increase in activism is associated with
0.32-0.46 standard deviations lower negative and higher positive emotions for someone in the control
group. As a result, the fear induction seems to bring activists to basically the same emotional state as
non-activists post-treatment. Similarly, the fear treatments have smaller effects for people who have
been exposed to more trauma. Again, the coefficients on the Trauma × Treatment interaction are
around the same magnitude and in the opposite direction of the coefficients on Trauma alone. This
suggests that people who have experienced more past trauma in control report more negative and less
positive emotions, and the fear treatment makes people who have not experienced trauma experience
similar emotions to treatment participants who have been traumatized.
Figure 2.12 estimates the ATE at different levels of self-efficacy to examine whether the pattern
appears to be linear. I cut up the standardized self-efficacy variable into six categories with 92-138
participants in each category: less than 1 SD below the mean, 0.5-1 SDs below the mean, 0-0.5 SDs
below the mean, 0-0.5 SDs above the mean, 0.5-1 SDs above the mean, and more than 1 SD above
the mean. Indeed, the relationship between self-efficacy and the ATE does appear to be roughly
linear for anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust.
2.A.6.3 Heterogeneous effects on outcomes
Next I look at the outcomes of interest using the same specifications in Tables 2.17, 2.18, and 2.19.
The tables show a pretty robust relationship between self-efficacy and the estimated treatment
effect on the non-behavioral measures (Propensity to Act, Perceived Repression Risk, and Proportion
of Others Acting). The interactions on the behavioral measures (Wristband and Risk Aversion)
are pretty tightly estimated null effects. After controlling for the interaction of the treatment with
activism and past trauma, there is no heterogeneous effect on the perceived proportion of others who
will act. As before, high self-efficacy people in the control group are significantly more likely to
take action, believe that others will take action, and less pessimistic about the risk of repression and
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risk averse. On the non-behavioral measures, the treatment counter-balances these effects such that
post-treatment, high and low self-efficacy people look very similar.
Past activism and trauma show similar effects: control participants who are high in activism
(trauma) are more (less) likely to act and believe that more (fewer) of their neighbors will act. In
addition, control participants high in trauma have a much higher perception of the risk of repression
and are much more risk averse. The interaction of these characteristics with the treatment wipes
out these differences such that the treatment has a bigger effect on activists and people who have
experienced little past trauma.
Figure 2.13 plots these effects on self-efficacy as a categorical variable. Again, it generally
confirms that the heterogeneous effects are roughly linear.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fear Treatment × Self-
Efficacy
−0.30∗∗∗ −0.01 0.38∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗ 0.09
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy 0.42∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Fear Treatment −0.54∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Constant −0.08∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.06 −0.11∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Observations 647 663 646 649 666
R2 0.23 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.03
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
2.A.6.4 Possible interpretations
Before suggesting a few explanations for these patterns, I will summarize the results. For high
self-efficacy people, the results show that:
• For control participants, there are no strong relationships between self-efficacy and emotions,
except they are more happy.
• The treatments did not induce more fear for high self-efficacy people, but they did induce more
anger, sadness, surprise and disgust.
• People high in self-efficacy in the control group are more likely to act (behavioral and hypo-
thetical measure) and less pessimistic and risk averse.
• The treatments had larger effects on high self-efficacy people on the self-reported and
perception-based measures. These heterogeneous effects are basically the same magnitude as
the differences in the control group between the high and low self-efficacy people such that
high self-efficacy people in treatment look like low self-efficacy people in control. On the
risk aversion measure, although the interaction is insignificant, it is still basically the same
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fear Treatment × Self-
Efficacy
−0.31∗∗∗ −0.03 0.37∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗ 0.09
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy 0.43∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Fear Treatment × Age −0.004 −0.002 −0.004 −0.01 −0.0004
(0.01) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fear Treatment × Education 0.004 0.04 0.27∗∗ −0.05 0.21
(0.12) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Fear Treatment × Female 0.05 0.04 0.10 −0.002 −0.07
(0.13) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Fear Treatment × As-
sets - Urban
−0.02 −0.08∗ −0.01 0.01 0.09
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Fear Treatment × As-
sets - Rural
0.04 −0.04 0.03 −0.05 0.13
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Fear Treatment −0.40 −0.18 −0.04 0.10 −0.06
(0.36) (0.19) (0.39) (0.40) (0.43)
Age 0.003 −0.001 0.01∗ 0.01 −0.005
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Education 0.08 −0.003 −0.11 0.04 −0.06
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Female −0.21∗∗ −0.02 −0.06 −0.10 0.15
(0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Assets - Urban −0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 −0.08
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Assets - Rural −0.02 0.06∗∗ 0.03 0.09 −0.09
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Constant −0.23 0.78∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.27 0.09
(0.25) (0.13) (0.27) (0.28) (0.30)
Observations 644 660 643 646 663
R2 0.25 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.05
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fear Treatment × Self-
Efficacy
−0.20∗∗∗ 0.02 0.44∗∗∗ −0.10 0.01
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Self-Efficacy 0.33∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Fear Treatment × Activism −0.86∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.09 −0.66∗∗∗ 0.14
(0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
Activism 0.80∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01 0.60∗∗∗ −0.10
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Fear Treatment × Trauma 0.32 −0.41∗∗ −1.59∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.17) (0.32) (0.34) (0.37)
Trauma −0.42∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.13) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28)
Fear Treatment × Age −0.002 −0.0004 0.001 −0.01 −0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Fear Treatment × Education 0.08 0.05 0.22∗ 0.01 0.20
(0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Fear Treatment × Female −0.12 −0.01 −0.001 −0.11 0.03
(0.12) (0.07) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Fear Treatment × As-
sets - Urban
0.01 −0.09∗∗ −0.10 0.04 0.12
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Fear Treatment × As-
sets - Rural
0.01 −0.04 0.08 −0.09 0.11
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Fear Treatment 0.40 0.08 0.27 0.59 −0.51
(0.33) (0.20) (0.38) (0.40) (0.43)
Age 0.002 −0.002 0.001 0.01 −0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Education 0.02 −0.01 −0.10 −0.01 −0.06
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Female −0.05 0.03 0.06 −0.01 0.06
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Assets - Urban −0.04 0.02 0.09 0.01 −0.11∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Assets - Rural 0.003 0.06∗∗ −0.02 0.13∗∗ −0.06
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Constant −0.96∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.69∗∗ 0.50∗
(0.23) (0.14) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30)
Observations 644 660 643 646 663
R2 0.42 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.09
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.13: ATES by Self-Efficacy Categories










































































































magnitude as the high self-efficacy people’s initial advantage.
• The treatments did not wipe out the differences between high and low self-efficacy people on
the wristband measure.
For people who have participated in more past activism, the results show that:
• Control participants high in trauma report much lower negative emotions and higher positive
emotions.
• The treatments had larger effects on emotions. This interaction is consistently significant.
The magnitude is similar to the differences between high and low activism individuals in the
control group.
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• Activists in the control group are more likely to act and believe that more of their neighbors
will also act.
• The treatments had bigger effects on activists on all measures where they were initially
different from non-activists. These heterogeneous effects are basically the same magnitude
as the differences in the control group between the high and low activism people. The fear
treatment had a bigger effect on activists on both the hypothetical and behavioral measures of
dissent, and on the perceived proportion of others who would dissent.
For people who have experienced lots of past violence, the results show that:
• Control participants high in trauma report much higher negative emotions and lower positive
emotions.
• The treatments had smaller effects on emotions. This interaction is not consistently significant,
but the magnitude and direction is consistent. The magnitude is similar to the differences
between high and low trauma individuals in the control group.
• People high in past trauma in the control group are less likely to act and more pessimistic and
risk averse.
• The treatments had smaller effects on high trauma people on almost all measures. These
heterogeneous effects are basically the same magnitude as the differences in the control group
between the high and low trauma people.
There are a few possible explanations for these patterns: strategic reporting, exclusion restriction
violations, and off-the-equilibrium path behavior.
Strategic reporting. The treatments had larger effects on high self-efficacy people on the self-
reported and perception-based measures, but not the behavioral measures. If the fear treatment caused
high self-efficacy people to want to engage in more strategic behavior to denounce the regime to an
outside third party, we might see this type of deviation between the behavioral and non-behavioral
measures.
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I’m wary of this interpretation, however, in light of the results on activism and past trauma. For
activists, we see similar heterogeneous effects on both the behavioral and non-behavioral measures
of propensity to act, and we don’t see any heterogeneous effects on the perceived repression risk.
If anyone is going to be strategic about how they respond to the survey, I would expect it to be
people with more past political action, and for activists the treatment had a larger effect both on the
behavioral and hypothetical measures of propensity to dissent.
Exclusion restriction violations. Ultimately it’s very difficult to interpret the heterogeneous ef-
fects on self-efficacy because they feel much more of the non-targeted emotions than low self-efficacy
emotions. As a result, we can’t interpret the heterogeneous effects on outcomes as heterogeneity
due to increases in fear. It’s not clear to me why getting a stronger dose of the emotions that high
self-efficacy people report after the treatment (anger, sadness, disgust, and surprise) would cause
the patterns that we observe on the outcomes of interest, and hard to form post-hoc interpretations
because it theory on these four emotions and risk perceptions is sparse but nevertheless different
across these emotions.
Again, the effects on activism and past trauma cannot be explained by focusing on the relative
exclusion restriction violations (i.e., higher levels of non-targeted emotions) that the high self-efficacy
people experience. For activists and people high in past trauma, the treatment did induce more (less)
of all the emotions, so the overall balance between the targeted emotion of fear and the non-targeted
emotions is pretty much the same for activists and those high in trauma, although the overall level
is increased (decreased). Thus, changes in the balance of fear to the non-targeted emotions doesn’t
explain all of the observed patterns.
Off-equilibrium behavior. The psychology literature argues that people who are high in self-
efficacy are less likely to feel fear in a given situation (Bandura, 1988). I do not know of any literature
in psychology that suggests that fear should have a bigger effect on the decisions of people low in
self-efficacy. For people who are likely to be afraid in a given situation (those low in self-efficacy
and past activism and high in trauma), the fear treatment is not that different from their normal state
because they experience fear on a fairly frequent basis. In particular, being asked to answer the
questions about repression that I used to measure outcomes should have made these people more
afraid even when they are assigned to the control group. People high in self-efficacy and past activism
and low in trauma, however, would be less likely to experience fear unless they are assigned to the
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treatment group. As a result, the treatment has a larger effect on their behavior because it takes them
further from their normal state.
Another way of looking at this is that the treatment makes people who are high in self-efficacy
and activism or low in past trauma move off the equilibrium path such that their outcomes are
similar to those who are low in self-efficacy/activism or high in past trauma. Figure 2.14 plots
the predicted values of the outcomes for participants in the treatment (in red) and control (in blue)
conditions if they are at the average level of self-efficacy (on the left) and one standard deviation
above average (on the right). For the outcomes where there is a strong heterogeneous effect of
the fear treatment, i.e. Figures 2.14a, 2.14c, and 2.14d, the control predicted values for average
and above-average self-efficacy participants are quite different, but their treatment outcomes are
statistically indistinguishable.
Figure 2.14: Predicted Outcomes for People at Average and 1 Standard Deviation Above Average
Self-Efficacy
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2.A.7 Results from the first experiment
The first experimental test of some of the propositions tested here was carried out in May 2015 with
a similar participant population. While most of the experimental design was the same, there were
several aspects that differed. First, we induced three different emotions: anger, fear, and a relaxed
control. Second, all participants were asked about past exposure to political violence before they
responded to the modules measuring outcomes. Third, rather than using different instructions for the
political and apolitical versions of the emotion inductions, we used an encouragement design that
increased the proportion of participants who reflected on political anger and fear by randomizing the
order of two pre-treatment modules of questions. Specifically, some people were asked to reflect on
what makes them angry or afraid immediately after answering a module of questions on past political
violence, while for others that module came earlier in the study. Fourth, in the emotion inductions, in
addition to describing something that makes them angry, afraid or relaxed, participants looked at a
photograph of a person expressing that emotion.
These aspects of the design were changed in the second round for various reasons. The anger
treatment was dropped in order to increase power for the fear treatment. The questions about past
political violence were moved to the end of the survey because of worries that they were priming
everyone to think about traumatic negative events and therefore reducing the effect sizes. The
encouragement into thinking about politics was dropped in favor of directly asking some people to
think about politics and giving examples of situations involving political violence.
Table 2.20 also shows that fear is associated with decreases in the propensity to act, but these ef-
fects are not significant. This may be because respondents did not seriously consider the hypothetical
actions, or because the increases in risk perceptions did not lead them to change their propensity to
act. To test whether this might be a measurement issue, I will take a several steps. First, because
it is possible that the effect of the primes had simply worn off during the questions about political
risks, I will randomly assign the order of the risk assessments and political action measures. Second,
because it is possible that participants don’t take the hypothetical questions seriously, I will add a
real, though low-risk, political action. Although my hypotheses predict that fear should decrease
political action, I have no previous estimates of this relationship to give me strong priors about what
the effect size might be.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fear 0.27∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.27∗ −0.04 −0.05 −0.07
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
Anger 0.16 0.15 0.15 −0.06 −0.07 −0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.16)
Political (Z) 0.03 0.03
(0.15) (0.17)
Fear × Political (Z) −0.04 0.05
(0.22) (0.24)
Anger × Political (Z) −0.02 0.03
(0.22) (0.24)
Female −0.08 −0.08 −0.08 −0.49∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Age 0.03 0.03 0.04∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0005∗ −0.0005∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Education 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Assets 0.05 0.05 −0.04 −0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Intercept 2.10∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗ 1.12∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗ 3.03∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.49) (0.49) (0.17) (0.52) (0.53)
Community FE X X X X X X
Observations 473 473 473 473 473 473
R2 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.19
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.B Additional results: Self-efficacy and dissent
2.B.1 Determinants of self-efficacy
Table 2.21 presents the results of an analysis of the correlates of self-efficacy. Column 1 presents the
analysis of the without community fixed effects, while Column 2 adds community fixed effects.












Urban Assets −0.193∗∗∗ −0.064
(0.052) (0.067)







Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.B.2 Self-efficacy and the severity of violence
In Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 I showed that self-efficacy is correlated with lower participation in
dissent and higher levels of fear, pessimism, and risk aversion. However, while these tests show that
self-efficacy is related to the outcomes of interest in a repressive context, they do not precisely show
that self-efficacy moderates the effect of repression because everyone in the sample is exposed to
repression. A more precise way to test whether self-efficacy moderates the effect of repression is to
test for the interaction of self-efficacy and past exposure to repression. The moderating relationship
that I predict would suggest that there should be a negative interaction between self-efficacy and the
severity of violence on fear, and a positive interaction on dissent. One major concern with such an
analysis is that past exposure to violence is endogenous to self-efficacy and past activism. However,
the conjoint analysis does allow me to look at the relationship between the randomly-assigned
severity of violence in hypothetical scenarios and the outcomes varies for people with different levels
of self-efficacy. In this section, I test whether people who are low in self-efficacy are more likely to
respond to more severe violence scenarios with more fear, and with less action, than those high in
self-efficacy. Table 2.22 presents the results of this analysis.
Table 2.22 confirms that the interactions terms are in the predicted directions, and in the case
analysis with propensity to dissent as the outcome statistically significant. Columns 1 and 2 show
that respondents report that they would feel more fear in more severe scenarios (i.e., when people are
killed rather than threatened). This relationship is attenuated, however, for people with high self-
efficacy, although the interaction is not statistically significant (p = 0.15 in Column 2). Columns 3
and 4 show that more severe scenarios make people say they would be less likely to dissent, but again
the effect of severity is smaller for high self-efficacy people. In both cases, a one standard-deviation
increase in self-efficacy reduces the effect of an increase in severity by about one-third of the effect
size.
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Table 2.22: Self-efficacy as a moderator of the effect of violence severity in the hypothetical scenarios
Dependent variable:
Fear - Scenarios Dissent - Scenarios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Self-Efficacy Index ×
Severity of Violence
−0.03 −0.04 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Self-Efficacy Index −0.16∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Severity of Violence 0.10∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ICT Index −0.02 −0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Closeness to Party 0.03 0.12∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04)
Female 0.08 0.08 −0.13∗ −0.15∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age2 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Education −0.03 −0.04 0.05 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Assets - Urban 0.05 0.05 −0.02 −0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Assets - Rural 0.03 0.03 −0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.25 0.27 0.38 0.30
(0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.35)
Observations 1,325 1,297 1,326 1,298
R2 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.21
Standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Each unit represents a the response of a respondent to one scenario; each respondent assessed
two different scenarios, so each respondent appears twice in this dataset. Severity of Violence
is coded on a standardized scale of 1 to 4 where 1=threatened, 2=beaten, 3=abducted and
4=killed in the scenario that was described. The outcome Fear - Scenarios represents how
afraid the respondent says they would feel in the described scenario on a scale of 1 to 4.
Dissent - Scenarios represents how likely the respondent says they would be to attend an
opposition rally one week after the described scenario on a five-point scale. Both outcomes
are also standardized.
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2.C Text of survey measures used
Enumerators were given a list of probes to use to follow up on the response, including “What makes
you feel most relaxed / afraid?”, “Why does it make you feel so relaxed / afraid?”, and “What does it
feel like to be relaxed / afraid?”
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Table 2.23: Reflection Treatments
Assignment
Control General Political
N = 350 N = 175 N = 175
1. What are the three to five
activities that you like to do
to relax? Please tell me two
to three sentences about each
thing that you like. (Examples
of things you might talk about
include: playing with your chil-
dren, resting, taking tea, talking
to friends.)
1. What are the three to
five things that make you most
afraid? Please tell me in
two-three sentences about each
thing that makes you afraid.
(Examples of things you might
talk about include: being alone
on a dark street, being in a traf-
fic accident, dangerous animals
like snakes or lions, etc.)
1. What are the three to
five things that make you most
afraid about politics and elec-
tions? Please tell me in
two-three sentences about each
thing that makes you afraid.
(Examples of things you might
talk about include: getting
beaten up, being abducted, los-
ing your home, etc.)
2. Now we’d like you to de-
scribe in more detail the (an-
other) way you typically like
to relax. Begin by giving a
description of your favorite re-
laxing activities. Examples of
things you might describe in-
clude going to church, spend-
ing time with certain friends,
watching football, eating a
meal with your family, etc.
What is it like to be in this sit-
uation? Why is it so relaxing?
X2
2. Now we’d like you to de-
scribe in more detail the one
(another) situation that makes
you most afraid. This could be
something you are presently ex-
periencing or something from
the past. Please tell me as if
you’re trying to make me afraid
as well. What is it like to be
in this situation? Why is it so
scary? X2
2. Now we’d like you to de-
scribe in more detail the one
(another) situation around elec-
tions and politics that makes
you most afraid around politics
and elections. This could be
something you are presently ex-
periencing or something from
the past. Please tell me as if
you’re trying to make me afraid
as well. What is it like to be
in this situation? Why is it so
scary? X2
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2.D Comparison of sample to nationally representative data
One concern with the experimental results presented in Sections 2.4 is that they were run on a
non-random sample of Zimbabwean opposition supporters. While this is quite standard for a lab
experiment, it raises questions about the generalizability of the results to other populations. In
particular, given the very high levels of past exposure to political violence observed in my sample, we
may be worried that if other Zimbabweans are less exposed to political violence and past exposure
moderates the effects, then the effects observed in this sample may overstate the effect size in the
population. In this section, I compare the experiment participants to the pool of respondents on two
nationally representative samples of Zimbabweans. I find that the demographic breakdown as well
as the past exposure to political violence observed in my sample is quite similar to that observed in
nationally representative samples in Zimbabwe. The only measures where I find substantively large
differences between the nationally representative sample and my participant pool are measures of
subjective poverty.
For a demographic comparison, I use the most recent round of the Afrobarometer survey for
which the data is publicly available. I exclude people from the comparison group who reveal
that they support the regime on the survey because this was an eligibility criteria for my study. On
demographic measures, the experimental sample is quite similar to the opposition supporters surveyed
in the fifth round of the Afrobarometer survey in 2011. The median age in my sample is 35, while
the Afrobarometer opposition supporters’ median age is 34. The median level of education in both
samples is a high school degree, with means of 1.72 in my sample and 1.55 in the Afrobarometer.15
My sample is 52% female, while the Afrobarometer opposition supporters are 51% female. However,
my sample seems to be poorer than the Afrobarometer opposition supporters. In my sample, the
median respondent reports that they “often” go without enough food and without a cash income,
while the median Afrobarometer opposition supporter reports that she “rarely” goes without enough
food and “sometimes” goes without a cash income. The mean values of these variables in my
sample are 3.59 and 4.12 for food and a cash income on a five-point frequency scale, while in the
Afrobarometer they are 2.13 and 3.15. This is not a function of the constituencies that we selected,
150=no formal education, 1=finished primary school, 2=finished high school, 3=finished vocational school or university,
and 4=post-graduate studies.
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which are quite similar to the national averages in the Afrobarometer on the subjective poverty
measures. It is possibly because the potential to win up to $1.10 in the lottery was more attractive to
the poorest residents, whereas the Afrobarometer did not offer any incentivized games.
Finally, I turn to another dataset to assess whether my sample is similar to the national average
in terms of its past exposure to state repression. Past exposure to repression is not covered in
the Afrobarometer surveys, but it was included in a 1,200 person, nationally representative survey
conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in 2009. In the MPOI 2009 survey,
respondents were asked: “Thinking of the period since independence in 1980, please tell me if you
personally/members of your family were ever affected in any of the following ways. Important:
please refer only to events that were politically motivated.” In the experiment survey, respondents
were asked: “I’m going to read you a list of things that many people consider political violence.
For each of these things, please tell me whether you have personally experienced it and whether
you have heard about it happening here since the year 2000” and enumerators clarified (1) that
“experience” referred to something that happened to you or to a member of your household, and (2)
that respondents should report things that they consider to be political violence.
A few things must be kept in mind while comparing the observed victimization in the two
populations. First, because I do not have access to the raw data from this survey, I am restricted to
reporting the published numbers based on an analysis done by Bratton (2011). As a result, I only
know the observed victimization for the full sample, rather than the subset of non-supporters of the
regime. However, this concern is mitigated by the fact that only 11% of that sample, taken shortly
after the peak of support for the opposition, reveals that they support ZANU-PF, which means that
excluding this group would have limited effects on the results. Second, the questions in the MPOI
2009 survey and on my survey measuring past exposure to repression ask about different specific
items. Again, this is not a major concern because all of the items can be linked to one or more
questions in the other survey. Third, the two surveys ask about different time periods: the MPOI
2009 survey asks respondents to report repression that has occurred between 1980 and 2009, while
my survey asks about repression exposure between 2000 and 2015. This is unlikely to lead to large
differences both because the two measures both include the period from 2000-2008 when most state
repression occurred, and because recall bias and age would likely lead respondents to under-report
violence between 1980 and 2000, when the median respondent was a child or adolescent. Fourth,
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while MPOI asks separately about the respondent’s personal experience and the experiences of their
family members, my survey asks about the experiences of the respondent and his family together.
This means that the measures are not directly comparable because calculating the proportion of the
MPOI sample that either personally experienced violence or had a member of her family experience
it requires that we know how many respondents both personally experienced violence and had a
family member experience it. Finally, the MPOI survey stressed that reported experiences should be
“politically motivated,” while my survey only mentioned “political violence.” However, given that
“political violence” is frequently discussed in Zimbabwe as politically motivated abuse, it is unlikely
that this changes the measure in important ways.
Table 2.24 presents a comparison of the incidence of different types of political violence in the
MPOI sample and in my experiment participant pool. Because this measure was asked post-treatment
to avoid inducing negative emotions in the control group, I present the results only for the control
group that did not go through a fear induction.
Table 2.24: Comparison of past exposure to political violence in the experiment participant pool and
a nationally representative sample
Experiment Control Group Bratton (2011)
Self/Family Self Family
Verbal abuse or threats 83% Intimidation, threat or harassment 51% 54%
Withholding of benefits (food, goods,
etc)
67%
Denial of food or starvation 24% 26%
The closure of a business 10% 14%
The loss of a job 9% 14%
Torture 43% Personal injury (including physical as-
sault, sexual assault, or torture)
17% 31%Physical harm (beating, assault, etc) 40%
Sexual abuse or rape 2%
Destruction of property 41%
Theft of (or damage to) your personal
property
16% 25%
Forced removal from your home or con-
fiscation of land
13% 23%
Kidnapping or abduction 21%
Arrest, kidnap or abduction
9% 19%
Arbitrary detention or arrest 19%
Murder 0% Death - 13%
Witnessing someone else being injured
or killed
38% 34%
Despite the differences across these measures, they present broadly similar pictures of the overall
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level and distribution of victimization in Zimbabwe. Whereas in my sample 83% of the respondents
or their family members have experienced verbal abuse, 51% of respondents have experienced verbal
abuse and 54% report a family member who has experienced it in the MPOI sample. Indeed, on
some measures my sample appears to have much lower exposure to violence: 13% of the MPOI
sample report that a family member has been killed, while no one in my sample reports that they
have experienced murder.
Overall, this analysis suggests that my participants, who have been exposed to extremely high
levels of political violence in the past, are not far from the average exposure in Zimbabwe. Assuming
that groups tracking political violence in Zimbabwe are correct that the vast majority of politically-
motivated violence is perpetrated by the ruling party, the MPOI survey underscores the widespread
use of repression. It also suggests that we have little reason to believe that the effects of the treatment
observed with this non-random participant population are unlikely to generalize to the rest of the
population of Zimbabwe because the participants are quite similar on key measures to representative
samples taken around the same time.
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Chapter 3
Preying on the poor: The impact of
repressive violence on citizen behavior
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Abstract
State repression is used in many countries by unpopular regimes to force citizens
to speak or act against their preferences. It is often assumed that repression is effective
in shaping citizen behavior; however, there is enormous heterogeneity in how citizens
respond. I argue that repression is most effective against the poor, and that this effect
may be driven by both psychological and physical vulnerability. I test my theory using
data from the case of Zimbabwe and two empirical strategies at the constituency and
individual level that draw on exogenous variation in economic scarcity and exposure to
repressive violence. The results presented here show that repression is more effective
in shaping the behavior of citizens living in a state of economic scarcity. These results
are robust across three analyses using independent variation in repression and scarcity.
I also rule out alternative explanations by showing that repression and scarcity are
not accompanied by changes in preferences, differences in the type of repression, or
differences in the effectiveness of clientelism. These results help explain why underde-
velopment is associated with authoritarian, non-responsive institutions, and why we see
less redistribution to the poor than we would expect in many poor democracies.
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3.1 Introduction
In March 2008, Zimbabweans went to the polls. Economic mismanagement had given many reason
to vote against the incumbent regime despite a large police presence at the polling stations and a
history of electoral intimidation and violence during elections. In the days after the poll, the results
were not announced and police were deployed in the streets, leading opposition voters to fear that
the government was rigging the results. During this period, voters sent messages to the BBC (BBC
News, 2008):
“Police have already been deployed on the streets in Harare and are telling people not to
assemble, to keep quiet. I have never been this afraid before.”
“People talked freely - even in the voting queues - of their discontent at Mugabe rule.
They openly said they would vote for change...”
“...people will burst with anger and probably demonstrate or become violent.”
The reactions of voters to the same series of political events are highly diverse. Fear, indifference,
and anger are all common reactions by citizens to threats of punishment by the state for political
action or speech. What explains this heterogeneity in voter reactions to state intimidation?
Intimidation and the threat of violence are frequently used by ruling parties to deter resistance to
the regime. Straus and Taylor (2012) report that between 1990 and 2007, around one in five elections
in sub-Saharan Africa was affected by significant levels of electoral violence, usually perpetrated
by the incumbent. Hafner-Burton et al. (2014), using data assembled by Hyde and Marinov (2012),
find that in 30% of elections worldwide between 1981 and 2004, governments used violence or
harassment against their opponents during the pre-election period. I define repression as “the actual
or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific
activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions”
(Goldstein, 1978, xxvii). This definition thus focuses on coercive applications of the state that violate
First Amendment rights like freedom of speech, freedom of association, as well as personal integrity,
and excludes the use of coercion to deter or punish theft or violent crime (Davenport, 2007).
Ruling parties use acts of repressive violence to send clear signals to citizens that they will be
punished for publicly expressing dissent by casting the wrong vote, chanting the wrong slogan, or
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wearing the wrong t-shirt. Yet there is considerable variation in the extent to which such strategies of
intimidation are successful: even in extremely repressive contexts some people are usually willing to
resist, while others acquiesce to much lower levels of intimidation. We also see dramatic shifts in
when these strategies work: repression can effectively keep unpopular regimes in power for decades,
and then suddenly catalyze mass protest. Indeed, one of the most puzzling patterns in the repression
literature is why states continue to regularly resort to repression when there is so little evidence that
it works (Davenport, 2007).
This variation in outcomes creates a puzzle: for some, the threat of repression pressures people
to stay out of politics or to feign support for the repressive regime. For others, however, the same
level of repression is not convincing, or can even increase the desire to dissent. What determines
when coercive violence works? What type of citizens are more likely to submit to the will of the
regime in the face of a repressive threat? Under what conditions might repression actually lead to
more resistance?
I argue that voters who are particularly vulnerable to violence are the most likely to capitulate in
the face of violent threats. I argue that the poor are more likely to capitulate to threats because they
are both more physically and psychologically vulnerable to violence. Physical vulnerabilities include
factors that influence voters’ abilities to protect themselves against violence, such as the ability to
invest in security or flee. Psychological vulnerabilities include factors that make voters more likely
to perceive an elevated personal risk or process information about political risk in a sub-optimal way.
This paper brings micro-level evidence to bear on the question of when intimidation effectively
causes citizens to hide their true anti-regime preferences. My goal in this analysis is thus to identify
the causal effect of both violence and poverty on the expression of dissent. It is important in such
an analysis to deal with the potential for confounding factors that are correlated with poverty and
the expression of dissent, or selection into exposure to violence. In an ideal world, I would exploit
random variation in both poverty and violence to identify the causal effects of these two factors on
dissent. In this paper, I use two empirical tests to identify the causal impact of violence and poverty
in separate analyses. At the individual level, I build on the analysis of Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale
(2014) to use random variation in recent exposure to violence to identify the causal effect of violence.
At the constituency level, I exploit random rainfall shocks in areas dependent on agriculture as shocks
to economic scarcity.
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I find that pre-election repression is associated with significant increases in the vote share of the
ruling party. This effect is concentrated in poor constituencies, and is consistent when I operationalize
poverty both with the endogenous measure based on the weight-for-height measures of children
under five and the random variation in the quality of the rainy season rainfall. Furthermore, I find
using the research design of Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014) that the very poor are significantly
more likely to hide their support for the opposition after state violence, while the behavior of citizens
who are better-off is relatively unaffected.
This project relates to the large literature that argues that underdevelopment causes poor and
undemocratic institutions (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 2000; Svolik, 2008). If the poor are easier
to repress, then this suggests another channel through which poverty stymies the development of
responsive democratic institutions. Furthermore, the relatively high ability of politicians to get
votes from the poor using violence may help explain why democratic states in countries with large
populations of poor voters can get away with failing to redistribute wealth. In this way, my argument
is related to Bates (1981), who argues that leaders redistribute away from rural areas because they are
less likely to rebel. If the poor are more easily repressed than the rich, politicians in semi-democratic
systems have less of an incentive to be responsive to their demands.
Finally, this project has implications for interventions to prevent and mitigate election violence.
Identifying where election violence should have the largest effects on voting behavior can help target
efforts to deter malfeasance such as election monitoring to maximize its impact on the legitimacy of
the election.
3.2 Theory
In this section I discuss theoretical explanations regarding how poverty at the national, subnational,
and individual level might affect the incidence and effectiveness of election violence. I divide
explanations into three main types: those related to constraints on election violence, those related
to the supply of violence, and those related to the effectiveness of violence in influencing voters. I
contend that variation in the effectiveness of violence due to poverty have largely been overlooked,
but that violence might be more effective in changing the behavior of the poor because they poor are
more vulnerable to the physical and psychological effects of violence.
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There is mixed evidence about how election violence may be affected by poverty. First, there is
considerable evidence that election violence is more common in poor countries. For example, the
NELDA dataset developed by Hyde and Marinov (2012) shows a very strong negative relationship
between GDP per capita and the incidence of pre- and post-election violence. This relationship does
not hold up to the inclusion of country fixed effects, however, meaning that the same country is not
more likely to experience election violence in years when its GDP per capita is lower. In addition,
Taylor et al. (2013) do not find a correlation between GDP per capita and the severity of election
violence within sub-Saharan Africa.2
There are many possible reasons for this pattern, but existing research has tended to focus on how
poverty reduces constraints to the use of violence. At the national level, poor countries tend to have
weaker institutions that could constrain violence such as the security sector, judiciary or press, all of
which have been linked at a cross-country level to the use of illicit election tactics including violence
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). Similarly, Hoglund (2010) argues that low
rule of law and a “culture of impunity” are “conditions enabling the use of electoral violence” (423).
The number of people willing to participate in election violence may also be affected by poverty.
In particular, poverty may reduce the opportunity cost of violence such that more people are willing
to participate, or foster grievances that politicians can take advantage of around elections (Boone and
Kriger, 2010). This relationship may depend on the strategic logic of violence. In Kenya, election
violence was used to displace opposed voters and perpetrators were rewarded with the land and assets
that the victims left behind (Boone, 2011). In this case, there is evidence that election violence was
more likely in areas with fewer people below the poverty line (Kasara, 2016).
At the individual level, there is fairly consistent evidence that the poor are more likely to be
afraid of election violence, at least in Africa. Analyses using the Afrobarometer data consistently
find that across all countries in the Afrobarometer sample (Arriola and Travaglianti, 2015) and in
those with the highest incidences of fear of election violence, the poor are more likely to report being
afraid that they personally will be targeted with violence during elections (Mares and Young, 2016).
Analysis of data from individual countries has found mixed results, with some showing that the poor
2Taylor et al. (2013) only include GDP per capita as a control variable, however, and their regressions include a
number of controls that are plausibly part of the mechanism linking poverty to election violence such as social conflict,
democratization, and previous election violence.
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are more likely to experience violence (Sacramone-Lutz, 2013), while others find no significant
effect (Bratton, 2008; Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero, 2011; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014).
Although there is strong evidence that the poor report that they are more afraid of violence, there
has been relatively little theory to explain why poor voters might be more exposed or responsive to
violence. I suggest two reasons that they might be. First, the poor are more physically vulnerable to
the effects of violence. The non-poor can mitigate and cope with the effects of violence by making
investments in defense, flight, or healthcare if they are victimized. For example, many Nairobi
residents in areas that had been affected by violence in 2008 left the city for the countryside during
the 2013 election to protect against the possibility of violence. While the rich in developing countries
tend to live behind large fences and can wait out short periods of instability, the very poor often live
in slums without secure walls or locks on their doors. Finally, while most people presumably want to
avoid violence, for someone living in extreme poverty who depends on daily wages or cannot afford
to pay a hospital bill, violence has particularly negative effects. For all of these reasons, the threat of
violence may be a particularly strong incentive for poor voters.
Furthermore, the poor may be more psychologically vulnerable to the effects of violence. In
other work, I show that there is considerable variation in how citizens interpret signals about their
own risk of facing repressive violence. In most cases, citizens change their behavior not because they
are physically incapacitated by violence but because of the perceived threat of violence if they take
certain actions. The perceived threat of violence must be estimated on the basis of rare, noisy and
potentially biased signals (Stern and Hassid, 2012; Stern and O’Brien, 2012). As a result, variation in
how information about the risk of repression is perceived and processed can have a large mediating
effect in how exposure to repression influences citizen behavior. I show in other work that variation in
self-efficacy, or beliefs about one’s general ability to cope with difficult situations, is strongly related
to higher levels of fear, a higher perceived risk of repression, and lower pro-opposition political
participation (Young, 2016). In many contexts, marginalized individuals such as the poor tend to
have lower self-efficacy than the better-off. In addition, living in a state of scarcity may create a
cognitive load that impedes rational decision-making or higher time discount rates. All of these
factors may make it harder for the poor to process information about the risk of repression, and more
likely that they will have a higher estimation of their personal risk of repression than a person who is
not living in a state of scarcity. Indeed, the fact that the poor do not seem more likely to report actual
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exposure to violence in Kenya (Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero, 2011; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2014), but
do report higher fear of election violence in the Kenya Afrobarometer after the 2008 election (Mares
and Young, 2016) could be explained by variation in how fearfully citizens react to incidents of
repression.
Finally, it is important to point out that showing that violence is more effective against the poor
does not necessarily imply that we should see violence used more frequently or severely against poor
voters. Political violence is one of a number of illicit electoral strategies, including vote buying and
fraud. If politicians substitute between these strategies to use an optimal mix of positive and negative
inducements and fraud against different subgroups, then it is the relative effectiveness of violence
compared to alternative strategies that should influence politicians’ decisions. Most importantly,
given the strong theory and evidence that vote-buying is more effective with poor voters, as poverty
increases violence may become more effective in shaping voter behavior but still increasingly less
effective in shaping the vote share relative to vote buying.
3.3 The Zimbabwean Case
Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been an electoral autocracy (Kriger, 2005). It
holds regular elections but these have not resulted in any peaceful transitions of power between
parties, in part because of the ruling party’s use of violent force. ZANU-PF grew out the independence
struggle and enjoyed widespread popular support in the 1980s and 1990s that diminished in the
1990s in part due to a severe structural adjustment program (LeBas, 2011). Beginning around 1999,
an opposition party that grew out of the country’s major trade union has credibly challenged the
ruling party ZANU-PF. The first sign of real trouble for the ruling party came in a constitutional
referendum in 2000, when the regime failed to secure the votes to pass a constitution that would have
expanded its powers. The referendum process was poorly managed by the regime, with squabbles
over unpopular clauses covered extensively in the media (LeBas, 2011, 138). The referendum was
not preceded by significant intimidation or threats, and is largely interpreted as an expression of
voters’ true preferences.
Zimbabwe’s current period of serious electoral violence began in 2000. The opposition party
MDC had just orchestrated the unexpected defeat of ZANU-PF’s proposed constitution in a refer-
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endum. Shortly thereafter, the government stopped preventing and ultimately began encouraging
extra-judicial efforts to expropriate land from white farmers. (LeBas, 2006) describes the events that
set off these attacks in the constituency of Bindura, where an MDC supporter was killed, the MDC
offices were petrol-bombed, and two MDC vehicles were burned within a few days of the governor
announcing at a rally that ZANU-PF members “must warn supporters of opposition parties that Zanu
PF is well known for spilling blood” (427). Continuing into 2000 after the referendum, violence
took two main forms. First, there were clashes between land invaders, often led by self-claimed
veterans of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle, and white commercial farmers and their workers.
Second, there were violent brawls in communal and urban areas that seemed to be opportunistic and
disorganized skirmishes between low-level supporters of the MDC and ZANU-PF (LeBas, 2006).
By 2002, violence was more directly organized by party elites. In 2001 the government initiated
a national youth training program which created a nationwide militia for the party. These militia set
up bases around the country and began using more sophisticated forms of violence such as torture
(LeBas, 2011; Reeler, 2003). State-sponsored violence has subsequently been used to directly target
opposition candidates and voters around elections. The worst cases and highest rates of violence
occurred in rural areas, particularly in ZANU-PF strongholds. Party agents, youth wing members,
members of the association of war veterans from Zimbabwe’s independence struggle, soldiers, and
traditional leaders have all played a role in organizing intimidation campaigns around recent elections
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). This type of violence peaked with the popularity of the MDC in
2008, when hundreds were killed and hundreds of thousands displaced after the MDC won the first
round of the presidential election.
How was violence targeted during this period? It is initially puzzling that violence was most
concentrated and severe in areas with high levels of electoral support for ZANU-PF where the
ruling party candidates’ positions were at little risk of being lost. For example, Mashonaland
Central and Mashonaland East, the two provinces that had seen the highest rates of support for the
government’s constitution during the 2000 referendum, experienced the most violence during the
2000 parliamentary elections. LeBas (2006) argues that violence occurred largely as a function of
ZANU-PF’s internal politics. LeBas documents through interviews with ruling party elites that they
themselves saw the political violence during this period as a way for “particular elites within the
party to expand their control over decision making, threaten those they suspected of opposing the
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centralization of party, and pursue specialized, somewhat reactionary ideological agendas” (429).
This strategy, which was ultimately successful in consolidating power within ZANU-PF, emerged in
large part because by the early 2000s some members of the ruling party leadership had lost control
of party structures in their constituencies. The use of youth militias and party-affiliated civil society
groups enabled them to retake control and threaten local challengers (LeBas, 2006).
In 2005, pre-election violence was significantly reduced, with most analysts arguing that the
ruling party aimed to avoid the international condemnation that had followed the brutality of the
2002 elections (ZHRNGOF, 2005). However, low-level, opportunistic violence continued to target
MDC activists and supporters, and by many accounts served to remind people of the capacity of the
ruling party to exact the kind of brutal campaign that they had carried out in 2002.
3.4 Methodology
My theory makes predictions about the causal effect of both repressive violence and poverty on the
expression of dissent. Testing for such a causal relationship is difficult because evidence based on
correlations is likely to be biased by confounding factors, reverse causality, and selection bias. The
ideal design from a methodological perspective would randomly assign both poverty and exposure to
violence to establish a design-based counterfactual. In this case, that is not possible for both ethical
and logistical reasons. The purpose of this project is to bring evidence to bear on how a government
policy of repression is related to subsequent changes in citizen behavior at a significant scale.
My research design combines two identification strategies applied in two separate analyses
that draw on exogenous variation in poverty and exposure to state repression to address the major
challenges to inference that testing such a theory implies. The first challenge is that it is difficult
to separate out the role of poverty from the role of other factors such as education, ethnicity, or
occupation that may be correlated with socioeconomic status. In a constituency-level analysis, I draw
on random variation in poverty caused by bad rainy season rainfall to identify the causal effect of
variation in poverty. The second challenge is that citizens with certain characteristics may select into
exposure to violence, and this propensity may be correlated with willingness to express dissent. I
extend an individual-level analysis by Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014) to exploit random variation
in the order in whether survey respondents were surveyed immediately before or after a repressive
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event in their district. Table 3.1 describes for each analysis which explanatory variable is identified
and which is endogenous.





el Individual Endogenous Exogenous
Constituency Exogenous Endogenous
My methodology makes several contributions. First, I provide both a constituency- and individual-
level test of my theory and show that it applies to both voting for a less-preferred party and lower-level
forms of preference falsification like revealing anti-regime political preferences to a stranger. Second,
in different sections of the analysis, I provide causal estimates of the effect of scarcity due to
random variation in the quality of the rainy season and violence due to random variation in whether
an individual was surveyed before or after a violent event in his district. Taken together, these
results provide strong evidence that there is a causal relationship between economic scarcity and the
propensity to capitulate in the face of violent threats.
3.4.1 Constituency-level analysis
3.4.1.1 Research design
In the first section of this paper, I analyze how pre-election violence is related to changes in the
vote share of the ruling party. I use several strategies to create a counterfactual for the ruling party’s
vote share in the constituency. First, I leverage a constitutional referendum that occurred in March
2000 that occurred before ZANU-PF started using significant levels of violence against voters. This
poll took ZANU-PF by surprise: from independence in 1980 until that 2000 election, ZANU-PF
easily won supermajorities in elections based on their popularity. At the end of the 1990s, they
lost a significant amount of support as the economy began to slow down but were unprepared to
lose a constitutional referendum that was essentially a referendum on the president’s core policies
and leadership. Thus, I use the level of support for ZANU-PF’s policies from this referendum as a
baseline measure and analyze whether violence increases support for ZANU-PF from this baseline.
Second, I use time and region-specific fixed effects to control for all time- and province- or
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constituency-specific factors that influence the degree to which ZANU-PF’s support deviates from
this baseline. Indeed, support for ZANU-PF was overall increasing from 2000 to 2005. Similarly,
some constituencies, such as those in the Matabeleland region that is populated by the Ndebele
minority ethnic group, have lower support for ZANU-PF. In my preferred specification, I use fixed
effects for each constituency and election to implement a difference-in-difference design where the
coefficients are estimated using the variation in the severity of violence in a specific constituency
over time.
Last, I use random variation in the quality of the rainy season to identify the impact of scarcity on
the effectiveness of violence. I hypothesize that in poor constituencies, violence should be associated
with a higher increase in ZANU-PF’s vote share. For my first set of results, I measure scarcity using
data from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) on wasting, a measure of child
malnutrition. However, wasting is correlated with a number of other factors that might influence the
effectiveness of violence such as ethnicity or flows of patronage from ZANU-PF.
To isolate the random variation in scarcity, I use variation in the quality of the rainfall in each
constituency during the rainy season preceding the election. Specifically, for each constituency I
calculate the 20-year average rainfall during the rainy season from 1990 to 2010 using data collected
by satellite by the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS). Average
rainfall by constituency is not random, as it is varies in predictable ways across constituencies.
However, whether the rainfall in a given December-February rainy season is above or below the
constituency average is as-if random as it is orthogonal to the political characteristics that might be
correlated with my dependent variable. Thus, I create a dummy variable for whether the previous
rainy season’s rainfall was below average and use this as a random shock to the economic status of
Zimbabwean voters.
3.4.1.2 Specifications
For this section of the analysis I estimate the following specification to test whether state-sponsored
pre-election violence increases the ruling party’s vote share:
Yit = βviolenceit + γi +λt + εit
where Yit is the difference between ZANU-PF’s vote share in an election post-March 2000 and
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its vote share in the March 2000 referendum. γi is a constituency-specific fixed effect (in some
specifications I use a province fixed effect, but in my preferred specification it it at the level of the
individual unit, the constituency) and λt is an election-specific fixed effect. violenceit is the number
of violent events that have occurred in a constituency during the three-month period immediately
prior to the election. For specifications where I include fixed effects for each province instead of
each constituency, I also estimate the effect of some constituency-level controls.
To estimate the heterogeneous effects I test for the interaction of pre-election violence and a
measure of scarcity in a given constituency:
Yit = β1violenceit × povertyit +β2violenceit +β3 povertyit + γi +λt + εit
where the coefficient of interest β1 is on the interaction of the extent of violence violenceit and
the extent of economic scarcity povertyi in a constituency.3
3.4.1.3 Data
I construct a time series dataset of constituency-level characteristics using four primary data sources.
First, I build a time series of ZANU-PF’s vote share in all elections taking place between 2000 and
2005. During this period there were four elections: the March 2000 constitutional referendum, a June
2000 parliamentary election, the March 2002 presidential election, and a March 2005 parliamentary
election. During this period Zimbabwe had 120 unique constituencies across 10 provinces; I stop at
2005 because Zimbabwe had a major redistricting before the 2008 election that increased the number
of constituencies to 210 that makes it very difficult to trace continuous vote shares from the prior
period. Zimbabwe also underwent two minor redistricting exercises in 2000 between the referendum
and parliamentary elections and between the 2002 and 2005 elections. Both of these were highly
politicized, and to deal with the threat that these changes pose to my analysis I create measures of
the extent to which the constituency boundaries changed during each of these delimitation exercises.
I include these as controls in some analyses and in others drop constituencies that had more than a
3This specification does not always include the direct effect of povertyit because in some cases I use non-time varying
measures of poverty and they are subsumed by the constituency fixed effects. Specifically, the exogenous measure of
poverty (deviation from average rainfall) is time-varying and constituency-specific, while the endogenous measure (wasting
in children under five) is measured just once per constituency.
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minor change to their boundaries.
To measure pre-election violence, I coded text reports of cases of state violence against civilians
during the three months leading up to the elections in 2000, 2002, and 2005. These reports were
collected by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (ZHRNGOF), a network of 17 human rights
NGOs that pooled data on cases of violence and collaborated to conduct research and lobby for
justice. ZHRNGOF produced monthly reports on major violent events from 2000 to 2009 with
descriptions of the event and information on its location (meaning the constituency it occurred in)
and date. I coded these for the perpetrator and victim types (ZANU-PF vs. MDC), type of abuse, and
number of victims. The majority of their cases are reported from member organizations that had an
active monitoring presence in the constituencies, although in some cases they also drew information
from local media reports.
Third, I measure poverty by constituency using data collected in the 2005 Zimbabwe DHS on
children’s nutritional status. Specifically, I calculate using ArcGIS the average weight-for-height z-
score of children surveyed by the DHS in each constituency. The weight-for-height z-score compares
surveyed children to an international healthy standard taken from children in the US. From this,
I calculate a normalized measure of wasting severity that is the inverse of the weight-for-height
z-scores.
Last, as a second measure of poverty I calculate the extent to which the December to February
rainy season preceding each election deviates from the 20-year average rainy season rainfall for that
constituency. I again calculate this measure using ArcGIS from monthly rainfall satellite images
collected by the UC Santa Barbara CHIRPS project. I calculate the rainy season rainfall for each
constituency for each year, subtract out the 20-year average rainy season rainfall, and then create a
dummy for whether the rainy season preceding each election was above or below average.
Figure 3.1 displays the main variables in 2005 visually.
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Figure 3.1: Main explanatory and dependent variables in the constituency-level analysis, 2005
(a) Wasting (b) Rain Deficit
(c) Repression (d)4 ZANU
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3.4.2 Individual-level expression of anti-regime preferences
3.4.2.1 Research design
Second, I test my theory of the effectiveness of repression using opinion data from five rounds of
Afrobarometer surveys in Zimbabwe conducted between 1999 and 2012. The strategy that I employ
to test this theory is adapted from Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014). I subset the survey data to
only communities that have experienced violence in the week before or after being surveyed. Thus,
this strategy controls for the characteristics that determine whether communities are targeted with
violence and isolates the plausibly random variation in timing within a very small window.
I first test whether recent pre-survey violence is associated with a decline in willingness to
publicly reveal support for the opposition. Because some Zimbabwean respondents are falsifying
their preferences in the Afrobarometer surveys, it is impossible to determine the true level of support
for the two main parties or which voters actually support the opposition or the ruling party. However,
comparing rates of support for the ruling party areas with pre-survey violence to those with post-
survey violence allows us to measure the proportion of voters who switch their revealed preference
as a result of the treatment.
Second, I interact pre-survey violence with a respondent’s self-reported poverty level, which I
predict makes them more likely to be influenced by pre-survey violence. I operationalize poverty by
creating a composite measure of how frequently a respondent goes without food, and how frequently
she goes without a cash income.
This strategy has three key identifying assumptions that are important to clarify:
1. The timing of the survey within a district is orthogonal to violence
2. Repression does not change preferences toward the regime
3. Repression is not correlated with other events that affect preferences or falsification
The first assumption implies that the surveyors do not include or exclude households from the
survey based on whether they were recently exposed to repressive violence. Interviews with the head
of the survey firm that conducts the Afrobarometer in Zimbabwe and the Afrobarometer’s sampling
protocols confirm that this is the case.
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The second assumption is necessary to identify variation in willingness to express dissent because
two parameters fundamentally shape the expression of dissent: preferences over the regime and
willingness to express them. Citizens who do not express dissent may do so either because they
truly like the regime, or because they do not but are not willing to run the risk of expressing it.
Therefore, to identify changes in willingness to express dissent, preferences over the regime must be
held constant. In this case, and particularly during the period under study, voters have strong partisan
identities that are unlikely to be affected by a single recent experience (LeBas, 2011).
Last, we must assume that repression is not correlated with other events that might affect
preferences or willingness to express dissent. To the extent that repression occurs in response to
opposition mobilization, for example, the results would be biased by the effect of these other recent
events on expression of dissent. I test this assumption empirically by controlling for recent opposition
mobilization.
Given these assumptions, I am able to identify the causal effect of violence on willingness to
reveal support for the opposition. However, the key tests of my hypotheses come from the interactions
of this causal effect with covariates that are not randomly assigned. While these interactions do show
that certain types of individuals are more likely to respond to violence in certain ways, we cannot
interpret the effects as the causal impact of economic vulnerability on the propensity to comply with
repression. Nevertheless, they provide important insight into when intimidation has the intended
effect on citizen behavior.
3.4.2.2 Specification
To test my theory at the individual level, I run a regression of revealed support for the opposition (or,
in alternative specifications, support for the ruling party, no party preferences, or refusal to answer the
question about party identification) on exposure to pre-survey violence. The main variable of interest
is the interaction between individual-level characteristics and district-level exposure to pre-survey
violence. To take into account the propensity of the respondent to be exposed to violence, I include
district fixed effects. This implies that the estimated coefficient on pre-survey violence comes from
within-district variation in whether someone was surveyed just before or just after a violent events,
which I argue is orthogonal to the political beliefs that I use as an outcome variable.
The specification that I estimate in this section is therefore:
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Yi = β1violencei× povertyi +β2violencei +β3 povertyi + γ j +λt + εi
where i represents each individual, j each district, and t each Afrobarometer round (i.e. a
dummy for being surveyed in 2004, 2005, 2009, etc). The main coefficient of interest is on the
interaction between whether an individual was exposed to pre-survey state-sponsored violence and
their individual level of experienced poverty. I control for each district with the fixed effect γ j, and
for each Afrobarometer round with λt . I also include the direct effects of exposure to violence and
poverty.
3.4.2.3 Data
I analyze the impact of violence on revealed support at the level of the individual Afrobarometer
respondent using data on violence at the level of the district, the second-lowest administrative unit in
Zimbabwe. The ACLED data includes geo-coordinates that could enable more specific targeting of
violent events, but these geo-coordinates are unreliable as events that are identified with a low level
of precision (such as an event that took place in the city of Harare) are geo-localized at the center of
the geographical area. Thus, the lowest consistent level of geo-localization for all the events is at the
district level. The Afrobarometer data is identified at the constituency level, which I aggregated up
to the district. In the case of Harare, I followed the convention in the ACLED data of splitting the
district into several large urban areas (Harare, Chitungwiza, and Epworth) that are included within
the district of Harare.
To measure exposure to violence, I use violent events from the ACLED dataset. ACLED measures
violence from a variety of public sources including newspapers and NGO reports. Although recent
several studies have shown that the ACLED data is not an exhaustive measure of violence, this is not
a major concern for this particular study for several reasons. First, because I am looking at the effect
of violence on citizens at the district level, the type of violent events that are relevant for this analysis
are fairly large-scale, public events. Second, compared to many conflict-affected countries covered
in the ACLED data such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, Zimbabwe has a
robust independent media and civil society that tracks state violence. Many of the ACLED records
draw from these sources, including the ZHRNGOF.
From the ACLED data, I excluded events that were not “violence against civilians” or “ri-
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ots/protests.” I constructed measures of the date of violent events and the perpetrator’s affiliation
(government or MDC) based on the identity of the perpetrators or their allies. A table of the coding
of the perpetrator’s affiliation is in Appendix 3.B.2.
I chose the measures in the Afrobarometer data to use to examine heterogeneous effects based
on the predictions of my theory and the availability of the data. The Afrobarometer was fielded in
Zimbabwe over five different rounds, with only a handful of questions asked in the same way in
multiple rounds. The measures for gender, age, education, and employment were straightforward.
The measure of poverty of food and a cash income are strong indicators of economic vulnerability
and were included in all five rounds in the same way.
3.5 Results: Constituency-level analysis of voting
3.5.1 Main effects: Pre-election violence and vote share
In this section I present the results of my tests at the constituency level. As described in Section
3.4.1, the unit of analysis is the constituency-election. The dependent variable is the deviation in a
given election from the baseline measure of support in the referendum vote in 2000. The independent
variables include dummies for whether the delimitation exercises in 2000 and 2005 resulted in major,
minor, or no changes in the constituency boundaries. All specifications include election (time) fixed
effects, and progressively include province or constituency level fixed effects. Finally, Table 3.2 is
split between results from two different datasets. The first dataset used for Columns 1-4 includes
all constituencies, regardless of the extent of redistricting that occurred. The second dataset used
for Columns 5-8 excludes constituencies that underwent major changes during either redistricting
process.
All models are estimated using OLS, and the standard errors are clustered at the level of the
constituency because constituency results are correlated across years.
The results shown in Table 3.2 show that pre-election violence is strongly associated with
increases in ZANU-PF’s vote share. This result is largely driven by variation in the number of violent
events within a constituency over time: the results from Columns 4 and 8 with both election and
constituency fixed effects are not very different from the results in Columns 2-3 and 6-7 with election
and province fixed effects.
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Table 3.2: Pre-election violence and changes in ZANU-PF vote share
Dependent variable:
Change in ZANU vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Repression Events 3.94∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 4.15∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.46) (0.46) (0.53) (0.78) (0.48) (0.48) (0.57)
2000 Redist - Minor −0.62
(2.46)
2000 Redist - None −2.38 −1.49
(2.23) (1.37)
2005 Redist - Minor −0.19
(1.82)
2005 Redist - None −3.15∗ −3.14∗∗∗
(1.88) (1.21)
Intercept −9.90∗∗∗ −14.41∗∗∗ −11.97∗∗∗ −9.92∗∗∗ −9.61∗∗∗ −13.47∗∗∗ −10.72∗∗∗ −9.50∗∗∗
(1.75) (1.17) (2.76) (0.69) (1.90) (2.09) (2.63) (0.73)
Election FE X X X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X
Constituency FE X X
Observations 369 369 369 369 279 279 279 279
R2 0.23 0.61 0.62 0.85 0.22 0.62 0.64 0.86
Clusters 119 119 119 119 93 93 93 93
Sample All Minor or no redistricting
Standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models estimated using OLS. Columns 1-4 are estimated using data from all the constituencies, and 5-8 are estimated
using a subset of constituencies that experienced minor or no changes during the delimitation exercises in 2000 and
2005. The dependent variable is the change in ZANU-PF’s vote share from the 2000 referendum to the election of
interest in 2000, 2002, or 2005. The main coefficient of interest is on Repression Events, which is a measure of the
number of events of state violence against the opposition in a given constituency in the three months leading up to an
election, and has been logged. All columns include fixed effects for the election. Columns 2-3 and 6-7 add fixed
effects for each of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces. Columns 4 and 8 replace the province fixed effects with fixed effects
for each constituency (the individual unit of analysis).
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To deal with the threat that the redistricting exercises pose to this kind of time series inference, I
use two strategies. First, I include controls for dummy variables indicating whether the constituency
underwent a major, minor or no boundary changes during the redistricting process. The coefficients
on these variables show logical patterns in light of the significant anecdotal evidence that these
redistricting processes were politically motivated: constituencies that underwent no redistricting
(both in 2000 and 2005) have the smallest changes in ZANU-PF’s vote share, while constituencies
that underwent minor changes also have smaller changes than those that underwent major boundary
changes. While most of these coefficients are not significant, the coefficient on the dummy indicating
that a constituency underwent no boundary changes in 2005 is significant in both Columns 3 and 7.4
The second strategy to deal with redistricting is to simply exclude all constituencies that under-
went major changes during either of the redistricting processes. When I exclude the constituencies that
underwent any major redistricting changes in Columns 5-8, the coefficient of interest on Repression
Events actually increases in magnitude.
Substantively, these results imply that a ten percent increase in pre-election repression events
is associated with a 0.193 percentage point increase (from the preferred specification in Column
8) in the change in ZANU-PF’s vote share in an election over their vote share in the constitutional
referendum in 2000. This implies that going from no violent events to one violent event is associated
with a 1.3 percentage point increase in ZANU-PF’s vote share.
If we interpret this result causally, this implies that if there had been no violence during the
2000-2005 elections, ZANU-PF’s national share of the vote would have dropped by 3.5 percentage
points in 2000, 1.3 percentage points in 2002, and 0.5 percentage points in 2005. Assuming that this
vote share would have gone to the main opposition party, this estimate implies that ZANU-PF would
have lost seven constituencies that it narrowly won: Bindura, Chinhoyi, Chiredzi East, Makoni East,
Marondera East, and Masvingo North in 2000, and Tsholotsho in 2002.
Robustness checks in Appendix 3.A show that these results are not driven by outlier values of
the main independent variable as they are robust to using a binary and rank measure of Repression
Events as the key explanatory variable.
4In Column 3, the coefficient is estimated in comparison to the base case of major boundary changes, while in Column
7, the coefficient is estimated in comparison to the base case of minor boundary changes because all major cases are
excluded from the analysis.
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3.5.2 Heterogeneous effects: Endogenous poverty
In this section I test my hypothesis that poor voters are most likely to be influenced by pre-election
violent repression. I do this by testing for the heterogeneous effects of pre-election repression events
by estimating the coefficient on the interaction of repression events and economic poverty.
I use two primary measures of economic poverty in this analysis. First, I use a measure of wasting
of children under five from the Demographic and Health Survey in Zimbabwe in 2005. This is a
direct measure of my concept of poverty as it measures the inability of families to provide sufficient
calories for their children. However, wasting is endogenous to a range of factors, including others
that could theoretically influence the effectiveness of violence. Therefore, as a second measure I also
use the rainfall deficit in the last rainy season before the election in question in Section 3.5.3.
As in Section 3.5.1, the unit of analysis is the constituency-election. I again run the analysis
using both a complete dataset of Zimbabwean constituencies and a second dataset that excludes
constituencies affected by major boundary changes during the 2000 or 2005 delimitation exercises.
The dependent variable is the change for a given constituency-election from the constituency’s results
in the pre-violence constitutional referendum in 2000. Table 3.3 shows the results of this analysis.
Table 3.3 shows that the impact of pre-election violent repression is higher in constituencies
with higher levels of wasting in children under five. The positive coefficient on the interaction
term Repression Events ×Wasting indicates that the effect of an increase in the coefficient on the
logged measure of repression events is larger in constituencies with more wasting. However, this
coefficient decreases slightly in magnitude and loses significance when I include constituency rather
than province fixed effects. Nevertheless, these results, although they appear to be driven by variation
between constituencies rather than within constituencies over time and are thus more vulnerable to
concerns of endogeneity, suggest that there might be a positive relationship between wasting and the
strength of the relationship between pre-election violence and ZANU-PF’s vote share.
Figure 3.2 plots the effect of a one-unit increase in the logged number of violent events at
different levels of wasting in children under five.
Figure 3.2 shows that additional pre-election violent events have little or no effect on ZANU-
PF’s vote share in constituencies that have very low levels of wasting in children under five. For
constituencies that are high in this measure of poverty, however, additional violent events have a
large and significant effect on electoral outcomes.
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneous effects of pre-election violence in poor constituencies
Dependent variable:
Change in ZANU vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Repression Events ×
Wasting
0.63∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.55∗ 0.42 0.99∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.76∗∗ 0.53
(0.36) (0.27) (0.28) (0.33) (0.44) (0.30) (0.30) (0.41)
Repression Events 3.86∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ 2.13∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.44) (0.44) (0.50) (0.78) (0.48) (0.47) (0.55)
Wasting 0.90 −0.86 −0.65 0.35 −1.13 −0.86
(0.87) (0.69) (0.70) (1.02) (0.75) (0.77)
2000 Redist - Minor −0.03
(2.52)
2000 Redist - None −2.28 −2.19
(2.23) (1.59)
2005 Redist - Minor −0.29
(1.88)
2005 Redist - None −3.17∗ −3.09∗∗
(1.89) (1.23)
Intercept −9.75∗∗∗ −14.82∗∗∗ −12.20∗∗∗ −9.88∗∗∗ −9.33∗∗∗ −14.25∗∗∗ −10.49∗∗∗ −9.43∗∗∗
(1.77) (1.20) (2.76) (0.69) (1.94) (1.94) (2.96) (0.73)
Election FE X X X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X
Constituency FE X X
Observations 366 366 366 366 276 276 276 276
R2 0.25 0.61 0.62 0.85 0.24 0.63 0.64 0.86
Clusters 118 118 118 118 92 92 92 92
Sample All Minor or no redistricting
Standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models estimated using OLS. Columns 1-4 are estimated using data from all the constituencies, and 5-8 are estimated
using a subset of constituencies that experienced minor or no changes during the delimitation exercises in 2000 and
2005. The dependent variable is the change in ZANU-PF’s vote share from the 2000 referendum to the election of
interest in 2000, 2002, or 2005. The main coefficient of interest is on the interaction term Repression × Wasting.
Repression Events is a measure of the logged number of events of state violence against the opposition in a given
constituency in the three months leading up to an election. Wasting is a standardized measure of the weight-for-height
z-scores of children surveyed during the 2005 DHS in a given constituency. All columns include fixed effects for the
election. Columns 2-3 and 6-7 add fixed effects for each of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces. Columns 4 and 8 replace the
province fixed effects with fixed effects for each constituency (the individual unit of analysis).
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3.5.3 Heterogeneous effects: Exogenous poverty
In the next section I discuss the results of my second test of the heterogeneous effects of pre-election
violence based on exogenous variation in poverty. Specifically, instead of using child malnutrition as
a measure of poverty, I use exogenous variation in the quality of the annual rainy season for each
constituency. As discussed in Section 3.4.1.3, these measures both proxy for the underlying state of
poverty that households are living in. Appendix 3.A.5 shows that the two measures are positively
correlated with each other, suggesting that bad rainy seasons do indeed negatively affect households’
economic situations.
Whether or not a given rainy season is better or worse than the historical average for a constituency
is random – it is not influenced by local political or economic factors that could influence the
effectiveness of violence. Each constituency has an equal likelihood of having an above or below
average rainfall during a given year. When the rains are bad, it affects not only Zimbabwean families’
abilities to produce food for consumption but is also a shock to the incomes of households that
produce crops to sell. Thus, this analysis allows me to show that economic poverty has a causal
impact on the relationship between repression and the ruling party’s vote share.
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As in the previous section, the unit of analysis is the constituency-election and the dependent
variable is the deviation in a given election of ZANU-PF’s vote share from its vote share in the 2000
referendum. Table 3.4 shows the results of this analysis.
Table 3.4 shows that the relationship between pre-election violence and ZANU-PF’s vote share
in constituencies in which the previous rainy season was below-average is significantly more positive
than constituencies with normal or above-average rainy seasons. This significant positive coefficient
on the interaction term Repression Events × Rain Deficit is robust to the inclusion of controls for
the extent of redistricting that occurred in 2000 and 2005 (Columns 3 and 7) as well as fixed effects
for each province (Columns 2-3 and 6-7) or for each individual constituency (Columns 4 and 8).
There is no significant effect, however, if we do not include geographic controls and the province or
constituency level. Importantly, once we exclude constituencies whose boundaries have gone through
major changes due to the politicized delimitation process, the relationship between pre-election
violence and the heterogeneous effect of bad rainfall increase in magnitude (Columns 1-4 compared
to 5-8).
Figure 3.3 displays graphically how the marginal effect of pre-election violence depends on
whether the last rainy season was above or below average.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous effects of pre-election violence in constituencies with below-average
rainfall
Dependent variable:
Change in ZANU vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Repression Events ×
Rain Deficit
0.13 2.18∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 0.20 2.84∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗
(1.30) (0.87) (0.86) (0.93) (1.45) (1.06) (1.00) (1.11)
Repression Events 3.72∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗ 1.14∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 3.89∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 1.22∗
(0.76) (0.51) (0.53) (0.60) (0.86) (0.54) (0.54) (0.63)
Rain Deficit −0.58 0.11 0.30 −0.38 −0.53 −0.34 −0.13 −0.34
(1.94) (1.35) (1.26) (1.52) (2.36) (1.47) (1.38) (1.75)
2000 Redist - Minor 0.48
(2.47)
2000 Redist - None −2.85 −3.34∗∗∗
(2.39) (1.23)
2005 Redist - Minor 0.07
(1.89)
2005 Redist - None −3.06 −3.25∗∗
(1.93) (1.30)
Intercept −9.25∗∗∗ −13.75∗∗∗ −11.39∗∗∗ −10.68∗∗∗ −8.86∗∗∗ −13.13∗∗∗ −8.83∗∗∗ −10.12∗∗∗
(1.85) (1.27) (3.01) (0.84) (1.98) (2.02) (2.43) (0.89)
Election FE X X X X X X X X
Province FE X X X X
Constituency FE X X
Observations 347 347 347 347 265 265 265 265
R2 0.24 0.61 0.63 0.86 0.22 0.64 0.65 0.87
Clusters 115 115 115 115 91 91 91 91
Sample All Minor or no redistricting
Standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models estimated using OLS. Columns 1-4 are estimated using data from all the constituencies, and 5-8 are estimated
using a subset of constituencies that experienced minor or no changes during the delimitation exercises in 2000 and
2005. The dependent variable is the change in ZANU-PF’s vote share from the 2000 referendum to the election of
interest in 2000, 2002, or 2005. The main coefficient of interest is on the interaction term Repression Events × Rain
Deficit. Repression Events is a measure of the number of events of state violence against the opposition in a given
constituency in the three months leading up to an election. Rain Deficit is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the rainy
season rainfall in a given constituency was below the 20-year average for that constituency. All columns include
fixed effects for the election. Columns 2-3 and 6-7 add fixed effects for each of Zimbabwe’s ten provinces. Columns
4 and 8 replace the province fixed effects with fixed effects for each constituency (the individual unit of analysis).
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3.5.4 Robustness and Mechanisms
In this section I run a series of robustness checks and test for evidence consistent with my argument
and several alternative explanations for the observed patterns. To recap, in the previous sections I
found first that violence appears to work – it does effectively increase the vote share of the ruling
party. First, I test that the results are not driven by outliers in the right-skewed measure of repression
events. The results are robust to different transformations of the key measure of repression events,
including a binary measure of whether any events occur and a ranked measure. These results are
shown in Appendix 3.A.1. This test should assuage some concerns that the results are driven by
variation in the quality of the conflict data, an important concern in several recent analyses (Dafoe
and Lyall, 2015; Weidmann, 2015). If some constituencies that do experience repression events
are erroneously coded as zeros in the binary coding, this would lead to under-estimation of the
coefficient of interest, but the robustness to a binary version of repression events suggests that under
most plausible types of reporting bias we would not expect to over-estimate the relationship between
repression and change in the ruling party’s vote share.
Second, if poverty is making citizens more vulnerable to repression, we should expect to see that
increases in poverty matter more when people are relatively more poor. For instance, being extremely
poor versus somewhat poor should have a greater relationship with the marginal effect of repression
than being well-off versus average because being above a certain threshold additional wealth should
not imply more physical or psychological resources to cope with violence. I test whether there is a
threshold of poverty below which the marginal effect of violence begins to increase. To test for a
threshold effect of poverty, I create categorical versions of the measures of wasting and bad rainfall
in Appendix 3.A.2. Indeed, I find that my results are driven in variation in poverty above the mean,
while decreases below the mean have no effect. This is consistent with a theory in which extreme
poverty makes citizens vulnerable to repressive threats.
I also test the plausibility of several alternative mechanisms. First, I test whether violence
might be more severe or more frequent in poor areas. To test this potential confound, I estimate the
relationship between the severity of violence and the level of wasting. In Appendix 3.A.3 I show that
violence overall and more severe types of violence like murder, rape, and abduction are not more
likely in poorer constituencies. If anything, less severe types of violence like assault may be less
common in poorer areas, which would lead me to under-estimate my coefficients, although there is
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no statistically significant evidence of any relationship.
As discussed in the methodology section, my difference-in-difference design controls for all time-
and constituency-specific factors that might bias my estimates. However, to the extent that there are
confounding factors that vary over time within each constituency, my results might be biased. One
such factor that might affect the analysis of the effect of rainfall on the effectiveness of violence in
Section 3.5.3 is any change in citizen preferences caused by rainfall shocks. My theory implies that
changes in poverty affect the willingness to reveal or act on preferences under the threat of violence,
which means that empirical tests must hold the actual preferences constant. The existing literature
suggests that bad rainfall might cause citizens to prefer the government less (Achen and Bartels,
2002; Healy and Malhotra, 2010), which would lead me to underestimate the effect of poverty on the
effectiveness of repression. I conduct an empirical test of the relationship between bad rainfall and
citizen preferences in Zimbabwe in Appendix 3.A.4. This analysis shows that there is little to no
evidence that bad rainfall affects citizen preferences, and if anything this would indeed lead me to
under- rather than over-estimate my coefficient of interest.
Another potential time-variant and constituency-specific confound is the effectiveness of clien-
telism, or offers of positive inducements in exchange for electoral support. Clientelism is difficult to
measure as it is fundamentally based on perceptions, or whether citizens believe that their ability to
access transfers is contingent on how they vote. In Zimbabwe, the supply of clientelistic goods is
near constant as the Zimbabwean state is relatively high-capacity and has control over the distribution
of a range of important transfers including food aid, agricultural inputs from seeds and fertilizer
to machinery, farmland, permits to sell goods in markets, all the way up to commercial farmland,
banking licenses, and key positions in state-owned enterprises (Davies, 2004; Dawson and Kelsall,
2012). If the supply of clientelism is essentially constant, then if clientelism is more effective during
poor periods we should expect to see a positive relationship between overall poverty and increases in
ZANU-PF’s vote share. In fact, in both Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 the direct effect of the two measures
of poverty are both indistinguishable from zero, and often negatively signed. This suggests that it is
unlikely that increases in the effectiveness of clientelism are driving the results observed here.
Thus, this analysis provides strong support for my theory that violence is most effective against
the poor. At very low levels of wasting and during good rainy seasons, pre-election violence has little
or no significant effect on ZANU-PF’s vote share. The estimates using rainfall deviations suggest
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that the relationship between poverty and responses to repression is indeed causal.
3.6 Results: Individual-level analysis of survey response
In this section I present the results of an individual-level analysis that exploits Garcia-Ponce and
Pasquale’s (2014) strategy to identify the effect of violence on citizen behavior by using random
variation in the timing of violent events around an opinion survey. One concern with the previous
results based on a difference-in-difference design is that the there could be an omitted factor that
varies both with time and by constituency and is confounded with the incidence of violence and
ZANU-PF’s vote share. In this section of the analysis, I use random variation in violence to test
whether the relationship between exposure to violence, poverty, and capitulation still exists when I
use a research design that eliminates the possibility for that type of confounding factor.
I extend the results of Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014) to show how pre-survey violence affects
the propensity of respondents to reveal the most sensitive political opinion in Zimbabwe: political
party preference. I show how respondents in this case choose to falsify a preference by refusing to
reveal their preference for the opposition rather than falsely claiming a preference for the ruling party.
Last, I test my theory that the poor are more likely to respond to violent threats with submission by
showing that these effects are driven by the responses of the very poor.
3.6.1 Main effects: Violence and revealed party preferences
First, I show that in line with the results of Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014) that citizens exposed to
pre-survey state repression are more likely to hide their party preferences. Table 3.5 shows the results
of a regression of exposure to pre-survey state-sponsored violence on the revealed party preferences
of Afrobarometer respondents.
In this analysis the data is subset to only districts that have an episode of state repression during
the course of the survey in a particular district. Surveying in any particular district lasted between
one and six days. I include district fixed effects which means that my estimation uses the variation
within a district between individuals who were surveyed immediately before and immediately after
one of these violent events. There are fifteen districts with a total of 552 respondents in which a
violent event occurred during the course of the survey in that district. Because surveying in most rural
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districts only lasted for a single day, this sample is disproportionately urban. To take into account
the fact that the treatment is assigned at the district level, I cluster my standard errors at the district
level. Given the small number of clusters, I use Cameron et al.’s (2008) strategy for wild cluster
bootstrapped standard errors.5
In the table that follows, Columns 1 and 2 use a dummy for whether the respondent revealed
support for the MDC as the dependent variable. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is a
dummy for whether the respondent revealed support for ZANU-PF, in 5 and 6 it is a dummy for
whether the respondent revealed that she supports no party, and in Columns 7 and 8 it is a dummy for
whether the respondent refused that question. In the even columns I also include controls for age,
gender, education, employment, poverty, and ethnicity. Table 3.5 shows the results of this analysis.
5Cameron et al. (2008) show that traditional clustered standard errors are biased upward for data with less than 30-50
clusters.
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Table 3.5: Pre-survey ZANU-PF violence and willingness to reveal party preferences
Dependent variable:
MDC ZANU None Refuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PSV - ZANU −0.109 −0.099 −0.032 −0.035 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.001
(0.069) (0.062) (0.020) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.020) (0.006)
Age −0.019 0.0002 0.054∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009)
Female −0.080∗∗∗ −0.049 0.102∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.019) (0.033) (0.033) (0.018)
Education 0.025 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Employed 0.027 0.010 −0.046∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Poor 0.004 0.020 −0.030∗∗ −0.008 0.020
(0.023) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Ndebele −0.036 −0.032 −0.077 −0.090 0.064 0.068 0.028 0.034
(0.039) (0.039) (0.069) (0.069) (0.103) (0.069) (0.067) (0.063)
Other −0.003 −0.004 0.071 0.065 −0.081 −0.087∗ 0.015 0.027
(0.072) (0.066) (0.044) (0.046) (0.055) (0.046) (0.044) (0.032)
Intercept 0.271∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ −0.081∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.048) (0.028)
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.109 0.130 0.221 0.238 0.110 0.138 0.053 0.072
Cameron et al.’s (2008) wild cluster bootstrap standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a dummy for whether the respondent
revealed that she supports the main opposition party MDC; in Columns 3-4 it is a dummy for whether the respondent
revealed support for ZANU-PF; in Columns 5-6 it is a dummy for whether the respondent revealed that she supports
no party; and in Columns 7-8 it is a dummy for whether the respondent refused to answer the question about party
identification. The main explanatory variable of interest is PSV - ZANU, which is a measure of whether the a violent
event perpetrated by ZANU-PF occurred in the respondent’s district during the seven days before she was surveyed.
The variable Poor is the standardized sum of the responses to the Afrobarometer questions about the scarcity of food
and the scarcity of a cash income. Age, Female, Education, Employed, and the ethnicity dummies also come from
the Afrobarometer survey questions. The data is subset to only districts with a violent event in the seven days before
or seven days after the respondent was surveyed.
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These results extend the analysis by Garcia-Ponce and Pasquale (2014) by showing that revealed
party identification is also affected by exposure to pre-survey state repression. Interestingly, revealed
support for the opposition and the ruling party goes down by approximately ten percentage points
after violence, although this coefficient is insignificant. Instead, respondents are more likely to say
that they support no party at all.
One limitation of this methodology is its inability to separate changes in the willingness to reveal
preferences from changes in actual preferences. For the analysis to identify changes in preference
falsification, we must assume or prove that changes in preferences truly do not change after state
repression. In this case, it is plausible that some supporters of ZANU-PF change their preferences
after exposure to their party’s use of violence. Empirically, however, there does not appear to be a
relationship between
3.6.2 Heterogeneous effects: Poverty and pre-survey violence
Next, I test for the heterogeneous effects of poverty on the effect of pre-survey ZANU-PF violence.
My theory predicts that the poor should be even more likely than the better-off to hide their preferences
for the opposition and tell a surveyor that they support ZANU-PF, no party at all, or refuse to answer
the question on party identification. Thus, I predict a negative interaction when the dependent variable
is support for the MDC, and a positive interaction on support for ZANU, support for no party, and
refusal to answer. Figure 3.4 plots the marginal effects of pre-survey ZANU-PF violence by severity
of poverty. The full table of results is in Appendix 3.B.1.
Figure 3.4 shows that the marginal effect of pre-survey violence is significant and substantively
large only for the poor in most cases. Respondents who say that they frequently go without food
or a cash income are significantly more likely to hide their preference for the MDC and refuse to
respond to the question on party affiliation after an event of state repression. There is no significant
effect of violence on respondents who are better off than average on their propensity to reveal
pro-MDC preferences or to answer the question on party affiliation. The magnitude of the effect
on the propensity to respond that you have no party affiliation is also larger for the poor, although
even the better-off are significantly more likely to respond that they have no party affiliation after a
pre-survey violent event. Last, no respondent is significantly more or less likely to respond that they
prefer ZANU-PF after an episode of state-sponsored violence.
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These results, despite the limitation that we cannot cleanly separate a change in preference
falsification from a change in real preferences, do provide suggestive evidence that supports the
common belief that Afrobarometer respondents in Zimbabwe are falsifying their political preferences
due to fear of violence. Switching from revealing support for the opposition to revealing no support
for any party or refusing to answer the question about party identification is a pattern that is much
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more in line with preference falsification than changing preferences. More importantly, these results
provide strong evidence at the individual level that it is in fact poor individuals who change their
behavior after violence to a larger extent than the better off.
3.7 Conclusion
I this paper, I develop a theory that the poor, for either physical and psychological reasons, are more
vulnerable to repressive violence. The poor are both less capable of physically defending themselves
against personal attacks by investing in security, and less capable of mustering the mental bandwidth
or self-efficacy to coolly process frightening signals about the risk of repression.
I test this theory using two empirical strategies at the constituency and individual level. First,
I use a difference-in-difference design that controls for all characteristics that vary by time period
and constituency to test whether pre-election repressive violence during the 2000-2005 period
in Zimbabwe resulted in increases in ZANU-PF’s vote share. I find that violence is significantly
associated with increases in the vote share of the ruling party, and that these increases are concentrated
in poor constituencies. The relationship between poverty and the effectiveness of violence holds true
when I use an endogenous measure based on child nutritional outcomes or an exogenous measure
based on random variation in the quality of a given rainy season compared to the constituency’s
20-year average.
I then apply an empirical strategy at the individual level that exploits variation in recent exposure
to violence to test whether the impact of violence on citizen behavior is causal. I find again that
violence reduces the share of citizens who state preferences for the opposition, and that this effect is
driven by people who say they always or often go without enough to eat.
This paper addresses a gap in the literature on state repression by developing a theory that may
explain why the poor are consistently more likely to be afraid of electoral violence across a number
of cases in Africa (Mares and Young, 2016). I address a gap in the literature on electoral violence,
which has so far focused largely on the strength of party identification and ethnicity to explain which
voters are targeted with intimidation during elections.
The results show that repressive threats do not affect all citizens equally. Violence is most
effective in coercing support from the poor. This result puts forward another potential channel
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through which poverty may prevent the development of responsive democratic institutions. It implies
that dictators in poor countries should be better able to prevent democratization. Furthermore, this
may explain why semi-democratic leaders in very poor countries redistribute so little, despite having
large populations of poor voters. If these leaders are willing to use repressive tactics to remain in
power, they may worry least about the votes of the poor as those voters are the easiest to manipulate
with threats.





Table 3.6 shows that the results in Table 3.2 are not driven by outlier values of the main variable of
interest. The number of pre-election repression events by constituency is strongly right skewed. In
this analysis I use a binary or ranked measure of repression events in each constituency-election as
the main explanatory variables.
The coefficients on Repression Events remain strongly significant after creating both a binary or
ranked version of this variable, suggesting that the results are not driven by outlier values.
3.A.2 Robustness: Levels of poverty
Another question that we may have is whether the effect of violence on support for ZANU-PF really
has a linear relationship with poverty. This is a robustness check because we would want to see a
somewhat linear relationship between poverty and the effectiveness of violence to justify our choice
to analyze poverty as a continuous variable. However, if violence becomes more effective at a certain
point, it could give us relevant substantive information about how this phenomenon works.
For this robustness check, I create categorical versions of both Wasting and Rain Deficit. For the
factorial Wasting variable, I create six categories based on how wasted children are compared to other
Zimbabwean children. In the worst (highest) category, wasting in the constituency is more than one
standard deviation above the mean for Zimbabwe. In real terms, the average child in this category is
1.3 standard deviations below the average weight of the WHO’s reference for a child of his or her age
(a child with a weight-for-height z-score of -2 is considered malnourished). Three of the categories
of this variable are above zero (which marks the average weight of a child in Zimbabwe), and three
fall below it.
For the factorial measure of Rain Deficit, I also cut the measure of rainy season rainfall into
meaningful and somewhat even categories. For this variable the worst or poorest category is below
-0.15, which represents a constituency whose rainy season was more than 0.15 standard deviations
below its 20-year average. Again, I split the data at zero, which marks the 20-year mean for each
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Table 3.6: Binary or ranked pre-election violence and changes in ZANU-PF vote share
Dependent variable:
Change in ZANU vote share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Repression Events - Binary 2.49∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗
(1.08) (1.09)
Repression Events - Rank 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Intercept −9.15∗∗∗ −11.34∗∗∗ −8.72∗∗∗ −11.41∗∗∗
(0.60) (1.11) (0.58) (1.17)
Election FE X X X X
Constituency FE X X X X
Observations 369 369 279 279
R2 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86
Clusters 119 119 93 93
Sample All Minor or no redistricting
Standard errors clustered at the constituency level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models estimated using OLS. Columns 1-2 are estimated using data from all the
constituencies, and 3-4 are estimated using a subset of constituencies that experienced
minor or no changes during the delimitation exercises in 2000 and 2005. The depen-
dent variable is the change in ZANU-PF’s vote share from the 2000 referendum to
the election of interest in 2000, 2002, or 2005. The main coefficient of interest is
on Repression Events, which is a measure of the number of events of state violence
against the opposition in a given constituency in the three months leading up to an
election. In this table the number of repression events is transformed to reduce the
influence of outliers: in Columns 1 and 3 it is made into a binary measure of whether
there were any repression events in a constituency-election, and in Columns 2 and 4 it
is the rank of violent events. All columns include fixed effects for the election and for
the constituency as in the preferred specification in Columns 4 and 8 of Table 3.2.
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constituency. Two categories are below 0, indicating worse-than-average rainy seasons, and five are
above it.
Figure 3.5 plots the heterogeneous effect of ZANU-PF violent events based on these categorical
measures of poverty.
Figure 3.5: Relationship between poverty and type of violence
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Figure 3.5 shows that both of the categorical variables show that variation in poverty seems
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to matter above a certain threshold of poverty. In Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, we see that the marginal
effect of exposure to violence is larger and becomes statistically significant for constituencies
where the average child is above Zimbabwe’s average level of wasting. The marginal effect gets
increasingly large as we move from the category with constituencies that are between 0 and 0.5
standard deviations above the mean on wasting, to the next highest category where children are
between 0.5 and 1 standard deviations above the mean on wasting, and then the highest category
where they are above 1 standard deviation above the mean.
Figures 3.5c and 3.5d show that the marginal effect of ZANU-PF violence seems to matter when
rainfall is at or below the constituency average, with one exception. When rainy season rainfall is
between 0 and 0.1 standard deviations above the mean, violence has a small and significant marginal
effect on ZANU-PF’s vote share. Between -0.15 and 0, it has a slightly larger effect, and the largest
effect is in the category with the worst rainy season rainfall of below -0.15 standard deviations below
the mean. The exception to this trend is in the category between 0.3 and 0.5 standard deviation above
the mean, where violence again has a significant marginal effect. Nevertheless, the general pattern is
clear when we analyze rainfall as a factor as well as a binary variable.
This analysis confirms that there is generally a linear relationship between poverty and the
effectiveness of violence, particularly at high levels of poverty, meaning high wasting or particularly
negative levels of rainfall.
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3.A.3 Mechanisms: Is violence more severe in poor areas?
One explanation for the patterns uncovered here is that violence is simply more severe in poorer
areas. In this section, I test whether different categories of violence that differ in their severity are
more or less likely in areas that have high levels of wasting or bad previous rainy seasons.
To test for relationships between poverty and severity of violence, I regress each type of violence
on my measures of poverty and a time fixed effect. I coded seven different types of violence from the
ZHRNGOF data during this period: murder, rape, abduction, torture, assault, malicious destruction
of property/theft, and intimidation. While it is impossible to create a clear ranking of the severity of
these types of violence, there are some rankings that most people would agree on. For instance, it is
generally agreed that intimidation is less severe than physical assault, and that murder is worse than
physical assault that doesn’t result in death.
In Figure 3.6, I plot the coefficients on my measures of poverty from these analyses.
Figure 3.6: Relationship between poverty and type of violence
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Figure 3.6 shows that the severity of violence does not seem to be related to the level of poverty in
a constituency. The first coefficient plotted in the right of each graph shows that violent events overall
are not significantly related to poverty, and if anything, there seems to be fewer violent events in
areas with bad rainfall. Furthermore, the most severe types of violence such as murder and abduction
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are not more likely in poorer constituencies; if anything, the least severe types of violence appear to
be slightly less likely in poorer constituencies. Assault is almost significantly less likely in poorer
places, while the more severe forms of physical violence like murder and rape are less negatively
related to poverty.
3.A.4 Mechanisms: Does bad rainfall change citizen preferences?
Another challenge to the identification of the effect of poverty on the effectiveness of repression is that
time-variant measures of poverty, particularly rainfall shocks, could also change citizen preferences.
My theory is fundamentally about when citizens choose to express preferences, which implies that
preferences should be held constant in any empirical tests in order to identify the impact of violence
on willingness to reveal preferences.
One concern with my analysis in Section 3.5.3 is that rainfall shocks might be changing prefer-
ences as well as poverty levels. If rainfall shocks themselves have a negative effect on ZANU-PF’s
vote share, then I may in fact be underestimating the relationship between poverty and the effective-
ness of violence.
One way to test whether this assumption that preferences are not changing after rainfall shocks is
valid is to estimate empirically the relationship between bad rainy seasons and citizen preferences.
One would expect based on a theory of “blind retrospective voting” (Achen and Bartels, 2002; Healy
and Malhotra, 2010) that voters would like the ruling party less after bad rainy seasons. Unfortunately,
as we demonstrated in Section 3.6.1, citizens do not always reveal their true preferences in opinion
surveys due to the fear of violence. Therefore, we should expect that any analysis of how bad
rainfall affects expressed opinions on a survey is a mix of both changes in preferences and changes
in willingness to reveal preferences.
With those caveats, I analyze how bad rainfall affects expressed citizen preferences towards the
ruling party. To take into account to some degree variation in willingness to reveal preferences, I
analyze the impact of bad rainfall on attitudes towards the ruling party at different levels of fear of
electoral violence. Presumably, people who have less fear of electoral violence should be more likely
to reveal their true opinions after rainfall shocks, while those with more fear should be more likely to
express opinions out of fear.
To implement this analysis, I use opinion data from the Afrobarometer on both revealed support
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for ZANU-PF and reported trust in the president as the dependent variable. As the independent
variable, I use the same dummy indicating whether a constituency is below its own 20-year average
rainfall during the rainy season preceding the opinion survey. I also include a four-category factor
measure of fear of violence as an independent variable, along with an interaction term between fear
of violence and bad rainfall. This interaction allows me to estimate the impact of bad rainfall on
opinion at different levels of reported fear. I also include district and year fixed effects such that
the coefficient is estimated off of the variation within a district in attitudes from good to bad rainy
seasons. The final specification that I estimate is:
Yi jt = γ j +λt +β rain jt × f earit +θrain jt +δ f earit + εit
where i represents a respondent, j a district, and t a year. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level.
Figure 3.7 plots the marginal effects of bad rainfall at varying levels of fear of political violence.
Figure 3.7: Relationship between bad rainfall and revealed citizen preferences
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Figure 3.7 shows that citizens at low levels of fear of political violence do indeed seem to have
slight more anti-government preferences after bad rainy seasons. However, most of these marginal
effects are not significant, with the exception of the responses on party preference for people who
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have no fear of political violence at all. For people who are afraid, however, there is no effect or a
slightly positive effect of bad rainfall on preferences towards the government. This effect hovers
around zero and is not statistically significant.
Taken together, these results suggest that bad rainfall may indeed have a small negative effect on
citizen preferences towards the government, although this effect is statistically indistinguishable from
zero. The negative coefficients for low-fear voters are a better test of respondents’ true preferences,
while the null effects on high-fear respondents may be driven by their unwillingness to reveal their
preferences more than the lack of a change in the preferences.
This analysis, while not totally conclusive, suggests that bad rainy seasons are probably not
changing citizen preferences towards the ruling party. Furthermore, if bad rainy seasons do have any
effect on preferences, it would lead me to underestimate the relationship between poverty and the
effectiveness of violence on increasing ZANU-PF’s vote share in the regressions in Section 3.5.3.
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3.A.5 Validation: Measures of poverty
In this study I use both the weight-for-height z-scores of children under 5 and whether the previous
rainy season was less than average for a constituency as measures of poverty in a constituency. I use
both of these as proxies for the underlying concept of poverty, based on the arguments that wasting
in children under five is a sign of poverty and that bad rainy seasons are a cause of it. If both of these
measures are based on the same underlying concept, we would expect them to also be correlated. In
other words, if bad rainy seasons do indeed cause poverty which leads to wasting in children under
five, there should be a positive relationship between my measure of the quality of the rainy season
and under-5 wasting. I test that assumption here by regressing wasting on the dummy indicating a
bad rainy season and dummies for each year.
I test for the relationship between bad rainfall and wasting in two specifications. First, I test for
the effect of a dummy variable indicating whether the rainy season was below the 20-year average.
Second, I test for whether the deviation from the 20-year average has a positive effect on stunting
when the rainy season was less than average. I test for the effect of this deviation condition on being
in a below-average rainfall year with the interaction of Rain Deviation and Rain Deficit. Because I
expect that positive deviations from average should have little or no deleterious effect on children’s
health, I expect that the direct effect of Rain Deviation should be close to zero and insignificant while
the interaction effect Rain Deviation × Rain Deficit should be positive and significant.
This analysis supports my predictions that bad rainy seasons should be associated with increases
in wasting in children under five. In Column 1 the coefficient on the dummy variable Rain Deficit
(which takes a value of 1 during below-average rainy seasons) is positive and significant, indicating
that bad rainy seasons lead to increased wasting in children under five. In Column 2 I test for whether
the extent to which the rainy season rainfall deviates from the constituency’s average affects wasting.
Indeed, the coefficient on Rain Deviation when the Rain Deficit dummy is 0 is slightly positive
but insignificant, suggesting that deviations from the average rainfall do not have a deleterious
effect on children’s weights during above-average rainfall years. The coefficient on the interaction
term, however, is significant and positive, suggesting that in bad rainfall years when Rain Deficit
takes a value of 1 the size of the deviation from the average is positively associated with children’s
nutritional status. Figure 3.8 plots the effect of a rainfall deviation by the dummy indicating whether
the constituency is in an above- or below-average year.
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Figure 3.8: Positive and negative deviations from average rainfall and wasting
Deviations from average rainfall and wasting
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3.B Individual analysis
3.B.1 Heterogeneous effects: Full table
Table 3.8 shows the full table of results in the analysis of the individual-level heterogeneous effects
of pre-survey violence on willingness to reveal party preferences.
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Table 3.8: Pre-survey ZANU-PF violence and willingness to reveal party preferences
Dependent variable:
MDC ZANU None Refuse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PSV - ZANU × Poor −0.031 −0.040 −0.004 −0.004 0.010 0.016 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.027) (0.030) (0.009) (0.011) (0.032) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
PSV - ZANU −0.126∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.032 −0.037 0.135∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.016 0.014∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.056) (0.021) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033) (0.021) (0.004)
Age −0.019 0.0003 0.054∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
Female −0.082∗∗∗ −0.050∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.022
(0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.017)
Education 0.026 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Employed 0.029 0.011 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.020) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Poor 0.037 0.063 −0.011 −0.026 −0.020 −0.025 −0.007 −0.011
(0.044) (0.049) (0.018) (0.021) (0.056) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
Ndebele −0.039 −0.037 −0.077 −0.090 0.065 0.070 0.031 0.037
(0.044) (0.038) (0.068) (0.069) (0.101) (0.069) (0.068) (0.064)
Other −0.001 −0.001 0.069 0.065 −0.083 −0.088∗∗ 0.016 0.025
(0.071) (0.066) (0.042) (0.044) (0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.032)
Intercept 0.256∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ −0.058 −0.065∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.057) (0.062) (0.057) (0.048) (0.032)
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552
R2 0.111 0.134 0.222 0.238 0.110 0.138 0.062 0.078
Number Clusters 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Cameron et al.’s (2008) wild cluster bootstrap standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Models are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is a dummy for whether the respondent
revealed that she supports the main opposition party MDC; in Columns 3-4 it is a dummy for whether the respondent
revealed support for ZANU-PF; in Columns 5-6 it is a dummy for whether the respondent revealed that she supports
no party; and in Columns 7-8 it is a dummy for whether the respondent refused to answer the question about party
identification. The main explanatory variable of interest is PSV - ZANU, which is a measure of whether the a violent
event perpetrated by ZANU-PF occurred in the respondent’s district during the seven days before she was surveyed.
The variable Poor is the standardized sum of the responses to the Afrobarometer questions about the scarcity of food
and the scarcity of a cash income. Age, Female, Education, Employed, and the ethnicity dummies also come from
the Afrobarometer survey questions. The data is subset to only districts with a violent event in the seven days before
or seven days after the respondent was surveyed.
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3.B.2 Perpetrator coding
Table 3.9 shows the actors and allies that I used to code whether a violent act was committed by the
government or the opposition.
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• ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front
• ZANU-PF
• ZRP: Zimbabwe Republic Police Militia
• Police Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-)
• Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-)
• Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-) Presidential
Security Unit
• Mutiny of Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-)
• ZNLWVA: Zimbabwe National Liberation War Vet-
erans Association
• Joint Operations Command (2008-)
• CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
• ZNYS: Zimbabwe National Youth Service
• MDC-M: Movement for Democratic
Change (Mutambara Faction)
• MDC-N: Movement for Democratic
Change (Ncube Faction)
• MDC-T: Movement for Democratic
Change (Tsvangirai Faction)
• MDC: Movement for Democratic
Change




• ZNLWVA: Zimbabwe National Liberation War Vet-
erans Association
• CIO: Central Intelligence Organization
• Farm invaders (Zimbabwe)
• Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-)
• Military Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-) Presidential
Security Unit
• Police Forces of Zimbabwe (1987-)
• ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front
• Farm Workers (Zimbabwe)
• Farm Owners (Zimbabwe)
• MDC-N: Movement for Democratic
Change (Ncube Faction)
• MDC-T: Movement for Democratic
Change (Tsvangirai Faction)
• MDC: Movement for Democratic
Change
• WOZA: Women of Zimbabwe Arise
• ZCTU: Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions
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Chapter 4
Mobilization under threat: An
experimental test of opposition party
strategies in a repressive regime
Lauren E. Young1
Abstract
Although participation in opposition politics carries significant risks in many coun-
tries, large numbers of citizens consistently turn out to cast their votes for opposition
parties. Why do citizens mobilize against threatening regimes despite the risk of high
1PhD Candidate, Columbia University Department of Political Science (ley2106@columbia.edu,
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Elizabeth Levy-Paluck, Isabela Mares, Tamar Mitts, Suresh Naidu, Gabriella Sacramone-Lutz, and Susan Stokes for
comments on the design and analysis of this project, as well as seminar audiences at the European Political Science
Association and American Political Science Association annual meetings. The author thanks the U.S. Institute for Peace,
the International Peace Research Association Foundation, and the National Science Foundation for support for her travel
and time. The intervention described in this paper was funded and implemented by Transform Zimbabwe. This study
was determined to be “not human subjects research” by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board decision on
protocol AAAP0700. The research design and hypotheses were preregistered on the EGAP design database on March 20,
2015, and can be accessed at http://egap.org/registration/741.
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personal costs? In this study, I test whether appeals to opposition supporters’ emotions
have an impact on their level of political participation. Through an experiment carried
out by an opposition party in Zimbabwe, I test whether party messages that appeal to
anger are more effective in mobilizing party members to engage in pro-opposition speech
than purely enthusiastic appeals. I find that randomly assigned anger appeals with the
same informational content increase action on average by 0.38 standard deviations. In
real terms, this represents levels of activity in the anger groups that were higher than
the control by between 32% and 174% across four different measures of participation.
There is also evidence that these results are strongest in areas with past repression. These
results suggest that anger can be an important factor in mobilizing political participation
in repressive environments.
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4.1 Introduction
Millions of citizens around the world live in political systems where organizing against a ruling
party or regime can carry severe consequences. All but about a dozen governments around the
world, including every country in sub-Saharan Africa besides Angola, Eritrea, and Somalia, held
direct national elections between 2000 and 2006 (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). In many of these cases,
opposition parties work to mobilize voters – to varying degrees of success – despite promises of
patronage and threats of punishment from ruling parties that are unwilling to compete in a truly
competitive election.
The threat of coercion in particular is a major impediment to competitiveness in elections in
Africa: across the 33 countries surveyed during the 2011 round of the Afrobarometer survey, 46% of
Africans surveyed fear violence during elections. In one-third of the countries surveyed, majorities
of voters fear violence during elections. By contrast, only 16% of citizens report having been offered
a gift in exchange for their vote (Mares and Young, 2016). Fear of violence is higher in autocratic
countries, and this data excludes some of the most repressive autocracies in Africa such as Ethiopia,
Eritrea, Rwanda, the Republic of Congo, and Angola.
Thus, though most Africans have the opportunity to vote, for large proportions of citizens
voting can carry severe consequences. Yet despite the risk, millions continue to turn out to support
opposition parties such as the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe in 2008, the Coalition
for Unity and Democracy in Ethiopia in 2005, and Combat for Political Change in Togo in 2015.
Why do citizens in repressive regimes take the risk of engaging in pro-opposition politics? How do
these opposition parties mobilize their supporters to act despite the threat of repression?
Emotions are one tool that political entrepreneurs have at their disposal to influence citizens.
Emotions are almost ubiquitous in political acts such as canvassing, protests, and speech. It is
hard to imagine a political rally or campaign ad that does not invoke emotions such as happiness,
anger, or fear. Are these emotions important to understand participation in risky political actions?
There is little theoretical or empirical work in political science testing whether emotions actually
play a causal role in political participation, or whether they are epiphenomenal to other factors that
mobilize citizens such as selective incentives, social pressures, identity, and preferences. This lack of
evidence is especially true for high-risk political environments, where emotions may play an even
more important role in mobilizing participation.
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Although case studies have documented that emotions shape political participation, it has been
difficult to quantify the extent to which they matter, or identify at what point they influence behavior.
Understanding whether individuals are more likely to participate when they experience certain
emotions requires that we isolate the causal effect of an emotion, which is often confounded with
the fact that some people are more likely to select into feeling certain emotions. Most importantly,
understanding whether emotional appeals influence citizens requires that we hold information and
preferences constant. Both of these are particularly difficult to do in an environment such as an
electoral autocracy in Africa where we might be most interested in understanding the role of emotions
in mobilization.
I bring evidence to bear on the question of how emotions influence political participation in
a high-risk environment by partnering with an opposition party in Zimbabwe to conduct a field
experiment testing the impact of appeals with different emotional content. Zimbabwe is an electoral
autocracy where 86% of citizens surveyed during the 2011 round of the Afrobarometer reported
fear of violence during elections. Though Zimbabwe was experiencing relatively low and infrequent
political violence at the time of this experiment (Freedom House, 2015), opposition supporters have
faced severe levels of political violence, particularly around election time, for the past fifteen years.
This violence peaked in 2008 when more than a hundred were killed and thousands assaulted or
displaced after the ruling party lost the first round of the presidential election (HRW, 2008; Bratton
and Masunungure, 2008; Sachikonye, 2011).
This experiment was conceived and carried out by an opposition party that was founded in
2013 after an election that revealed a significant loss of public support for the previously dominant
opposition party Movement for Democratic Change. The party was founded out of a national
Christian network and has a small but nation-wide base of support built through the network and
a series of rallies that they had run in eight out of ten of Zimbabwe’s provinces in 2014. In this
experiment, they randomly assigned groups of voters to receive angry or enthusiastic campaign
messages with the same informational content. These messages were sent out to chat groups of the
party’s supporters via the mobile messaging application WhatsApp, after which I tracked how the
appeals affected the behavior of the party’s supporters. The party designed two rounds of image- and
video-based messages that had the same information but invoked anger or enthusiasm using variation
in the images, music, and small deviations in the wording of the ads.
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I find that anger appeals led to more pro-opposition participation. Specifically, groups that
received the anger message participated approximately 0.38 standard deviations more than those that
received the enthusiasm message on an index of all four measures of participation. This translates
into 2.7 additional messages sent out, 0.8 additional participants, 0.4 additional repetitions of the
party slogan, and 0.8 additional party symbols being sent out in groups that received the anger
appeals. There is some evidence that these effects are stronger with voters in constituencies that were
exposed to past violence. These findings suggest that anger can be an important factor in efforts to
increase political mobilization in repressive contexts.
This study builds on recent empirical work documenting that partisan concerns and the mobi-
lization strategies of political parties matter, even in the context of high levels of vote buying and
intimidation, in explaining transitions to democracy (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010, 2011), opposition
party vote share and consolidation (LeBas, 2011), and party identification (Bratton et al., 2012). This
study tests those claims at a micro level using random assignment to identify causal relationships in
a real political setting, building on the work of Wantchekon (2003) in Benin.
The idea that anger is a powerful mobilizing tool is grounded in many foundational theories of
mass mobilization, and has been show to have explanatory power in numerous cases. Gurr (1970),
for instance, similarly that the anger caused by relative deprivation enables citizens to overcome the
collective action dilemma, and that this anger is even redoubled by the threat of repression. Scott
similarly argues that anger precipitates the expression of dissent: “Outbursts of this kind are perhaps
more often experienced as a loss of temper, a rush of anger that overwhelms one’s deliberative
self rather than an act of calculated anger” (Scott, 1990, 218). In cases ranging from the wave of
democratizations that swept across Africa in the early 1990s to the Arab Spring, anger over declines
in the standard of living or repression help explain how pro-democracy protest movements sparked
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Pearlman, 2013).
Furthermore, this study adds to the literature on the role of emotions in political participation.
There is a large body of research in political science showing qualitatively that emotions matter
in launching and sustaining participation in politics. Much of this work has examined the impact
of communications in a lab setting with subjects often recruited from university student bodies
(Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013). My study is one of a few recent experiments that uses
information and communication technology to randomly assign subjects in a real-life setting to
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exposure to messages with different emotional content (Ryan (2012) is another example from the
U.S. setting using Facebook to deliver treatments). Testing whether the findings of lab experiments
conducted with American students extend to real, highly contentious political settings is an important
contribution to this literature.
4.2 Theories of Emotions in Political Mobilization
Decisions about political participation often take place in highly emotional environments. This
may be even more true in repressive political systems where the threat of violence leads to acute
and frequent fear and anger. In this section, I synthesize research in neurology, psychology, and
behavioral economics to draw conclusions about how anger and enthusiasm appeals should influence
opposition supporters in an electoral autocracy.
4.2.1 Emotions, cognition and behavior
Emotions play an integral role in decision-making and cognition of all kinds, including decisions
about political participation. Emotions are chemical and electrochemical processes triggered by the
brain in response to a stimulus (Damasio, 2000). Emotional responses are associated with activity in
different sections of the brain that researchers have identified using experimental manipulation of
emotions and various types of brain scans to measure activity. Although humans are capable of a rich
spectrum of emotions, psychologists have classified six primary emotions that are recognizable and
similarly felt across cultures: anger, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness, and sadness (Ekman, 1993).
Emotions are associated with changes in how the body and brain functions that are intended
to prepare an individual for action. These include physiological changes that affect the autonomic
nervous system including breathing patterns and heart rate and the central nervous system and
changes in cognitive functioning such as memory and attention. Anger, for example, is an approach-
oriented negative emotion (Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Brain scans of people experiencing
anger show that it is related to activity in the left anterior region of the brain, which is also related to
lack of inhibition and action (Harmon-Jones and Sigelman, 2001; Murphy et al., 2003). In addition,
there is evidence that it is associated with changes in peripheral physiology like blood flow to the
hands that might prepare an individual to fight (Ekman et al., 1983).
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As a result, emotions are associated with action tendencies, particularly approach and avoidance
responses (Frijda, 1986). Some have argued that these action tendencies enable organisms to react to
a potentially valuable or dangerous stimulus faster than the logical response to that stimulus can be
formulated (LeDoux, 1996; Keltner and Gross, 1999). Anger is associated with a desire to change
the status quo, remove obstacles, or hurt a target (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994).
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) proposes a view of emotions as both being caused by
and causing cognitive appraisals that lead to action (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001). Lerner and
Tiedens (2006) describes the relationship between emotions and cognition as “recursive” (p118),
in that cognitive appraisals both cause and are caused by emotions. For this reason, emotions have
“pervasive carryover effects” (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006, 124), meaning those induced in one context
influence cognition and behavior in other domains. It is typically by studying such “incidental
emotions” that social scientists have been able to causally identify the effects of emotions while
holding constant the underlying appraisals that might cause a certain emotion to arise.
ATF builds on a view that emotions are characterized by six different cognitive dimensions:
certainty, pleasantness, attentional activity, control, anticipated effort, and responsibility (Smith and
Ellsworth, 1985). Anger, for instance, “arises from appraisals of: (a) other-responsibility for negative
events, (b) individual control, and (c) a sense of certainty about what happened” (Lerner and Keltner,
2000, 476). In turn, anger has been shown to have causal effects on judgment, decision-making and
behavior. Individuals who have been experimentally induced to feel anger have been shown to make
stronger attributions of responsibility and causality (Keltner et al., 1993a; Goldberg et al., 1999),
more optimistic perceptions of risks (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003), more heuristic
processing (Bodenhausen et al., 1994), and stronger preferences for punitive or aggressive policies
or actions (Lerner et al., 1998, 2003).
Similarly to anger, enthusiasm is seen as an emotion governed by the mental system designed to
respond to incentives (called the appetitive, incentive or approach system), while anxiety is part of a
separate system that monitors and reacts to threats (the aversive, threat or avoidance system) (Carver,
2004; Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Enthusiasm is thought to be activated when progress towards
incentives exceeds expectations, or has the potential to do so, while anger is triggered when progress
is blocked (Frijda, 1986). This framework has led some to predict that anger and enthusiasm should
have similar effects, but that the effect of anger on behavior should dominate that of enthusiasm
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because it stems from a negative appraisal:
“Anger and enthusiasm, then, both lead us to take action in order to achieve or preserve
goals. Those who are angry may struggle even harder to reach a positive outcome. Those
who are enthusiastic may also take positive action to continue their success, though the
effect may be weaker than is the case for anger.”
(Valentino et al., 2011, 43)
4.2.2 Emotional appeals in politics
Emotional appeals are common in political campaigns. Political messages appeal to anger about the
state of the nation, enthusiasm for a candidate or policy, and fear of threats to the nation or what
might happen should a certain candidate be elected. In less institutionalized electoral environments,
fear appeals may also involve threats directed at individuals or groups. Brader (2006) defines an
emotional appeal as “any communication that is intended to elicit an emotional response from some
or all who receive it” (68-69). Emotions in political communications can influence decision-making
in two ways. First, emotions can trigger automatic action responses before cognitive processes come
to conclusions about what actions are required in a given situation (LeDoux, 1996). Activists, for
instance, describe putting people into “attack mode” by transforming “inchoate anxieties and fears...
into moral indignation and anger toward concrete policies and decision-makers” (Jasper, 2008, 107).
Second, emotions change how cognitive processes function. Emotions in political communications
may make their targets more hasty in their decision-making, less skeptical, or more likely to question
their preexisting beliefs.
Emotional appeals are, in theory, independent of the informational content of political com-
munications. They are often transmitted through images, sounds, and ideas that trigger emotional
responses (Brader, 2006). This emotional content is processed quickly and non-cognitively and then
shapes how the informational message is subsequently received. While emotional and informational
content are clearly linked – for example, it’s hard to imagine a campaign ad on terrorism with purely
enthusiastic emotional content – the fact that they are transmitted through different mediums and the
generally low level of informational content in political ads means that the emotional content can be
isolated and experimentally manipulated to measure the causal effect of emotions in political appeals.
The study of emotional appeals using lab and field experiments has a long history in American
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politics (for a very early example, see Hartmann (1936)). Existing work on emotional appeals
began by analyzing appeals based only on whether the emotional valence of the ads was positive
or negative. These early studies that pooled emotional appeals using anger and fear found mixed
results, with some showing that negative appeals demobilized voters (Ansolabehere et al., 1994;
Ansolabehere, 1995), and others that anxiety appeals had mobilizing effects (Marcus and MacKuen,
1993). However, more recent work that disaggregates appeals based on whether they invoke anger or
fear has generally found that ads that invoke anger mobilize political action (Miller and Krosnick,
2004; Ryan, 2012; Weber, 2013) while fear stimulates attention, information seeking, and more
complex cognitive processes, but not action (Brader, 2005, 2006). These experiments testing the
impact of specific political ads build on a number of lab experiments and correlational studies testing
for the effect of incidental, often apolitical emotions on subsequent political decisions and behavior
that also show that anger is related to higher levels of political participation and action (Huddy et al.,
2007; Valentino et al., 2011; Groenendyk and Banks, 2014).
4.2.3 Emotions in the context of repression
There are several reasons to expect that the role of emotions in political mobilization may be even
greater in a repressive context. In weak democracies or autocracies where political participation is
risky, citizens must weigh the cost and benefit of political participation. In consolidated democracies,
the main barrier is the opportunity cost, while in electoral autocracies, the cost is higher, including
the risk that citizens will face significant economic or physical consequences if they participate
in support of the opposition. Considering that the threat of repression is a very strong form of an
emotional appeal, emotional appeals by opposition or pro-democracy groups may be even more
important in this context for two reasons in particular.
First, citizens in repressive environments may react more strongly to negative appeals that focus
on thwarted goals because they have stronger grievances than citizens in open and responsive political
systems. Much of the foundational work on emotions in politics has focused on the role of emotions
in protest under dangerous conditions, including the U.S. civil rights movement, the Solidarity
movement in Poland, insurgency in El Salvador, and ethnic violence in the Balkans (Jasper, 1998;
Petersen, 2002b; Wood, 2003; Goodwin et al., 2009). In countries with high levels of poverty or
unresponsive political institutions, the average citizen may feel more anger about politics than a
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citizen living in a reasonably responsive developed democracy. In such contexts, the stakes and the
personal risks are extremely high, and emotions may be both strong enough and necessary to explain
participation.
Second, political participation in repressive environments is thought to depend heavily on the
perceived risk of repression (Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1993), and this is likely to be influenced
by emotions. Regimes that threaten to use violence to punish opposition activity must credibly
signal to citizens how various pro-opposition activities will be punished. However, actual repressive
events are typically rare, leaving citizens to infer the personal risk involved in a range of different
pro-opposition actions on the basis of a few ambiguous signals of the regime’s willingness to
repress. Ultimately, most citizens estimate the risk of repression with very little information in highly
emotional environments. Emotions such as anger and fear are likely to influence how people perceive
risks, and particularly whether they are optimistic or pessimistic about risks (Johnson and Tversky,
1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2003). Results from lab-in-the-field experiments in
Zimbabwe show that fear–even fear induced in a context unrelated to politics–has a strong effect on
the perceived risk of repression (Young, 2016). In short, the more the risk of repression influences the
decision to participate in politics and the more ambiguous signals about the probability of repression
are, the more emotions should be expected to play a role in political participation.
4.2.4 Predictions
I test the following hypotheses about how party communications affect willingness of supporters
to take action in a repressive context. In order to commit to a set of hypotheses and analyses and
therefore limit the my ability to selectively present significant outcomes, these hypotheses were
pre-registered as part of a pre-analysis plan with the EGAP design registry on March 20, 2015,
before the first treatments were sent out. An update with more detailed descriptions of the analyses
was added before the researcher obtained the data on May 9, 2015.2 The first hypothesis makes a
prediction about the overall effectiveness of the anger appeal relative to the enthusiasm appeal, which
the remaining three are focused on predicting where the relative effect of the anger appeal will be
largest.
H1: Anger appeals will generate more pro-opposition action than enthusiasm appeals.
2The pre-registration document can be downloaded at http://egap.org/registration/741.
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Both anger and enthusiasm are approach- or action-oriented emotions and so are more likely
than other emotions to engender action. Carver (2004) argues that both anger and enthusiasm are
governed by the “Behavioral Approach System,” which monitors the individual’s progress towards
desired goals (this is in contrast to the “Behavioral Inhibition (Avoidance) System”). Depending on
whether an individual is reaching his goals more or less quickly than expected, he might experience
either enthusiasm or anger. Both emotions have the action tendency of spurring individuals to either
continue making progress or increase the effort to make progress towards a goal. Anger, however,
should have a stronger action tendency than enthusiasm because it is associated with appraisals that
goals are being thwarted (Valentino et al., 2011).
H2: Anger appeals will have an even larger impact in areas with high socioeconomic status.
People with higher socioeconomic status should be more susceptible to feel anger in response
to an angry ad because they have higher levels of self-efficacy. Because self-efficacy is primarily
developed through experiences of mastery, marginalized individuals are less likely to have the
opportunity to develop a high sense of their own self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). There is some
empirical evidence that the poor tend to view themselves as inefficacious (Boardman and Robert,
2000), although there is no evidence of such a relationship in existing data collecting from a non-
representative sample of Zimbabwean opposition supporters (Young, 2016).
People with higher internal efficacy are more likely to perceive negative situations as challenges
that they have the capacity to control and therefore respond to them with anger. General self-efficacy
has been linked to higher participation in several forms of political actions, including participation in
political campaigns (Rudolph et al., 2000) and calling in on radio shows (Newhagen, 1994). Lab
experiments have also shown that the greater propensity of high-self-efficacy individuals to respond
to a negative situation with anger underlies this correlation between self-efficacy and participation
(Valentino et al., 2009). Recent experiments using Mechanical Turk show that the poor are indeed
more likely to be demobilized by high-intensity challenges, while those who are better off are actually
more mobilized by these situations, a finding that is in line with the prediction that the poor are more
likely to perceive negative situations as threats rather than challenges (Denny, 2015). Finally, there is
strong and consistent evidence from Zimbabwe that individuals low in self-efficacy are more prone
to feeling fear and less likely to engage in pro-opposition political behavior.
H3: Anger appeals will have an even larger impact in areas that have experienced more past
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repression.
Two factors should influence the relative effectiveness of anger appeals in areas that have
experienced past repression. First, people who have faced more past repression may have stronger
grievances and thus be more likely to respond with anger to an anger appeal. Second, people who
face a higher risk of repression may be more susceptible to change their behavior due to shifts in
their perceptions of the risk of repression due to the cognitive effects of anger.
It is important to note that neither H2 nor H3 are unambiguous predictions, in part because both
socioeconomic status and past exposure to violence may affect both self-efficacy and grievances.
Prolonged or extreme past exposure to repression, for example, could have an effect on an individual’s
self-efficacy. In many contexts, poor economic conditions have formed the basis for In part, the
pre-registered predictions that I made depend on the
H4: Anger appeals will be more effective in conjunction with messages that emphasize personal
power and control.
Cognitive appraisal theory predicts that appraisals of certainty and control should reinforce
feelings of anger (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). A second layer of treatment emphasizing that the
supporters have the power to bring change should reinforce the angry emotion in the ads.
4.3 Research Design
Estimating the causal impact of emotional appeals on political mobilization in a repressive envi-
ronment is difficult due to a number of factors. First, identifying the causal impact of emotions on
participation requires exogenous variation in exposure to emotional appeals. Without exogenous
variation, it is impossible to prove definitively that it is the emotional appeal and not something about
the type of people who select into exposure to different appeals or some other factor that is driving
correlations between emotional appeals and participation. In this case, I use random assignment of
citizens to different emotional appeals to identify the impact of emotions on action.
Second, isolating the effect of emotions requires that the information in the messages be held
constant. Citizens should not learn anything new about Transform Zimbabwe or the state of the
nation from these messages. To hold information constant, Transform Zimbabwe agreed to create
two versions of the same ad that vary only in the images, music, and small variations in wording. In
CHAPTER 4. MOBILIZATION UNDER THREAT: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF OPPOSITION
PARTY STRATEGIES IN A REPRESSIVE REGIME 155
both messages, the images depict generic, common scenes that all Zimbabweans recognize: country
roads, clinics, and rural homesteads. The variation in the text does not provide different information
about the party’s position or the state of the nation across treatment and control groups.
Third, studying political participation in an electoral autocracy comes with significant ethical
and logistical challenges. This project would not have been possible without a partnership between a
researcher and an innovative opposition party in Zimbabwe called Transform Zimbabwe that was
interested in bringing data to bear on the question of how to best mobilize its supporters. Transform
Zimbabwe regularly sends out communications to its supporters and did not fundamentally change
its operations during the course of this experiment; rather, they simply introduced random variation
in the specific message that went out to specific supporters at a given time. Importantly, Transform
Zimbabwe was fully responsible for this intervention: TZ crafted and produced the messages and
created and managed the chat groups. The researcher’s role was limited to providing information
on the research design and analyzing the anonymized data. Its supporters voluntarily joined the
WhatsApp groups with knowledge that they would be receiving political messages from Transform
Zimbabwe. To formalize this agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the
president of Transform Zimbabwe and the provost of Columbia University that detailed each party’s
role and responsibilities.
Fourth, I wanted to choose an outcome measure that was at once behavioral, meaningful, and
within the level of risk that TZ’s supporters had accepted to take. Although Transform Zimbabwe
also mobilizes its supporters to engage in actions such as attending rallies and voting, I decided to
focus on political speech. Opposition supporters believe that political speech, including on social
media, is taken seriously by the regime. Around the time of the experiment, a meme making fun of
the 90-year-old president’s recent stumble on a red carpet was being circulated, along with rumors
that the police and secret service were randomly entering buses and taking Zimbabweans’ cell phones
or beating people up if they had any of these images saved. In a survey that I conducted of 474
opposition supporters in low-income neighborhoods of Harare and the rural province of Mashonaland
East, fewer subjects responded that it was “somewhat,” “very” or “definitely” likely that they circulate
a funny joke about the president than almost any other anti-regime action that we asked them about,
including attending an opposition party rally, refusing to go to a government political rally, revealing
to a perpetrator of violence that you support the opposition, or testifying in court against a perpetrator
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of violence. For example, in my sample of 474 opposition supporters, 60% would be somewhat, very
or definitely likely to circulate a joke about the president, while 77% would be somewhat, very or
definitely likely to attend an opposition meeting in a non-election period (Young, 2016). In short,
there is reason to believe that opposition supporters take political speech seriously and believe that it
carries risk.
4.3.1 The Zimbabwean context
Since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been an electoral autocracy (Kriger, 2005). It
holds regular elections but these have not resulted in any peaceful transitions of power between
parties, in part because of the ruling party’s use of violent force. ZANU-PF grew out the independence
struggle and enjoyed widespread popular support into the 1990s that diminished in part due to the
economic effects of a severe structural adjustment program (LeBas, 2011).
However, even during the 1980s ZANU-PF used violence to solve disputes over political power,
particularly to brutally eliminate the threat of a rival armed faction during the post-independence
period. In the early 1960s, ZANU formed by splitting from the original pro-independence party
ZAPU, and their armed wings ZANLA and ZIPRA both fought for independence under separate
commands and with separate bases of support that fell along and exacerbated ethnic divisions.
After ZANU’s Mugabe took control of the repressive Rhodesian state apparatus in 1980 when he
assumed office as prime minister, he faced a number of attacks by “dissidents,” most likely with the
backing of the white South African government, thought to be associated with ZAPU. In response,
the government turned the repressive force of its inherited state and newly-formed national army
against former ZIPRA fighters and eventually civilians thought to be supportive of the dissidents.
By the estimates of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace, which performed the most
comprehensive research on the violence, up 20,000 people were killed (Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ), 2007; Bratton, 2011). By many accounts, this period has
left a lasting mark on politics in the region, which has staunchly voted against the ruling party and
remains highly sensitive to the threat of violence despite relatively low levels during the recent years
(Alexander et al., 2000; Bratton, 2011).
Zimbabwe’s ruling party again began seriously employing the threat of repression to deter support
for opposition parties in the year 2000. Beginning around 1999, an opposition party that grew out of
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the country’s major trade union began to credibly challenge ZANU-PF. The opposition party MDC
had just orchestrated the unexpected defeat of ZANU-PF’s proposed constitution in a referendum.
Shortly thereafter, opposition supporters and organizers began to be killed, and the government
stopped protecting white commercial farmers and their farm workers from threats by land invaders,
often led by self-claimed veterans of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle (LeBas, 2006). Zimbabwe’s
white minority had been an important source of funding and mobilization during the referendum.
From 2000 to 2008, repressive violence by the ruling party, targeted on opposition supporters
and organizers, took a number of forms. In 2001 the government initiated a national youth training
program which created a nationwide militia for the party. These militia set up bases around the
country and began using more sophisticated forms of torture (Reeler, 2003; LeBas, 2011; Sachikonye,
2011). Party agents, youth wing members, members of the association of war veterans from Zim-
babwe’s independence struggle, soldiers, and traditional leaders have all played a role in organizing
intimidation campaigns around recent elections (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008). By some accounts,
by 2008 the youth militia had as many as 50,000 members (Sachikonye, 2011, 48).
Violent repression reached a peak during the 2008 elections, which took place in a context
of hyperinflation, deindustrialization and the collapse of public services that led to widespread
dissatisfaction with the ruling party. The lead-up to the first-round election in March 2008 was largely
peaceful, as the results were counted it and it became clear that ZANU-PF had lost its parliamentary
majority and was at risk of losing the presidency, “the party-state launched a terror campaign of a
scope and intensity never before seen in Zimbabwe” (Bratton and Masunungure, 2008, 51). This
campaign was centrally controlled by the Joint Operations Command under the leadership of the
Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa (HRW, 2008; Sachikonye, 2011).
A passage from a report by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe describes
how the 2008 violence was orchestrated:
“Perpetrators moved in groups of up to 30 and established ‘distinguishable bases’
supplied from confiscated foodstuffs and other necessities. The overwhelming numbers
of perpetrators made it difficult for individual victims to defend themselves. The tools
used varied from logs, sjamboks, machetes, steel rods, knobkerries to knives and chains.
However, there were cases where tools and equipment associated with security agencies
like the police (batons and guns) were used in the perpetration of the violence, suggesting
the direct involvement of state security agents or deliberate issuance of such tools to
party militia...”
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(CCJPZ, 2009, 43)
As a result of this violence, the opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai pulled out of the run-off
election scheduled for July. Negotiations brokered by the international community between the
government and the opposition MDC led to the formation of a coalition government with the long-
serving president and ruling party leader Robert Mugabe remaining as president and Tsvangirai
serving as Prime Minister. Entry into government in February 2009 was the beginning of the MDC’s
loss of popular support, as shown by a number of polls conducted by the Afrobarometer and Freedom
House (Bratton and Masunungure, 2012; Booysen, 2012). The MDC, focused on skirmishes over
parliamentary procedures and largely dismissive of internal and external research showing that they
had lost support, ran an anemic campaign in 2013 (Zamchiya, 2013). By contrast, the ZANU-PF 2013
campaign was “slick, well-funded, united and peaceful” (Tendi, 2013). Bratton (2014) writes that
ZANU-PF “out-foxed, out-organized and out-muscled” the opposition (p1), but ultimately concludes
that, although the election did not reflect the will of the voters, the ruling party’s win should be
attributed to changes in public opinion rather than manipulation (Bratton et al., 2016). ZANU-PF
crushed the MDC in the 2013 elections, with President Mugabe winning 61% of the vote against
Tsvangirai’s 34% and sweeping 160 out of the 210 seats in the legislature.
Post-2013, both ZANU-PF and the MDC fell into internecine conflicts. In 2014 President Mugabe
rapidly fired the popular vice president Joice Mujuru and purged her supporters from national and
regional posts, and promoted his wife Grace Mugabe to a powerful position as head of the ZANU-PF
women’s league (Freedom House, 2015). At the same time, the MDC’s defeat “catalysed and
consolidated sentiment against Tsvangirai who had now lost three presidential elections” (ICG, 2014,
10). A faction led by core members of the MDC leadership split off, creating a third MDC in addition
to an earlier regional faction that had split in 2005 (ICG, 2014). From this leadership gap, a number
of smaller parties sprang up around Zimbabwe, including my partner Transform Zimbabwe, which
ran candidates in 18 bye-elections in 2015 that the MDC boycotted. It is in this context of a long
history of repressive violence and growing dissatisfaction with both the ruling party and the major
opposition party that this study took place.
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4.3.2 Description of the treatments
This experiment was carried out using a factorial design implemented over two rounds. Specifically,
the design crossed an emotional appeal with a pre-appeal message emphasizing either that the party’s
supporters have sufficient power to transform Zimbabwe or that they had been repressed in the past.
The emotional content of the ads was re-emphasized in follow-up messages in text both before and
after the image or video went out.
During both rounds of the experiment, treatment was administered during a three-hour window
during which the party sent out a series of messages to its WhatsApp groups. First, they sent out
a message at approximately 3pm with the secondary treatment emphasizing power or the lack of
power. For groups assigned to the treatment condition for this secondary treatment, they received a
greeting message that notified them that they would get a special communication material that ended
with the sentence: “We have the power to transform Zimbabwe!” For groups assigned to the control
for this secondary treatment, the introductory message ended in “Our transformation has been held
back for too long!”
At approximately 4pm, the video or image went out, along with a text message reiterating the
message for supporters who did not have access to sufficient data to download the media. The
messages were as follows:
• Anger
– Round 1 - “Our leaders have given us roads that are unpaved and full of potholes. Service
Delivery and Infrastructure Development will be President Ngarivhume’s top priority in
his first term in 2018. Join Transform Zimbabwe now!”
– Round 2 - “Today, Zimbabweans die of treatable diseases because our health system is
broken. Service Delivery and Infrastructure Development will be President Ngarivhume’s
top priority in his first term in 2018. Join Transform Zimbabwe now!”
• Enthusiasm
– Round 1 - “We deserve roads that are paved and well-maintained so our economy can
thrive. Service Delivery and Infrastructure Development will be President Ngarivhume’s
top priority in his first term in 2018. Join Transform Zimbabwe now!’
CHAPTER 4. MOBILIZATION UNDER THREAT: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF OPPOSITION
PARTY STRATEGIES IN A REPRESSIVE REGIME 160
– Round 2 - “In a transformed Zimbabwe, everyone will have access to quality healthcare
from clinics and hospitals. Service Delivery and Infrastructure Development will be
President Ngarivhume’s top priority in his first term in 2018. Join Transform Zimbabwe
now!”
During the first round, the main treatment consisted of a jpeg image or video that presented
an issue, namely infrastructure development or health, in either a positive or negative light before
explaining that it is a major part of the party’s platform. Figure 4.9 in the Appendix displays the
content of the images used in the first round.
During the second round, the treatment was a dramatic video that depicted a story of a grand-
mother and her sick granddaughter. In the anger version of the video, the grandmother brings her
granddaughter to a rural clinic with no medicine, and then the truck she is traveling in breaks down
in a pothole on the way to a district hospital. At the hospital the grandmother waits for a long time
and then loses her spot in line to a man who bribes the nurse. In the enthusiasm version of the video,
the granddaughter gets treated well by a nurse at the rural clinic and then travels by car to the district
hospital. She is treated there by a professional nurse and in the last scene comes home healthy from
school the next day. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 in the Appendix shows screenshots of the anger and
enthusiasm videos that were used in round two.
These treatments were followed up in approximately one hour with a message asking the group
members “Are you angry / hopeful yet? Join Transform Zimbabwe today!”
4.3.3 Logistics and randomization
This experiment was carried out by Transform Zimbabwe with two types of messages in two waves.
The messages in each wave focused on the same issue (infrastructure and especially road maintenance
in the first wave, and health in the second wave) but one of the messages was designed to make
viewers angry while the other was designed to make them purely enthusiastic. Both had very little
informational content and included the same information about the party and its platform. Thus,
comparing the effects of these messages allows us to measure the relative effectiveness of anger and
enthusiasm messages on mobilizing TZ’s supporters.
Randomization was carried out in R. WhatsApp groups were block randomized based on the
province and size (above or below the province’s median group size) as these variables were expected
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to influence how supporters would react to the messages. For both rounds, randomization was carried
out within a few hours of when the first messages were sent out.
The messages were sent out to 929 TZ supporters who had joined a total of 85 groups in two
rounds: 703 supporters in 64 groups in the first round on March 20, 2015, and 929 supporters in 85
groups in the second round on April 3, 2015. Figure 4.1 shows in red that TZ has constituency-level
WhatsApp groups that were part of the experiment in every province in Zimbabwe.
Figure 4.1: Constituencies where TZ has WhatsApp groups
(a) All Zimbabwe (b) Harare
In both cases, the messages were sent out on a Friday afternoon between approximately 3pm
and 7pm. The activity in the groups was monitored for 24 hours before and after the messages were
sent out. It was made anonymous and shared with the Columbia researcher for analysis. I chose 24
hours as the window to measure outcomes by balancing concerns that network coverage gaps could
delay some groups from getting the messages for up to half a day, and wanting to hone in on the
immediate, heat-of-the-moment response that individuals had to the appeals.
Messages were distributed in English with some introductory greetings in the local languages
of Shona or Ndebele depending on the language of the group members, according to the standard
practice of the party.
There was some noncompliance due to administrative difficulties within the communications
team at Transform Zimbabwe. Ten of the 150 groups in the experiment (5 assigned to treatment
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and 5 assigned to control) did not receive the full treatment. However, all of these groups received
some part of the treatment (usually the last message asking them if they are angry or hopeful yet).
Two groups assigned to the treatment received the control version of the messages, and one group
received both the treatment and control versions of the messages. Noncompliance is clustered within
regions because the treatments were largely administered by region (i.e., the same communications
team member sent all the messages for a given region). 8-9% of the groups in Harare, Matabeleland,
and Midlands and 26% in Masvingo did not receive the correct message or also received the wrong
message. To account for this noncompliance, I estimate the Intent To Treat (ITT) effect, using the
treatment that was randomly assigned to each group as the independent variable.
4.3.4 Empirical strategy and estimation
4.3.4.1 Main effects
To test the main hypothesis that the angry messages would generate more participation than the purely
enthusiastic messages, I estimate the ITT. I use both a parametric and non-parametric approach based
on randomization inference. The primary test of this hypothesis is based on a mean effects index
using all four outcome indicators, although I also show results here testing for the subcomponents
that measure quality and those that measure quantity separately. I use two different methods to test
for the statistical significance of the difference between the two groups: first, a parametric test based
on the assumption that the outcomes follow a t-distribution, and second, a non-parametric test based
on randomization inference. For the analysis based on the t-distribution, I use inverse propensity
score weighting to account for the fact that not every unit had an equal probability of being assigned
to treatment.3 Because this hypothesis specified a direction of the effect, I use a one-sided test of
significance.
We measured how TZ’s supporters responded to the messages with four different metrics that I
combined into an index of pro-opposition participation:
• Number of messages sent by supporters
3Propensity score weighting places more (less) weight on units that are under- (over-)represented (i.e., make up less
(more) than 50% of the units in their block) by assigning weights of 1pi to units that are treated and
1
1−pi to units that are
not treated, where pi is the probability that unit i is treated.
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• Number of supporters who responded
• Number of times supporters sent the party slogan (“Viva!”)
• Number of times supporters sent the party symbol (a V-for-victory sign)
The first two indicators – number of messages and number of respondents – reflect the quantity
of the response to the messages. The last two – number of times supporters responded with the
party slogan and the number of times they sent the party symbol – reflect the level of enthusiasm of
respondents.
Figure 4.2 shows an anonymized transcript of one of the groups assigned to the anger condition.
You can see in this transcript that the participants speak in a mix of English and local languages
(including, unusually, the minority language Tonga), abbreviations and slang, and how they use the
slogan “viva” and the “v for victory” party symbol to express enthusiasm.
Figure 4.2: Example transcript
admin01: Maswera sei mhuri yeZimbabwe! We will be sending you a special video 
message this afternoon. Our transformation has been held for too long
sub01: Hie guyz
sub02: Bhoo hwzt
sub01: Gud howiz admin01?
sub03: Eagerly waiting for the video my dear sister.
sub01: Viva viva
sub01: Stil waiting  for the videos  my sistr
sub04: Viva TZ Viva
sub01: Viva
sub05: Waiting for the video
admin01: Today, Zimbabweans die of treatable diseases because our health system is 
broken. Service delivery and Infrastructure Development will be President Ngarivhume's 
top priority in his first term in 2018. Join Transform Zimbabwe now!
sub05: In Tonga we say  TULIBASAKWA BALOMBI ba TZ




sub01: Transform  zimba today !!!!
sub04: M ready to transform my country viva Tz viva
sub04: Viva TZimbabwe viva 
sub01: Viva tz  viva
sub05: I m aiso ready to transform zim TZ VIVA bazovuma come 2018
sub01: Viva tz
sub01: Viva tz come 2018
sub04: 🏃 🏃  yhoooo come 2018 i cnt wait
sub01: Are u ready to  transform zimbabwe ?
sub04: 💯
sub04: ✌✌
sub01: Jus say viva tz  viva
sub01: ✌✌
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The text was lightly pre-processed before these counts were taken. Text shared by a multi-lingual
groups of subjects in social media chat groups has characteristics that make pre-processing difficult.
For instance, participants in chat groups often use variation in spelling to signal levels of enthusiasm:
writing “vivaaaaa” in this context communicates more excitement than “viva.” Typical text processing
steps like stemming words is not possible when some words are written without punctuation and
some words are written without spaces: for example, in the transcript, “hwzt” replaces “how is it?”
Emoticons were processed by R as unicode. For all of these reasons, I limited the preprocessing
of the text to simply making everything lower case and choosing metrics that depend little on the
language being used. “Viva” is the party slogan in every language and is interspersed in written
and spoken text in Shona, Ndebele, and Tonga. The number of messages and respondents is also
independent of language or the balance of slang and formal text.4
I also planned to track whether the party received donations from each constituency via a mobile
money transfer. However, because the number of donations did not meet a pre-specified minimum
level to provide sufficient variation in the outcome, I do not analyze that outcome here.5
To test for differences in the general level of participation across the two treatments, I create
a mean effects index based on all four of the outcomes of interest. The total mean effects index
combines the measures of volume of response (number of messages and number of respondents) and
the enthusiasm of the response (the number of times the party slogan and symbol are sent out). I also
create quality and quantity sub-indices that only include the sub-indicators measuring the enthusiasm
and volume of the response, respectively. The indices are calculated by (1) if necessary, orienting
each outcome so that higher values always indicate “better” outcomes; (2) standardizing outcomes
4Although I preregistered an outcome measuring the count of the number of words sent out by respondents, I dropped
this measure for two reasons after seeing the data. First, the number of words used to communicate the same idea
varies significantly across languages. In Shona, a clause such as “I am going to go” would likely be written as a single
word. Second, the number of words varies based on the amount of slang that participants are using. Third, there are
numerous examples of words that are run together because of typos: for example, “Viva[symbol]viva” in the transcript
would be counted as one word due to lack of spacing although this communicates significant enthusiasm. Therefore, it is
plausible that as participants grow excited, they might actually use fewer words if they start using more vernacular, slang
abbreviations, or typos.
5This decision rule of only analyzing the donation data if more than 30 people donated during the 24 hours after the
appeals was pre-registered.
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to create comparable units;6 (3) if necessary, imputing missing values at the treatment assignment
group mean; and (4) compiling a summary index that gives equal weight to each individual outcome
component (Kling et al., 2007).
4.3.4.2 Heterogeneous effects
The remaining three hypotheses make predictions about where the anger treatment will have the
largest effect relative to the pure enthusiasm control. I test for these heterogeneous effects using the
following specification:
Yt=1 = τ1Zanger×Xpoverty + τ2Zanger×Xviolence + τ3Zanger×Zpower + γYt=0 +θXcontrols + ε
where Zanger is a dummy variable indicating assignment to the anger appeal, and Zpower is a
dummy indicating assignment to the initial message emphasizing personal power. The coefficients
on the interaction term Zanger×Xpoverty represents the differential impact of the anger treatment in
areas with varying levels of poverty and the coefficient on Zanger×Xviolence represents the differential
impact of the anger treatment in areas that experienced violence in the 2008 elections. Yt=1 is the
post-treatment measure of the relevant outcome (the mean effects index or sub-indices), while Yt=0
is a measure of the pre-treatment outcome of interest. Xcontrols includes the direct effects of all of
the components of the interaction terms (the two treatments, poverty, and past violence), as well as
the number of members in each group. In some specifications, I also include province fixed effects
and interactions between other baseline characteristics and the anger treatment as additional controls.
I continue to use inverse-propensity weights to take into account variation in the propensity for
treatment across blocks.
To measure past exposure to violence, I use the Sokwanele data from the 2008 electoral crisis,
the last major episode of electoral violence that the country has experienced and for which I have
data at the constituency level. Sokwanele’s data is collected from reports of citizens and service
providers for victims of political violence. Because reporting bias is a major concern with this type
6I standardize each unit based on the mean and standard deviation in the control group that received the enthusiasm
messages.
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of violence data, I use a binary version of the I use a logged and normalized measure of the total
number of violent events around the 2008 election.
To measure poverty, I use a measure based on the anthropogenic data of children under five
from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), averaged for all the enumeration areas within the
constituency boundaries that were used to define the WhatsApp groups. I use the data from the most
recent round of the DHS.7 My measure of poverty is a mean effects index based on the normalized
inverse of the weight-for-height z-scores of children under five as measured during the last DHS.
Figures 4.3 show maps of the distribution of exposure to violence and wasting.
The binary version of the violence variable is also distributed across Zimbabwe’s regions.
Table 4.1: Distribution of violence by region
Region Violence Reported?
No Yes Percent Yes
Matabeleland 17 5 23%
Masvingo 6 13 68%
Mashonalands 3 13 81%
Harare 7 38 84%
Manicaland 5 19 79%
Midlands 13 11 46%
4.3.5 Data
Before testing whether there were differences between the two types of messages, I present visual-
izations of the raw data during the 24 hours before and after the treatments were sent out. Figure
4.4 plots the number of messages, respondents, and times respondents sent out the party slogan and
symbol in the groups by hour for the groups assigned to the anger and enthusiasm appeals:
These figures show that at the moment of both treatments, there are large and immediate increases
in the activity in the groups. The total volume of activity is reasonably high. In terms of the number
of messages, the 78 groups assigned to the anger appeal sent out 745 non-admin messages in the
7Most of the constituencies (136 out of 150) can be matched with 2012 data, but for 14 constituencies 2005 DHS data
is the most recent available.
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Figure 4.3: Maps of Poverty and Violence by Constituency
(a) Violence in 2008 (Sokwanele) (b) Stunting in 2011 (DHS)
(c) Violence - Harare (d) Stunting - Harare
(e) Violence - Bulawayo (f) Stunting - Bulawayo
48 hours around treatment. The 72 enthusiasm appeal groups sent out 427 messages. In terms of
respondents, 231 individual party supporters participated in the anger appeal discussions, while 150
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Figure 4.4: Participation by hour around treatment
(a) Messages






























































participated in the enthusiasm appeal discussions. Most of the discussion occurred right after the
appeal was sent out. There is a lull between 8 and 16 hours after treatment – this is the period between
approximately 10pm and 6am on a Friday night. The anger groups sent out 132 party slogans and
133 party symbols, while the enthusiasm groups sent 78 and 58, respectively.
It is also important to note that, just by random chance, the groups assigned to the anger appeal
are generally more active before the moment of treatment. There is no way that this is due to
anticipation of treatment because treatment was assigned within a few hours of being sent out by
someone who had never seen the activity in the groups. The higher level of activity in the anger
appeal groups is random. Difference-in-means tests on the volume of pre-treatment activity fail to
reject the null hypothesis that there are pre-treatment differences between the groups assigned to the
anger and enthusiasm appeals in terms of number of messages (p = 0.31), number of respondents
(p = 0.43), number of party slogans (p = 0.21), or number of party symbols (p = 0.76).
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4.4 Results
I carry out the analysis in three parts. First, I present the results of tests of the hypothesis that
the anger treatment induced more participation than the enthusiasm messages. Second, I use the
regression analysis to explore whether the effect is consistent over time and across the individual
outcome measures. Third, I test for heterogeneous effects of the treatment effects by poverty level and
past exposure to violence. In this paper, I present the pre-specified analysis with some supplementary
figures and robustness checks. Section 4.D in the appendix also indicates how I operationalized each
pre-registered analysis, and where I deviated from this pre-analysis plan.
4.4.1 Main effects
First I present estimates of the Intent to Treat (ITT) effect and the results of hypothesis tests that the
anger messages caused more participation than the enthusiasm messages. Table 4.2 shows the mean
levels for the full mean effects index, mean effects indices of the quantity and quality (enthusiasm)
of the response, and the individual components that I measured for the groups that received the anger
and enthusiasm messages.
Table 4.2 presents the mean values of the outcome indices for the groups assigned to receive
the anger and enthusiasm messages, along with the p-values associated with tests of the hypothesis
that the anger groups’ outcomes are larger than the enthusiasm groups’ outcomes. The third column
presented the unadjusted p-value from a one-sided hypothesis test based on the assumption that the
null distribution is the t-distribution with 149 degrees of freedom. The fourth presents the unadjusted
p-value calculated using randomization inference based on 10,000 permutations, which uses the
existing variation in the data to test the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit. The fifth
and sixth columns present the p-values based on the t-distribution with two different corrections for
multiple comparisons for the sub-indices. I do not show a multiple comparisons correction for the
total effects index because there is only one test of the total effect of the anger messages. The fifth
column presents the p-value after adjusting to take the false discovery rate into account using the
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) formula. The sixth column presents the p-value after adjusting to
take the family-wise error rate into account using the Holm (1979) correction.
Table 4.2 shows that using simple comparisons of means, the anger treatment generates signifi-
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Table 4.2: Difference-in-means tests
ITT p-value adjusted p-value
t-test RI FDR FWER
Mean Index - Total 0.378 0.029 0.030 - -
Mean Index - Quantity 0.268 0.083 0.085 0.083 0.083
Mean Index - Quality 0.489 0.032 0.028 0.065 0.065
The unit of analysis is the WhatsApp group, and all calculations are based on the full
sample with N = 150. The outcome in Row 1 is a total mean effects index based
on the number of post-treatment respondents, messages, symbols and slogans, while
the outcomes in Row 2 and 3 are mean effects indices based on only the number
of respondents and messages, or symbols and slogans, respectively. The ITTs are
estimated using OLS with weights based on the inverse propensity of being assigned
to the unit’s realized treatment status. The p-values in Column 2 are estimated with
a one-sided t-distribution with 149 degrees of freedom. The p-values in Column 3
are estimated using randomization inference with 10,000 simulations. The adjusted
p-values in Columns 4 and 5 are estimated based on the t-test and corrected using the
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Holm (1979) formulas, respectively.
cantly more pro-opposition action than the enthusiasm control. This overall result is significant at the
5% level based on the analyses both using the t-distribution and randomization inference. Based on
this test, we can conclude that the anger messages were significantly more effective in generating
participation than the purely enthusiastic messages.
The hypothesis test using the quality sub-index is significant at the 5% level without correcting for
multiple comparisons, and at the 10% level using the Benjamini and Hochberg or Holm corrections.
The test using the quantity sub-index is significant at the 10% level before and after correcting for
multiple comparisons. Results on the individual measures are shown in the appendices in Table 4.6.
This effect is driven by substantively large and consistently positive increases in all four of the
sub-indicators. Table 4.3 shows that the treatment outcomes are between 32 and 174% larger than
the control outcomes across all four measures. The percent increase in Column 3 represents the ITT
estimated with inverse propensity weights divided by the mean of the control group that received
purely enthusiastic messages.
In addition, the effect of the anger treatment is stable over time, meaning that my estimation
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Table 4.3: Treatment outcomes as percent increases over control outcomes
Enthusiasm Mean Anger Mean Percent Increase
Messages 4.78 7.51 40%
Respondents 1.93 2.74 32%
Slogans 0.93 1.37 36%
Symbols 0.57 1.37 174%
of the ITT is not sensitive to the specific 24-hour window in which I chose to measure outcomes.
To examine the ITT over time, I create increasingly large windows of time around the treatment in
three-hour increments and estimate the ITT with each outcome. In Figure 4.5, the ITTs are calculated
with inverse propensity weights but without any control variables, but the results are similar in
magnitude and significance with controls.
Figure 4.5: ITTs over time - Mean Index
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Figure 4.5 shows that the estimate of the differential impact of the anger appeal on the mean
effects index is consistently positive and significant in six out of eight windows. The effect is
more precisely estimated in the earlier windows, and slightly larger in the later windows. It loses
magnitude during the period between approximately nine pm and three am on the day after the
treatment was released when there is little overall activity in the groups. This is evidence that the
estimated treatment effect of the anger appeal is robust to different definitions of the post-treatment
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time period.
Finally, I assess whether anger has a larger effect on the participation of people who are already
active in the groups, or those with relatively low pre-treatment participation. This question is
substantively interesting because it addresses whether anger increases participation of those who are
already committed, or those who are on the fence about participating or not. To do this analysis, I
split the participants in each WhatsApp groups into two types: those who participate at least once in
the 24 hours before the treatment is sent out, and those who do not. Overall, there are 339 unique
individuals (excluding the group administrators at the party headquarters) who participate in the
discussions at some point during the 48-hour period before and after the messages are shared. 105 of
those people participate during the pre-treatment period, and 73 of those 105 (70%) also participate in
the post-treatment period. An additional 234 individuals who did not participate in the pre-treatment
period participate at least once after the messages are sent out.
Figure 4.6 plots post-treatment participation broken down by treatment status and the pre-
treatment characteristic of whether an individual participated during the pre-treatment period.8
Figures 4.6a, 4.6b, 4.6c, and 4.6d plot the results for the number of messages, number of respondents,
number of slogans, and number of party symbols, respectively.
Figure 4.6 shows that across almost all the indicators, the treatment effects are being driven
by differences in the outcomes of the new participants rather than those who were already active
during the pre-treatment period. Each point on the graph represents the mean value for one of four
subgroups broken down by treatment status (groups assigned to anger are shown in red, and those
assigned to enthusiasm in grey) and by whether the individuals participated during the pre-treatment
period (on the left) or not (on the right). 95% confidence intervals are shown around each mean.
Thus, from left to right on each graph, the points show the average on each outcome for already
active participants assigned to enthusiastic messages, already active participants assigned to angry
messages, new participants assigned to enthusiastic messages, and new participants assigned to angry
messages.
For each outcome, there is a much larger difference between the anger and enthusiasm treatments
for people who are new participants than those who participated in the 24 hours before the messages
8The data is still aggregated up to the group level, so each unit represents the average number for one WhatsApp group
of already-active or new participants during the post-treatment period.
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are sent. This suggests that the observed treatment effects are driven by the larger response of new
participants to the anger messages. However, these differences are mostly driven by differences in
the size of the two groups, as there are more than 1500 group members across the two periods who
do not participate during the 24 hours immediately before the messages are shared, and just 105 who
do. Therefore, although the observed increases are driven by the increases in the new participants,
the treatment effect per participant is actually larger on three out of four outcomes for the members
who are already active.
Table 4.4 shows each outcome scaled by the number of members in each group (active and
inactive in the pre-treatment period by treatment status).
Table 4.4 shows that the treatment has a larger effect on the quantity of the responses by the
CHAPTER 4. MOBILIZATION UNDER THREAT: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF OPPOSITION
PARTY STRATEGIES IN A REPRESSIVE REGIME 174
Table 4.4: Outcomes by group scaled by group size
Already Active New Participants
Enthusiasm Anger % Difference Enthusiasm Anger % Difference
Respondents 0.32 0.47 48% 0.22 0.26 18%
Messages 0.92 1.56 70% 0.48 0.65 37%
Slogans 0.13 0.17 26% 0.10 0.14 10%
Symbols 0.06 0.03 -56% 0.04 0.25 484%
already-active participants on three out of four outcomes. On the number of respondents, for example,
the anger treatment causes a response from new participants that is 18% greater (26% of members
who are inactive in the pre-treatment period participate in the anger condition, and 22% in the
enthusiasm condition), compared to a response that is 48% larger in the already-active participants
(47% participate post-treatment in the anger condition versus 32% in the enthusiasm condition).
4.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects
So far I have shown that anger appeals from an opposition party lead to a larger response from the
party’s supporters, which is consistent with a theory that anger mobilizes political action. Next I
test three hypotheses about where the effects of the anger appeals should be largest. First, theory
from psychology suggests that people with higher self-efficacy should be more receptive to anger
in negative situations. Because socioeconomic status is thought to be positively correlated with
self-efficacy, the effect of the anger appeal might be even larger in high-income areas if higher-income
people are more likely to respond to negative situations with anger rather than fear. Second, areas
affected by more violence may be more susceptible to the anger appeal through its potential effect on
perceptions of risks. Third, the anger appeal should work best in conjunction with messages that
emphasize personal power.
Because all continuous measures (poverty, members, and pre-treatment outcomes) are normalized,
the coefficients on Anger represent the marginal effect of the anger treatment at the mean levels of
all other variables in constituencies with no violence that were assigned to the control on the power
message treatment.
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Table 4.5: Heterogeneous effects of the anger treatment
Dependent variable:
Mean Index - Quantity Mean Index - Quality Mean Index - Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anger × Power −0.11 0.002 −0.03 −0.39 −0.39 −0.34 −0.25 −0.19 −0.19
(0.42) (0.39) (0.37) (0.53) (0.56) (0.52) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40)
Anger × Poverty 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Anger × Violence 0.52 0.38 0.80∗ 0.76∗ 0.74∗ 1.67∗∗ 0.64 0.57 1.15∗∗
(0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.71) (0.40) (0.39) (0.51)
Anger ×Members (Log) −0.07 −0.23 −0.11
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25)
Anger × Pre-Treat Outcome −0.40∗ −0.31 −0.36
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23)
Anger × ZANU Percent (2008) 0.07 0.26
(0.22) (0.27)
Anger × Region - Manicaland −0.53 −0.60 −0.70∗
(0.60) (0.43) (0.42)
Anger × Region - Mashonaland −0.50 −0.55 −0.87
(0.56) (0.58) (0.60)
Anger × Region - Masvingo 0.27 1.04 0.35
(0.79) (1.02) (0.97)
Anger × Region - Matabeleland 1.00 1.84∗ 1.37∗
(0.75) (1.05) (0.81)
Anger × Region - Midlands −0.12 1.26 0.24
(0.55) (1.21) (0.78)
Direct Effects X X X X X X X X X
Observations 150 148 148 150 148 148 150 148 148
R2 0.05 0.19 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.13 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The unit of analysis is the WhatsApp group. The outcome in Columns 1-3 is a quantity mean effects index based
on the post-treatment number of respondents and number of messages. The outcome in Columns 4-6 is a quality
mean effects index based on the post-treatment number of party slogans and symbols by group. The outcome in
Columns 7-9 is a total mean effects index based on the number of post-treatment respondents, messages, symbols
and slogans. Anger is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the group was assigned to receive the anger version
of the treatment, while Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the group was assigned to receive a
message that emphasized personal power. Members (Log) is the logged and then standardized pre-treatment measure
of the number of members in each group. The region variables are dummies that take a value of 1 if the group falls
within five broad regions (Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo, Matabeleland, and Midlands) with Harare as the
omitted category. Although only the interaction terms are shown, all models also include the direct effects of all
variables that are included in the interactions. Models are estimated using OLS.
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Table 4.5 shows mixed support for the predictions about where the anger messages should
have the largest relative effect. First, there is no evidence that the anger messages generated more
participation when coupled with a message emphasizing personal power. Second, although the
coefficients are in the right direction, there is no evidence that the anger treatment had a larger effect
in areas with child health outcomes indicating lower poverty. However, there is some evidence that
the anger messages had the largest effect in constituencies that experienced violence during the 2008
election. In the approximately two-thirds of areas that reported violence during the 2008 election,
the anger messages elicited a response that was between 0.38 and 1.66 standard deviations larger
than the relative response in constituencies that had not experienced violence. This interaction term
is significant across specifications in the regressions using the quality index as the outcome, but is
statistically indistinguishable from zero in the analysis of the total effects index. Importantly, after
including interaction terms for each region, the coefficient on the interaction of the anger treatment
and 2008 election violence becomes much stronger and significant at the 5% level. This specification
(Columns 3, 6, and 9) shows that the anger treatments had a much larger effect in Matabeleland,
a minority region where the ruling party was responsible for mass atrocities in the 1980s but that
experiences little election violence since 2000 (for Justice et al., 1997; Alexander et al., 2000). In
addition, once the heterogeneous effect is estimated off of variation within regions, there is a much
stronger and statistically significant interaction between the anger treatment and election violence.
Figures 4.7 show the marginal effect of the anger appeal relative to the enthusiasm appeal at
different levels of poverty and past exposure to violence. Following Hainmueller et al. (2016), in
these figures I show that marginal effect estimated with continuous versions of the violence and
poverty measures, as well as binned estimates of the ITT for units in the bottom, middle, and top
third of the distributions of both variables.9 These marginal effects plots also include all controls
from Columns 3, 6, and 9 in Table 4.5.
Figure 4.7 shows that the effect of the treatment is monotonically increasing with the amount
of violence that a constituency has experienced. Although the treatment has no significant effect in
constituencies that did not report violence around the 2008 election, it is positive and significant at
the 95% level in constituencies that did when other variables are at their averages and in the largest
region (Harare). The ITT for constituencies at the highest level of violence is significantly larger
9The estimate of the ITT of violence at the low (left-most) level of violence is equivalent to a 0 on the binary measure.
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than the ITT in constituencies that have experienced no violence in 2008. On the other hand, the
effect of the treatment is not monotonically increasing, and there are no significant differences across
the three estimates.
These results provide partial confirmation for my hypotheses: they are in line with the prediction
that the anger appeal would be have a larger relative effect with people who live in areas with higher
repression. However, there appears to be no relationship between constituency-level poverty and
susceptibility to the anger appeals, and the anger treatment is not more effective in conjunction with
messages that emphasize personal power.
One important consideration in the interpretation of these treatment-by-covariate interaction
effects is that they may be driven by an omitted variable that is correlated with both the size of
the ITT and whether a constituency has experienced violence. One important possible confounder
is the level of support for the opposition, which is potentially correlated with repression and the
effectiveness of the anger appeals. However, I include a number of covariates and their interactions
with the treatment in the specifications to condition on this and other factors that might be correlated
with repression or poverty and the outcomes. In order to control for the general level of support for
the opposition, I include a control for the vote share of the ruling party in that constituency in the
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first round of the 2008 election and its interaction with the treatment. The size of the groups and
their pre-treatment activity are both good proxies for how group-level measures of the strength of
support for the opposition. Estimating the heterogeneous effects conditional on these controls based
on group characteristics, constituency characteristics, and region fixed effects reduces some concerns
about endogeneity, although these interactions should still not be interpreted as causal effects.
Another important caveat is that these heterogeneous effects should not be attributed to individual-
level variation in exposure to violence. The violence and poverty measures are calculated at the
constituency level, creating an ecological inference problem. WhatsApp groups in constituencies that
have reported past repression, for example, do not necessarily include people who have experienced
more repression than groups in no-repression areas, and groups in poorer constituencies are not
necessarily made up of poorer members. However, I believe this is less of a problem for heterogeneous
effects by past violence because citizens interpret past violent events in their area as a signal of their
own personal risk. Thus, I am not trying to infer individual victimization based on constituency-level
violence data, but rather am interested in the effect of being an opposition supporter in an area where
the ruling party has shown that it is willing to use violence.
4.5 Conclusion
Millions of voters throughout Africa mobilize to vote or protest against repressive ruling parties
despite the threat of personal sanctions, including violence. Why do these voters risk significant
personal losses to vote for opposition parties? How do opposition parties in Africa effectively
mobilize voters in repressive environments? I posit that emotions, particularly anger, play a role
in overcoming this collective action dilemma that voters face. Anger may make individuals more
likely to take action through a number of channels, including by influencing how individuals perceive
risks and their level of inhibition, which I test in other work using lab-in-the-field experiments with
opposition supporters in Zimbabwe.
This study tests whether and when appeals that invoke anger rather than enthusiasm are more
effective in mobilizing opposition supporters in a repressive environment. To test such a proposition,
a few methodological concerns are important. First, obtaining a causal estimate of the impact of
emotional appeals on action requires that we take into account citizens’ propensities to select into
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different types of emotional appeals. Second, it requires that the informational content of the appeals
be held constant in order to test for the impact of emotions alone. Third, it requires an empirical test
that is realistic and as close to the actual behavior and context that we aim to study as possible.
My empirical design aims to meet these methodological criteria by using a unique partnership
with a Zimbabwean opposition party to conduct an experiment testing angry and enthusiastic
communications with their supporters. To prevent supporters of different types from selecting into
anger or enthusiasm appeals, we randomly assigned groups of supporters to receive one of the
message types. To hold the information constant, the party designed two rounds of communication
on the topics of infrastructure and health that contained the same information about their platform and
revealed no specific information about the current state of Zimbabwe. The fact that this experiment
was carried out by a real political party with its supporters means that my outcomes track exactly
the real-life behavior that I aim to understand. Studying real-life behavior through such a field
experiment alleviates many common concerns about biased reporting or Hawthorne effects.
I find strong support for the prediction that anger appeals should have a stronger positive effect on
the political participation of opposition supporters in a repressive environment than purely enthusiastic
appeals. WhatsApp groups assigned to receive the anger appeals had an average participation level
of 0.38 standard deviations higher than those assigned to the enthusiasm appeals. This translates
into about 1.9 additional messages sent out, 0.62 additional participants, 0.34 additional repetitions
of the party slogan, and 0.99 additional party symbols being sent out in groups that received the
anger appeals. In other words, the anger appeal caused between 32 and 174% more activity than
the enthusiasm appeal across four different measures of activity. Considering that there are some
risks associated with pro-opposition speech in such a context, these are meaningful changes in
participation.
There is some evidence that the relative effectiveness of anger is highest in constituencies that
have experienced past repression. The anger appeals had larger effects relative to the enthusiasm
appeals in constituencies that experienced some violence during the 2008 election, and in the minority
region where the ruling party perpetrated atrocities in the 1980s. This may suggest that anger appeals
are most effective when the threat of violence is salient. However, because past ruling party violence
is endogenous, the increases in effectiveness in constituencies affected by violence may be driven by
some other factor that is related to both violence and the effectiveness of anger appeals. However,
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the fact that these estimates become stronger after including a number of covariates including the
ruling party’s vote share and province fixed effects, as well as their interactions with the treatment,
increases confidence in the validity of the finding.
I found no heterogeneous effects, however, on variation in the socioeconomic status of the group’s
constituency. This may be because my measure of socioeconomic status is very noisy: constructed
from the anthropogenic data of children under 5 during the 2005 and 2011 demographic and health
surveys, this data is not specific to the group and was collected several years before the experiment.
In addition, I did not find that the anger appeal worked best in conjunction with a message that
emphasized the personal power of the party’s supporters. This could be due to the weak nature of the
power treatment, which was a simple one-sentence statement.
These results suggest that emotions play a causal role in the mobilization of citizens in support
of democracy. This hypothesis has been the basis of many influential theories of participation in
contentious politics in developing countries but has to my knowledge not previously been testing
using field experimental methods. This finding is particularly important in Africa, where much
of the literature focuses on ethnicity and patronage as explanations for the mobilization of voters.
The mobilization strategies of political parties in Africa can have significant effects on the level
of mobilization of their supporters. Emotions may help explain the high levels of participation in
anti-regime actions despite the high potential costs and often low levels of resources of opposition
parties. Given that the information was held constant across the treatment and control conditions,
these effects cannot easily be explained by standard political economy models of behavior.
These results also have policy implications for political parties and organizations interested in
promoting democracy and electoral competition in repressive environments. Many opposition parties
focus on a positive message of multiparty democracy and future social benefits. However, this may
not be the most effective way to mobilize voters in a difficult political environment. Qualitatively,
anger seems to have played a significant role in the mobilization of many pro-democracy movements.
These findings support the case knowledge to suggest that anger can be deployed as a tool by
pro-democracy opposition movements trying to mobilize their supporters in risky environments.
CHAPTER 4. MOBILIZATION UNDER THREAT: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF OPPOSITION
PARTY STRATEGIES IN A REPRESSIVE REGIME 181
Appendix
4.A Analysis of Individual Measures
Table 4.6 shows the means for each individual outcome in the mean effects index and the results
of a series of hypothesis tests of whether the anger treatment created more and more enthusiastic
pro-opposition participation than the purely enthusiastic messages. The first and second columns
show the averages outcomes for groups assigned to the enthusiastic control messages (Column 1)
and the angry messages (Column 2). Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values from a one-
sided test of whether the anger messages created more participation than the enthusiastic messages
calculated based on the assumption of a t-distribution and randomization inference using 10,000
simulations. Columns 5 and 6 present the p-values calculated based on a t-distribution corrected for
multiple comparisons using the Benjamini and Hochberg correction (Column 5) to take into account
the false discovery rate and the Holm correction to account for the family-wise error rate.
The main test of whether the anger messages caused more participation than the enthusiasm
messages is the test using the total mean effects index presented in Table 4.2; these analyses are
conducted to assess the extent to which each individual sub-indicator might be driving that result.
Table 4.6 shows that on every sub-indicator, the groups that received the anger messages were more
active than those that received the purely enthusiastic messages.
Each individual ATE is also relatively stable over time.
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Table 4.6: Difference-in-means tests
ITT p-value adjusted p-value
t-test RI FDR FWER
Messages 1.932 0.118 0.127 0.158 0.237
Respondents 0.624 0.064 0.064 0.128 0.193
Slogans 0.338 0.229 0.240 0.229 0.237
Symbols 0.992 0.026 0.015 0.106 0.106
The unit of analysis is the WhatsApp group, and all calculations are based on the full
sample with N = 150. The outcome in Row 1 is a total mean effects index based
on the number of post-treatment respondents, messages, symbols and slogans, while
the outcomes in Row 2 and 3 are mean effects indices based on only the number
of respondents and messages, or symbols and slogans, respectively. The ITTs are
estimated using OLS with weights based on the inverse propensity of being assigned
to the unit’s realized treatment status. The p-values in Column 2 are estimated with
a one-sided t-distribution with 149 degrees of freedom. The p-values in Column 3
are estimated using randomization inference with 10,000 simulations. The adjusted
p-values in Columns 4 and 5 are estimated based on the t-test and corrected using the
Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Holm (1979) formulas, respectively.
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4.B Analysis with controls
Table 4.7 presents the main test of the hypothesis that the anger messages elicited a larger response
than the enthusiasm messages with controls for the round, pre-treatment level of activity, number of
members, whether the constituency experienced violence in 2008, and my proxy for socioeconomic
status based on the weight-for-height z-scores of children under five.
Table 4.7: Difference-in-means tests
ITT p-value adjusted p-value
t-test RI FDR FWER
Mean Index - Total 0.366 0.025 0.036
Mean Index - Quantity 0.257 0.060 0.092 0.060 0.070
Mean Index - Quality 0.474 0.035 0.035 0.060 0.070
The unit of analysis is the WhatsApp group, and all calculations are based on the full
sample for which I have controls with N = 148. The outcome in Row 1 is a total mean
effects index based on the number of post-treatment respondents, messages, symbols
and slogans, while the outcomes in Row 2 and 3 are mean effects indices based on
only the number of respondents and messages, or symbols and slogans, respectively.
The ITTs are estimated using OLS with weights based on the inverse propensity of
being assigned to the unit’s realized treatment status. The p-values in Column 2 are
estimated with a one-sided t-distribution with 141 degrees of freedom. The p-values in
Column 3 are estimated using randomization inference with 10,000 simulations. The
adjusted p-values in Columns 4 and 5 are estimated based on the t-test and corrected
using the Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Holm (1979) formulas, respectively.
The results are largely unchanged after including covariates: as in Table 4.2, the main test of
whether the anger messages caused a greater response using the total mean effects index is significant
at the 5% level. Texts using the quantity and quality sub-indices are also significant at the 5% or 10%
levels before and after correcting for multiple comparisons.
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4.C Treatments
Figure 4.9: Emotion Treatments for Round 1
(a) Anger
(b) Enthusiasm
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Figure 4.10: Anger Treatment for Round 2
Figure 4.11: Enthusiasm Treatment for Round 2
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4.C.1 Heterogeneous effects
In this section I show the full table of results from the analysis of heterogeneous effects presented in
Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Heterogeneous effects of the anger treatment
Dependent variable:
Mean Index - Quantity Mean Index - Quality Mean Index - Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Anger 0.01 0.01 −0.29 0.15 0.19 −0.97 0.08 0.09 −0.41
(0.42) (0.41) (0.52) (0.33) (0.34) (0.74) (0.33) (0.33) (0.58)
Power −0.13 −0.16 −0.10 0.11 0.08 0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.03
(0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.17)
Violence −0.59∗∗ −0.49∗∗ −0.46∗∗ −0.10 −0.08 −0.09 −0.35∗ −0.29 −0.24
(0.26) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.17)
Poverty −0.05 −0.07 −0.13∗ −0.02 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 −0.05 −0.09
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Members (Log) 0.35∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.20 0.25∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.09) (0.15) (0.10)
Pre-Treat Outcome 0.19 0.40∗∗ 0.11 0.33∗∗ 0.11 0.33∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12)
ZANU Percent (2008) 0.03 −0.13 0.04 −0.10 0.04 −0.22∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12)
Region - Manicaland 0.52 −0.17 0.24
(0.35) (0.27) (0.26)
Region - Mashonaland 0.35 −0.01 0.28
(0.37) (0.32) (0.29)
Region - Masvingo 0.66∗∗ 0.14 0.55∗∗
(0.33) (0.38) (0.25)
Region - Matabeleland −0.22 −0.35 −0.29
(0.28) (0.26) (0.22)
Region - Midlands 0.27 0.32 0.44
(0.31) (0.44) (0.30)
Anger × Power −0.11 0.002 −0.03 −0.39 −0.39 −0.34 −0.25 −0.19 −0.19
(0.42) (0.39) (0.37) (0.53) (0.56) (0.52) (0.42) (0.42) (0.40)
Anger × Poverty 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.20
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Anger × Violence 0.52 0.38 0.80∗ 0.76∗ 0.74∗ 1.67∗∗ 0.64 0.57 1.15∗∗
(0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.71) (0.40) (0.39) (0.51)
Anger ×Members (Log) −0.07 −0.23 −0.11
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25)
Anger × Pre-Treat Outcome
−0.40∗ −0.31 −0.36
(0.23) (0.25) (0.23)
Anger × ZANU Percent
(2008)
0.07 0.26
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(0.22) (0.27)




















Constant 0.48∗ 0.42∗ 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.24 0.22 0.02
(0.28) (0.23) (0.31) (0.18) (0.17) (0.28) (0.20) (0.17) (0.23)
Observations 150 148 148 150 148 148 150 148 148
R2 0.05 0.19 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.05 0.13 0.25
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The unit of analysis is the WhatsApp group. The outcome in Columns 1-3 is a quantity mean effects index based
on the post-treatment number of respondents and number of messages. The outcome in Columns 4-6 is a quality
mean effects index based on the post-treatment number of party slogans and symbols by group. The outcome in
Columns 7-9 is a total mean effects index based on the number of post-treatment respondents, messages, symbols
and slogans. Anger is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the group was assigned to receive the anger version
of the treatment, while Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the group was assigned to receive a
message that emphasized personal power. Members (Log) is the logged and then standardized pre-treatment measure
of the number of members in each group. The region variables are dummies that take a value of 1 if the group falls
within five broad regions (Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo, Matabeleland, and Midlands) with Harare as the
omitted category. Although only the interaction terms are shown, all models also include the direct effects of all
variables that are included in the interactions. Models are estimated using OLS.
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